Jungian and Dialogical Self Perspectives

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Jungian and Dialogical Self Perspectives
Also by Raya A. Jones

BODY, MIND AND HEALING AFTER JUNG: A Space of Questions

CULTURES AND IDENTITIES IN TRANSITION: Jungian Perspectives (co-editor with M. Stein)

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JUNG, PSYCHOLOGY, POSTMODERNITY

THE CHILD-SCHOOL INTERFACE: Environment and Behaviour
Jungian and Dialogical Self Perspectives

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Contributors

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John Rowan is a psychotherapist and an independent consultant. He has been writing about the multiplicity within the person for many years, with books such as *Subpersonalities* in 1990 and *The Plural Psyche*.
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Introduction

Raya A. Jones and Masayoshi Morioka

The time of our writing, 2010, is two years short of a century since the original publication of Carl Gustav Jung’s monograph, *The Psychology of the Unconscious*. In that monograph Jung (1912/1919) introduced the idea of the collective unconscious. It marked the Swiss psychiatrist’s departure from Freudian psychoanalysis and the beginning of analytical psychology, a unique variant of depth psychology. By now, the Jungian movement is well established worldwide both as a practical framework in psychotherapy and as a philosophical approach to the self, and has branched into several post-Jungian schools of thought (Samuels, 1985; Kirsch, 2000). ’Jung’ is famous even if precise details of his theory are less known and are often misunderstood (a reliable introductory text is Stein, 1998).

Our time of writing is also two years short of the twentieth anniversary of the seminal paper by Dutch psychologist Hubert Hermans and colleagues, in which they introduced the concept of the dialogical self (Hermans et al., 1992). It is a unique variant of postmodern psychology, epitomizing contemporary sensitivities to the primacy of the socio-cultural milieu in the formation of the self and narrative aspects of selfhood (the foundational text is Hermans and Kempen, 1993). It also acknowledges some aspects of the traditional-modern conception of the self, especially in more recent dissemination (e.g., Hermans and Hermans-Konopa, 2010). Since the 1990s, Dialogical Self Theory (DST) has provided an intellectual focus and impetus for a fast growing movement in psychotherapy, with firm footing also in general psychology. Unlike the Jungian movement – the current diversity of which branches, ultimately, from one individual’s system of thought – the dialogical-self movement has been characterized by collaborative pluralism right from the outset. The metaphor of many brooks feeding into a river seems apt.
Raya A. Jones and Masayoshi Morioka

This book brings together, for the first time, works from the two movements. We may take our cue from Hermans (2001), who has remarked that ‘an increasingly interconnected world society requires attention to dialogical relationships between different cultures, between different selves, and between different cultural positions in the self’ (p. 272). We hope to initiate a dialogue between these cultures of contemporary psychology and psychotherapy. The project has grown out of the editors’ activities in both contexts. We first met at the Fifth International Conference on the Dialogical Self in Cambridge, UK, August 2008, and subsequently at the Second International Conference of the International Association for Jungian Studies, organized by one of us (Jones) in Cardiff, UK, July 2009. We are privileged to have Hubert Hermans collaborate in writing chapter 1, which will serve as the book’s theoretical introduction.

These two movements also interact with geographical cultures, for ideas and practices acquire local colouring. Before saying more about the book, its academic context and scope, it’s worth considering the special case of Jungian psychology in Japan. Without references to dialogical and narrative thinking in contemporary psychology, its development has taken a turn that brings it quite close to DST.

The Jungian and dialogical in Japan

Masayoshi Morioka

Hubert Hermans, who visited Japan with Agnieszka Hermans-Konopka in the autumn of 2009, was invited as a keynote speaker for the Conference of Japanese Psychological Association. They participated in several lectures and workshops in Kyoto. The Japanese audience was charmed by their refined lectures. The range of thought of the dialogical self is wide. Hubert’s lectures were extended, especially the one that dealt with solutions concerning globalization and localization.

This was Hubert and Agnieszka’s first contact with Japanese culture. They found Japanese rock gardens interesting. I visited one of the Ninnaji gardens with them. They seemed to have a rather complex impression of Japan. They asked direct and sincere questions like, ‘Where could we catch the spirit of wabi in the garden?’ This was one of the questions that impressed me. It proved difficult for me to answer the question, but I tried to explain the aesthetic concept of ma in Japanese culture.

The unique Japanese word ma has multiple meanings. It can imply a space between two things, or it can indicate a space between two moments. Ma is a concept that includes intervals of both time and
space. The Chinese character *ma* when pronounced *aida* is also used to describe the quality of interpersonal relationships. The process of speaking and listening creates a unique *ma* between two persons.

Ryoanji Gardens are designed in the purest style of Japanese rock gardens. The garden contains only stones and rocks, with empty space in between. This space could be construed as intersubjective space. The participants in the garden project their psychic reality into the area. This is the aesthetic of *ma* that generates a virtual and dense reality.

Hubert and Agnieszka consider the significance of creative empty space in relation to silence in their dialogical self-theory; ‘Silence, too, giving space for inner recapitulation, rehearsal, and imagination, is a facilitating factor in dialogical relationships’ (Hermans and Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 294).

It is possible to develop an internal story and drama in this virtual space. The form of dialogue in Japanese culture may differ from that of Western culture. It can be said that internal dialogue is dominant in Japanese culture.

I would like briefly to review the introductory phase of Jungian analytical psychology in Japan, with focus on the clinical psychologist Hayao Kawai (1928–2007), who was the first Jungian analyst in Japan. He introduced the sandplay technique, which had been developed by the Swiss Jungian analyst Dora Kalff. Sandplay is now a popular therapeutic method in Japan. For Japanese people, the technique is associated with rock gardens. Kawai translated sandplay technique into ‘Hakoniwa’ therapy in Japanese, which means a miniature garden. This translation has facilitated the acceptance and promotion of the technique.

One of the key concepts of Kawai’s psychology is ‘monogatari’, which means narrative or story. Kawai focused on the concept of narrative or story throughout his academic career. Kawai was concerned with the significance of the narrative stance early on, since the 1960s. Of course, he was deeply influenced by the Jungian approach, but gradually developed his own original form of narrative psychology. Kawai’s psychology provides a basic orientation for the active amplification of the imagery of narrative content. He further developed his analysis on the basis of works about ‘monogatari’ from the Heian era in Japan.

Kawai’s deep concern for narratology was connected with his awareness of a crisis in the human soul due to the over-accelerative development of scientific technology. In his earlier book, *An Introduction to Jungian Psychology*, Kawai (1971) posed a basic question to readers. For example, a woman had lost her lover because of a traffic accident.
She asked, ‘Why did he have to die?’ The doctor explained that he had died because of excessive bleeding. However, she could not accept such an explanation. The scientific explanation was not a sufficient answer to her question, ‘Why?’ The meaning of the life of an individual as a human being cannot be explained by science. In other words, there is another reality, which scientific explanations do not address. Kawai confronted the basic question of the meaning of an individual’s life. This radical concern for the meaning of life is necessary for developing and connecting to a narrative and dialogical stance.

A narrative is useful for understanding reality that cannot be adequately explained by science. A narrative serves a basic function of connecting divided concepts such as mind and body, I and others, man and woman, I and the world, and life and death. These include bitter conflicts and divisions that cannot be easily resolved. A narrative helps in framing the human subject’s experience. The subject of an act of meaning is constructed and shaped by one’s narrative. The subject is generated by the telling of an act that connects one event to another. It is a kind of retrospective act; nevertheless, it generates one’s future.

Kawai remarked on the characteristic of narrative in the layers of psychic structure. It generates therapeutic outcomes if one focuses on the dialogical aspect of the client’s narrative, which includes multiple layers identified in Kawai’s personal and collective myth psychology. The narrative materials consist not only of the various events of the person’s life but also fragments of dreams and fantasies. Additionally, they consist of psychic impressions that are evoked within a therapeutic relationship. These materials can be linked, and they generate a contingent story mediated by a therapeutic situation. A story begins at the moment when one event is linked to another. One can discover a new relationship among the materials that are still fragmental and suspended. This discovery may be expected to produce a therapeutic meaning for the client.

The psychology of Kawai has emphasized the linkages among the above materials, giving them a deep therapeutic meaning. The new outcome of therapeutic meaning is facilitated by the action of personal meaning-making and by the support provided in the therapist’s response. However, Kawai’s therapeutic stance and perspective include not only personal relationships but also transpersonal relationships, which generate rich therapeutic meaning and images. His approach seems to be original and characteristic of the various narrative-based approaches.
Kawai continuously criticized previous approaches on the grounds that they could be damaging if personal conscious effort became the dominant method for creating a conscious narrative so as to smooth the enplotment of events. Therapeutic meaning would not be generated through a rational conscious understanding of a story. Kawai attached importance to appreciating the images and emotional experiences evoked from the story as well as to a deep understanding of its uniqueness:

To provide another explanation, my job is that of a storyteller. No clients visiting my office will experience a therapeutic change as long as they cannot understand themselves. If not, they may require assurance for the rest of their lives. They have to discover their own stories to comprehend their lives. My job requires of me to provide support for their task. (Kawai, 1998, p. 32)

This therapeutic stance is meaningful for recovering the sense of agency of a client's subjective being. It seems to be a narrative action for facilitating internal dialogue in the psychic space of the client. Telling one's own story essentially requires careful listening. Speaking and listening are inseparable from each other. Internal listening is generated in telling one's story in which the narrator is in the position of an internal audience. Speaking is not merely an utterance. The narrated characters in the story are portrayed animatedly and presented clearly in a deep listening relationship.

From the viewpoint of DST, therapy is conceptualized as an interactive dialogical process. The narrative is socially constructed both in a self-to-self and self-to-other dialogue. There is a fluid interchange among the characters of the narrative organization. These characters have their own voices; one character can be re-envoiced in the therapeutic situation. There is potential to explore the dialogical foundation of a narrative-based approach for psychotherapy.

**In-between the dialogical and the Jungian**

*Raya Jones*

Despite the potential for common ground, as the previous section reveals, there has been little dialogue across the Jungian and dialogical-self contexts. A unique exception is Hermans's (1993) paper in the *Journal of Analytical Psychology* (edited by the Jungian analyst John Beebe at the time), reciprocated by Beebe (2002) in a contribution to
a Special Issue of *Theory & Psychology* (guest edited by Hermans). Both papers identify a confluence at a meta-theoretical level. In particular, the two perspectives share the assumption of multiple centres of consciousness, and similarly view inner dynamics as ‘moving opposites in the self’ (Hermans) or ‘a Heraclitean flux’ (Beebe).

However, specific formulations, associated with Jungian and DST, respectively, represent contrasting standpoints that were typical of theorizing about the self at the beginning of the last century versus its closing. Furthermore, on some matters the theories decidedly disagree. For instance, in classical Jungian theory, the *collective unconscious* is a deep, biologically given layer of the human psyche: ‘The collective unconscious contains the whole spiritual heritage of mankind’s evolution, born anew in the brain structure of every individual’ (Jung, 1931, par. 342). Jung’s assumption about the brain is not supported by neuroscience, as many contemporary Jungians are aware, but there could be a sense in which it does make sense to speak of an embodied (hence ‘collective’ or common-to-all) unconscious. A diametrically opposite understanding of the collective foundations of selfhood informs DST: ‘Cultures can be seen as *collective voices* that function as social positions in the self. Such voices are expressions of embodied and historically situated selves that are constantly involved in dialogical relationships with other voices’ (Hermans, 2001, p. 272; my italics). The extent to which the idea of collective voices either contradicts or complements the Jungian idea is an open question. Yet, it would be incorrect to label Jungian and dialogical-self movements as two ‘camps’, for a debate about their mutual divergence is conspicuous in its absence.

It is typically or stereotypically Western logic that pitches theories against each other in categorical terms of either/or, true/false; and which views our intellectual history as necessarily a succession of paradigm shifts, whereby a new theory debunks the old one. As an antidote to the ‘either/or’ attitude, we may apply the concept of *ma*. Masayoshi Morioka links *ma* to the notion of space in Japanese consciousness:

> Space is not empty but holds everything fully. The word *ma* can be used to signify the space between one thing and another and also between one moment and another.... Furthermore, we can use *ma* in human relationships. The notion of *ma* indicates the creative lively tension between self and the other. (Morioka, 2007, p. 195)

At this boundary zone, *ma*, different systems can coexist (he points out). This applies to the present project in several ways. As a scholarly
contribution, the book is located in a space between two systems of thought – a space which we believe is potentially the locus of lively creative tensions. The apparent academic void between the two communities is not an empty space. Anecdotally, sometimes delegates in dialogical-self conferences talk to me about their interest in Jung, and delegates in Jungian conferences ask me about the dialogical self. The dearth of ‘formal’ scholarly exchanges might reflect ambiguity about what this space in-between may contain. What could ‘Jung’ do for those enthused by DST and, conversely, what could DST give Jung devotees? This collection is a first step towards dissipating that ambiguity. We have sought a cross-section of theoretical, clinical, and explorative essays, and have selected the general theme of thresholds of self-experience (a further sense in which ma may enter here) as something about which both Jungian and dialogical-self writers have something to say irrespective of their familiarity or not with the other perspective. In both contexts, thresholds of self-experience involve a confrontation with the ‘other’ or otherness in oneself. Through such confrontations, persons may gain a more complete understanding of themselves, necessary for personal growth.

However, the theories differ regarding the locus of that liminal process, and therefore differ in what each identifies as the phenomena with which therapists may work with their clients. Jungian theory points to the archaic depths of the unconscious, and regards the ‘spontaneous’ image (as in dreams, artwork, sandplay creations, etc.) as the phenomena of interest. As Toshio Kawai (2010) has remarked, although Jungian psychology is a school of modern psychotherapy, it shows close affinity to the ancient worldview in positing that the ‘mythological, pre-modern world is experienced not out there in rituals and nature, but rather individually as inner world. That is why image is a key term for Jungian psychology’ (p. 200). The clinical case studies presented by Megumi Yama (chapter 2) and Konoyu Nakamura (chapter 8) demonstrate this approach. While both chapters are written from an entirely Jungian standpoint, their specific topics – revealing dynamics of self/society thresholds – resonate with the main interests of DST. However, phenomena of interest in the dialogical self context are typically self-narratives (in some form). The counterpart for the role of image in Jungian clinical praxis is arguably valuation. In the Self-Confrontation Method, devised by Hermans for clinical application, valuation is operationalized as a narrative description of some aspect of the client’s life (past, present and future), which is associated with a pattern of affect: ‘A valuation is any unit of meaning that has a positive (pleasant), negative
(unpleasant) or ambivalent (both pleasant and unpleasant) value in the eyes of the individual’ (Hermans and Kempen, 1993, p. 148). Here the meaningful thresholds are found at the textual surface of clients’ evaluative self-reflections, as Carla Cunha, Miguel Gonçalves and Jaan Valsiner (chapter 3) demonstrate in their presentation of a different narrative-centred method in the therapeutic setting. Yet another technique for confronting the other in oneself, the ‘empty chair’ technique, is described by John Rowan (chapter 9). Rowan makes a passionate argument for having the nomenclature of I-positions (after Hermans) replace, inter alia, the terminology of Jungian complexes and archetypes. I’m not convinced that I-positions are the same as ‘complexes’ or ‘archetypes’ (which are themselves different concepts in Jungian theory); but that is open to discussion.

The book will fulfil its mission if it induces dialogues, even debates and acknowledgement of disagreement, across the two movements. There are risks, however. As the saying goes, we might find ourselves falling between two stools. Jung-oriented readers might read only chapters written from the Jungian standpoint whereas ‘dialogical’ readers would select only chapters that bear on DST. Another risk is quite the opposite scenario. Some might indeed read contributions written from the perspective unfamiliar to them, identify the confluence with the familiar, and conclude, ‘Basically they’re saying the same thing, so no need for me to bother with the other’. To press the point light-heartedly, a Japanese tale found in Lang (1901) tells of two frogs. One lived in Osaka, and the other in Kyoto. They simultaneously decided to see more of the world, and set out at the same time on the road between the two towns. They met halfway on a mountain and realized that if they stood up on their hind legs, holding onto each other, each could see his destination and decide whether it was worthwhile continuing. They stretched themselves as high as they could, supporting each other; but forgot that when they stood up, their eyes lay in the back of their heads. Although their noses pointed to where they wanted to go, their eyes beheld whence they had come. The Osaka frog exclaimed that Kyoto was exactly like Osaka, and likewise the Kyoto frog remarked that Osaka was a copy of Kyoto. It wasn’t worth travelling on, they decided, and each returned home, believing that Osaka and Kyoto, as different as two towns could possibly be, were exactly alike.

In other words, having a forum for meeting, even cooperation, is not enough. In the idiom of the tale, how to ensure that our eyes and nose point in the same direction? How to ensure that we see what the town
ahead has to offer us by virtue of its difference, and what we can take back home from it?

It may help to have a narrative that unites the two perspectives – not in the sense of a conceptual synthesis (as this must remain open to the scholarly debate we hope to encourage) – but by explicating thematic continuities and discontinuities. Narratologists emphasize the importance of how elements of a story are ordered in the plot sequence. Although chapters in an edited book are seldom read in order of their presentation, the particular organization ‘tells a story’. Below is the skeletal story behind our sequence:

Chapter 1 (Jones and Hermans) provides the book’s theoretical introduction with particular attention to the conceptions of the imaginal in the two perspectives. The imaginal enters chapter 2, by Yama, in a way that not only demonstrates the Jungian focus on the image (as mentioned), but also the Japanese-Jungian attention to narrative, as well as bringing into focus the theme of thresholds at both the personal and cultural-collective levels. We turn to a clinical method convergent with the dialogical-self framework in chapter 3, in which Cunha, Gonçalves and Valsiner describe an innovative approach to the analysis of clients’ personal narratives. Moving across from the clinical to the academic context, the focus on self-narratives continues in chapter 4, in which Shaima Ahammed applies cornerstone concepts of DST in her analysis of Jung’s autobiography. She identifies the many ‘voices’ (I-positions) that populate his text, and their contributions to the creation of analytical psychology. Remaining with scholarly explorations of dialogicality and creativity, in chapter 5 Małgorzata Puchalska-Wasyl examines fiction writers’ relation to their fictional characters, as well as creative dialogicality in philosophy and science. In chapter 6 Puchalska-Wasyl reports empirical findings on the association between personality traits and persons’ preferences of internal dialogical styles. We return to literary fiction from a different direction in chapter 7 (Jones), which speculatively reflects on the reader experience as an indirect dialogue-withoneself, a kind of self-confrontation. The next two chapters extend the theme of tacit self-confrontation whilst returning to the clinical setting. The case study told by Nakamura in chapter 8 demonstrates the application of the sandplay technique, whilst content-wise it grapples with the interplay between Japanese women’s individuation, on the one side, and what (after Hermans) we might call the collective voices of Japanese society concerning the woman’s role. Nakamura also draws attention to the dilemma of reconciling feminism with the ‘collective voice’ of classical Jungian theory concerning the feminine. Nakamura’s critical
theme broaches the psychosocial threshold central to DST, albeit from a Jungian angle. In contrast, in chapter 9, Rowan’s case for the clinical utility of Hermans’s notion of I-positions implicitly returns us to the individualistic ethos of traditional-modern psychotherapy. As mentioned, he advocates the ‘empty chair’ technique – a dramatic enactment of an intrapersonal dialogue. At the same time, Rowan takes us beyond the personal by linking his theme to transpersonal psychology (a term that he prefers to ‘spiritual’). We turn directly to issues of spirituality in chapter 10, in which Isaac Cherian and Shaima Ahammed compare and contrast DST with two Eastern traditions, Advaita Vedanta and Theravada Buddhism. Chapter 11 provides a different slant on East-West influences. Shoji Muramoto compares and contrasts Jung’s thought with the philosophy of Kiyoshi Miki. Miki, who had studied in Germany in the 1920s, was exposed to the same intellectual influences as Jung, but interpreted German Idealism differently (in some respects, convergent with DST). Finally, in chapter 12, Morioka considers the conception of the inner world in Jung versus Vygotsky. To those conversant with DST, Vygotsky hardly needs to be introduced. His view on the primacy of socio-cultural processes in children’s cognitive development inspired culture psychology, and is indirectly echoed also in DST.

It is often said that a narrative ought to have a beginning, middle and end. I’m not entirely persuaded about the ‘end’. The narratives we live by are inevitably open-ended and forever changing. Likewise, if this book is to be successful, it should open up spaces for alternative narratives, rather than impose a closure on how Jungian and dialogical-self perspectives may be brought together. Nevertheless, as we are erecting this metaphorical halfway mountain, it could be appropriate to offer reflections on the emergent themes in an editorial Epilogue.

References


Dialogical Self Theory (DST) refers to the dynamic multiplicity of I-positions in the landscape of the mind, intertwined as one’s mind is with the minds of others. That is, it is premised on a view of the self as characterized by multivoicedness and as extended into one’s environment. ‘Multivoicedness’ is inspired by Bakhtin’s dialogism, especially his description of the polyphonic novel. The ‘extended self’ is traceable to William James, especially as reinterpreted by G. H. Mead and others. The two ideas are inseparable in DST. A related idea is the *imaginal space*, an abstract intrapersonal domain wherein self-other relations are construed and re-construed. We may experience it when imagining ourselves speaking with others, in moments of self-contradiction, self-conflict, and so on. All of this suggests a basic similarity between interpersonal relationships and how different parts of the self are interrelated. ‘In a sense the dialogical self is a “society of mind” because there is no essential difference between the positions a person takes as part of the self and the positions people take as members of a heterogeneous society’ (Hermans, 2002, p. 147).

The understanding of the self as comprised of many dynamic opposites is the most conspicuous convergence point between DST and the Jungian perspective (Hermans, 1993; Beebe, 2000). However, while multivoicedness has its counterpart in Jung’s theory of the autonomous complexes, Jung contested notions of a ‘social mind’. Consequently, his assertion of the psyche as a divided whole does not carry the same connotations as does the ostensibly similar assertion in DST. Even the words of this chapter’s title are heard differently in the respective contexts. Susan Rowland (2005) speaks of ‘the dialogical aspect of the psyche’ to convey Jung’s ‘sense of the psyche’s dimension of the unknown, and its crucial role in all knowledge making’, poisoning this dimension of the
psyche ‘as opposed to its conservative social colouring’ (p. 104). While this is consistent with Jung’s own use of a dialogue analogy (cited later in the following), placing ‘psyche’ in opposition to ‘social’ contradicts the conception of the dialogical self as an emergent property of the social world. We prefer to discuss the dimension identified by Rowland in terms of the *imaginal*. Again, the meaning of the word is contingent on the context of its utterance. Hillman (1975) has set depth psychology the task of differentiating ‘the imaginal, discovering its laws, its configurations and moods of discourse, its psychological necessities’ (p. 37). Following Kant, Jung emphasized the generative or ‘productive’ power of the imagination, and regarded its creative themes as arising from the psyche’s essential nature (see, e.g., Bishop, 1996). Consequently, in the Jungian community, the word ‘imaginal’ is heard differently than its reference in the DST context.

In contrasting the two perspectives, we seek to establish their complementarity, rather than expecting a perfect consensus. Jungian theorizing understates dialogical aspects of selfhood, but identifies aspects of the imaginal that are understated in DST. Conversely, theorizing the dialogical self allow us to reinterpret some of Jung’s assertions in new ways, as will be illustrated towards the chapter’s end.

**The dialogical dimension**

While DST takes into account traditional as well as postmodern conceptions of the self (Hermans and Hermans-Konopka, 2010), it has been launched from a standpoint critical of the traditional: ‘The dialogical self, in contrast with the individualistic self, is based on the assumption that there are many I positions that can be subsumed by the same person’ (Hermans and van Loon, 1992, p. 29). DST endeavours to transcend the self-other dualism that was typical of conceptions of the self in much of modern psychology. In that view, the self is seen as having an existence separate from the existence of the other; it can be influenced and even be determined by the other, but in essence, the other is considered as purely outside the self. In DST – and likewise in Jungian theory – the other forms an intrinsic part of the self. However, to Jung, the formative otherness consists of elements outside ego-consciousness, not other people as such (the next section expands on this). According to DST, the self can only be understood as being constituted as part of a socially extended self, that is, in relation to others.

The extended-self idea is credited to James’s (1890) proposition that ‘a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him
and carry an image of him in their mind’ (p. 294). Expanding the idea, Mead (1934) averred that persons enter their experiences as a self only by taking on others’ attitudes toward them. DST continues this line of thought with the further assertion that we enter our experiences of own self in different ways when sharing contexts of experiences with various others. We see ourselves as if through many mirrors that sometimes give conflicting images. Consequently, the ‘I in one position can agree, disagree, understand, misunderstand, oppose, contradict, question, and even ridicule the I in another position’ (Hermans et al., 1992, p. 29).

The idea of the self as a ‘society of mind’ builds upon Mead’s concept of the ‘generalized other’ (cf., e.g., Dodds, Lawrence and Valsiner, 1997). The concept refers to individuals’ recognition of normative expectations as reflected in societal customs and rules, at the same time functioning as a constitutive part of the self, for the individual reacts to those expectations. DST goes a step further, beyond Mead, in the conception of society. As Ritzer (1992) observes, Mead’s theory lacks a macro-sense of society in the way that theorists such as Marx, Weber, and Durkheim have outlined. In his emphasis on the unity of society and the ‘objective’ attitude of the generalized other, Mead did not develop a systematic theory of macro-social conflicts, social differences, and ethnic- and gender-based inequality. From a sociological point of view, Mead’s theory represents a homogeneous society, with heavy accent on micro-social, game-like processes. With increasing globalization, the generalized other has become a more complex phenomenon in a world society. This has led to social interactions taking place at the interfaces between different cultures. At these interfaces, divergent and even conflicting rules that ‘worked’ within the boundaries of relatively isolated groups or cultures have lost their meaning as universal principles. For that reason, DST refers to the increasing multiplicity of collective voices that create interfaces, not only in society at large, but also in the micro-society of the self.

DST also recognizes the multivoicedness of the other. This recognition brings in alterity as a moral feature of the dialogical self and of dialogue more generally. In its most general sense, alterity refers to the otherness of another person or group, and its recognition as intrinsically valuable. Alterity implies the discovery, acceptance, and giving space to differences between self and other in dialogical relationships both between individuals and between groups or societies. The other too is multivoiced, and deserves space for expressing this multiplicity. Multiplicity refers, not only to the functioning of the other in a given situation, but also in successive situations, in which the same person
may take different positions. This ‘temporal multiplicity’ in the other is seriously restricted when the self, in need of stability and continuity, over-stabilizes the other-in-the-self, entailing the risk that contact with the actual other is constricted to a rigid position that reduces the movements of the actual other from one to another position.

The ‘fugitive dialogical’ in Jung’s work

In DST, the concept of multivoicedness replaces the Western ideal of the personality as a centralized equilibrium system. That ideal has been seriously challenged by postmodernist psychologists, such as Sampson (1985). The centralized self is typical mostly of post-war American psychology (Sampson’s examples are Erik Erikson’s concept of ego-integrity and Greenwald’s ‘totalitarian ego’). Following a late nineteenth-century European tradition, Jung (1948) held that the psyche is ‘a divided whole’ whose various parts are ‘relatively independent, so much so that certain parts of psyche never become associated with the ego at all, or very rarely’ (par. 582). Jung (1951) pitched this position against earlier notions of a unitary self, averring that ‘only since the end of the nineteenth century’, modern psychology ‘proved empirically the existence of a psyche outside consciousness’; and, with this discovery, ‘the position of the ego...became relativized’ (par. 11). Rather than a centralized self in a simplistic sense, Jung postulated a natural striving towards inner harmony or balance among the various parts of the self. He contended that neurosis is as an unsuccessful attempt to resolve the disunity that we all suffer as consequence of modernity. The ‘disunited man...ought to harmonize nature and culture within himself’ (Jung, 1943, par. 16). As Beebe (2002) commented, Jungian theory sets ‘a supraordinate, unified self as the driving force of individuation’, a postulation that DST resists (p. 269). Jung, on his part, resisted the extended-self postulation.

Jones (2007) describes the dialogical dimension as having a ‘fugitive’ status in Jung’s theorizing. We catch glimpses of it, but it vanishes when we turn to look directly. Jung might be referring to the co-construction of meaning when he wrote in a letter dated 29 September 1934, ‘As soon as certain patients come to me for treatment, the type of dream changes. In the deepest sense we all dream not out of ourselves but out of what lies between us and the other’ (Kirsch, 2005, p. 8). His theory, however, challenges the idea that the self is co-constructed with actual others. The ‘other’ as an abstract concept is a foundational element of Jungian thought. Papadopoulos (2002) describes Jung’s work as progressive reformulations about the other: Early on, Jung theorized the other
in terms of *complexes* that had ‘a semi independent and autonomous
existence within one’s personality’; this was followed by a reformula-
tion of the other as *symbols*, which ‘were not restricted within an indi-
vidual’s intrapsychic world and had a wider, collective applicability’.
Finally, Jung reformulated the other as *archetype*, ‘characterized by the
intricate combinations between intrapsychic and collective dimen-
sions’ (p. 170).

The last point should be read with a caution, however. Contrary to
the common usage of the word ‘collective’, in Jung’s idiom it implies
an intrapsychic domain (Jones, 2003). The collective unconscious is
something that all humans innately have, serving as common grounds
for cultural activities. Throughout Jung’s reformulations, the *other*
is simply other parts of one’s psyche. He postulated a universal structure
of the self, characterized by symmetry of archetypal dualities: ego and
its shadow, anima (the feminine in a man) or animus (the masculine
in a woman). Because the ego cannot know those other parts directly,
other people are necessary: ‘The shadow can be realized only through
a relation to a partner, and anima and animus only through a relation
to a partner of the opposite sex’ (Jung, 1951, par. 42). A prerequisite for
individuation, according to Jung, is realizing that something we see in
another person is a projection (rather than a trait of that person).

A focus on the role of a partner as a receptacle for one’s projections
deflects attention from considering the *partnership* as a gestalt whole.
Such consideration would entail taking into account the partner’s own
multivoicedness and valuing their alterity. To Jung, however, the psy-
chologically significant other is never really another person. This is car-
rried over into his discussion of the partnership in psychotherapy:

> Here the phenomenon of transference forcibly brings about a dia-
logue that can only be continued if both patient and analyst acknowl-
dge themselves as partners in a common process of approximation
and differentiation. In other words, a dialogue between analyst and
patient is important for clearing away obstacles to the psyche’s natu-
ral movement towards its ideal state of balanced opposites (individu-
ation). (Jung, 1957, par. 1172)

In other words, individuation is a thoroughly individualistic under-
taking, even though it requires the availability of (suitable) external
others. DST makes a partially convergent point in asserting that shadow
(‘disowned’) positions are often associated with negative feelings and
therefore are difficult to integrate as I-positions, hence significant others
facilitate the integration. However, the role of other people is construed differently. A loving partner, parent, friend, or therapist may integrate one’s shadow positions by accepting them, with implications for the interpersonal relationship. The most rewarding social relationships are those that are ‘able to cope with negative positions. The integration of shadow positions and negative feelings into a social relationship typically results in shared positive feelings and gives the relationship a broader bandwidth than before’ (Hermans and Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 235).

The fugitive dialogical is glimpsed in Jung’s (1946) short monograph, *The Psychology of the Transference*. Jung states that ‘the soul cannot exist without its other side, which is always found in a “You”’ (par. 454). Out of context, his statement might sound like Martin Buber’s concept of I-Thou, which emphasizes a symbiotic relatedness to another, or as being consistent with William James’s idea of the extended self. Jung’s ‘I-You’ makes no contact with those – not for lack of familiarity (he was involved in a much-publicized debate with Buber, and drew upon some of James’s ideas in developing his own theory). Jung warns in the Preface, ‘The reader will not find an account of the clinical phenomena of transference in this book’; instead, his monograph concerns ‘something so apparently remote as alchemical symbolism’ (p. 165). It is a study of the Rosarium Philosophorum, a series of 20 woodcuts from an alchemy text printed in 1550. Jung interprets the image of a mystic marriage as symbolic of the union of inner opposites within the self. ‘Wholeness is a combination of I and You’, he asserts, inserting a footnote caveat: ‘I do not, of course, mean the synthesis or identification of two individuals, but the conscious union of the ego with everything that has been projected into the “You”. Hence wholeness is the product of an intrapersonal process’ (par. 454, n. 16).

Transference is a dialogical phenomenon, involving the unconscious shifting of feelings associated with one person onto another. Jung’s puzzling endeavour to understand it by studying ‘something so remote’ as alchemy rests on his belief that recurrent motifs (which are not always recognized as fantasies) are symbolic representations of typical experiences. On the strength of that premise, he produced and inspired the most extensive explorations of the imagination undertaken in psychology to date.

**The imaginal realm**

In both Jungian theory and DST, the imaginal lies between the conscious and unconscious. However, the respective conceptions of the
unconscious differ. Burkitt provides a succinct definition of the dialogical understanding of the unconscious:

[It is] the influence that the voices and vocal intonations of others have in forming our own self and micro-dialogue, creating an ‘otherness’ within us – a voice or tone – that is not associated with speaking as ‘I’ or ‘me’... This is the otherness that has formed who we are through the vocal tones in which we regard ourselves and the world, a micro-dialogue and field of perception infused with the voices and evaluative tones of others that can intrude in unwanted, unplanned, and surprising ways, and can also be split and divided. (Burkitt, 2010, p. 323)

Accordingly, the imaginal is an abstract concept related to the ‘society of mind’ idea: ‘The I moves in an imaginal space... from the one to the other position, creating dynamic fields in which self-negotiations, self-contradictions and self-integrations result in a great variety of meanings’ (Hermans, 2001a, p. 252). It is ‘imaginal’ because we imagine self and others; but its dynamics reproduce our social reality. Hermans, Rlijks and Kempen (1993) elaborate the idea in terms of dialogues with imaginal figures: ‘Even when we appear to be outwardly silent, we may be talking with our mothers or fathers, opposing our critics, conversing with our gods, or questioning some personification of our conscience’ (p. 213).

The Jungian idea of a personal unconscious is similar to the Freudian, and would accommodate the dialogical conception cited previously. It contains ‘all elements that are too weak’ to reach the threshold of consciousness, material incompatible with conscious inhibition, and ‘all the forgotten material of the individual’s own past’ (Jung, 1958, par. 132). In keeping with his collective-unconscious hypothesis, however, Jung also lists ‘all the inherited behaviour traces constituting the structure of the mind’ and ‘all fantasy combinations which have not yet attained the threshold intensity’ (par. 132). While all these meanings imply definite contents, a more abstract meaning of the collective unconscious is latent in his statement, ‘the unconscious is not this thing or that; it is the Unknown’ (p. 67), as discussed later in the following. There is no equivalent of the collective unconscious in DST.

In Jungian theory, the imagination is a realm of mental activity with its own dynamics, and is ‘imaginal’ because it creates images of its own accord. This corresponds to what Kant called the productive imagination. Insofar as the productive imagination ‘aims at necessary unity in
the synthesis of what is manifold in appearance, it may be entitled the transcendental function of the imagination’, stated Kant (1781/1989, pp. 145–6). Kant’s statement is echoed in Jung’s (1958) attribution of spontaneous symbolic expressions, such as dreams, to what he called the transcendent function (discussed later in the following). Earlier, Jung theorized about it in terms of autonomous complexes, as discussed next.

The complexes

Jung developed analytical psychology over several decades, with later ideas enveloping earlier ones in his much-revised writings. He was already known for his theory of the complexes before joining Freud. The postulation of the collective unconscious, circa 1912, marks a significant turn. Whereas the early Jung was interested in the mechanics of how complexes are formed, the later Jung became more interested in thematic universals (i.e., archetypes). Throughout, he maintains that,

[A] ‘feeling-toned complex’ is ... the image of a certain psychic situation which is strongly accentuated emotionally and is, moreover, incompatible with the habitual attitude of the consciousness. This image has a powerful inner coherence, it has its own wholeness and, in addition, a relatively high degree of autonomy ... (Jung, 1934, par. 201)

In this context, ‘image’ has a specific meaning. It means ‘a condensed expression of the psychic situation as a whole, and not merely, nor even predominantly, of unconscious contents’ (Jung, 1921, par. 745).

Building upon work by Pierre Janet and others, Jung (1907) initially understood complexes as ‘splinter psyches’ that became dissociated from the ego through trauma. He proposed that suppressing a complex simply means a withdrawal of conscious attention. Because the autonomous complexes are deprived of clarity, they ‘can manifest themselves only in vague, symbolic expressions’ (par. 137). Those expressions include not only dreams, fantasies, or intrusive thoughts (all of which have an image-like element), but also inexplicable emotional reactions and delayed responses to specific words in the Word Association Test, which are not usually associated with the imagination. Circa 1911, Jung introduced the term imago (which was subsequently adopted by psychoanalysts) to indicate that images are generated subjectively, expressing the dynamics of an ongoing situation as experienced by the person (as opposed to being imaginative simulations of relations to external objects or people).
Jung’s (1934) abiding contention is that ‘Everyone knows nowadays that people “have complexes.” What is not so well known, though far more important theoretically, is that complexes can have us’ (par. 200). This may be illustrated with a vignette told by Hermans (2000; retold in Hermans and Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 228 ff.). During therapy, it was established that a certain client, Leo, thought of himself alternatively as an avenger or as a dreamer. When asked to tell his life story from the position of the avenger, Leo recalled experiences with dishonest people, his impulsive and overemotional father, and his girlfriend’s disappointing behaviour. Those experiences were associated with anger, powerlessness, disappointment and loneliness. From the dreamer position, he described himself as a rescuer of the world, and told of idealized relationships, extraordinary achievements in his job, and his most beautiful moments with his girlfriend. These experiences were associated with enjoyment, trust, energy, happiness and pride.

Up to a point, the difference between ‘complexes’ and ‘I-positions’ lies mainly in how these concepts are used. The Jungian framework generally concerns the phenomenological attunement to one’s own ongoing situation, a focus that has a close affinity to the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty (Brooke, 2009). Leo’s shifts demonstrate the context-dependence of constellation:

The term simply expresses the fact that the outward situation releases a process in which certain contents gather together and prepare for action. When we say that a person is ‘constellated’ we mean that he has taken up a position from which he can be expected to react in a quite definite way. (Jung, 1934, par. 198)

From a DST standpoint, the pertinent point is how particular positions influence the person’s relationships with others and self. For example, Hermans (2001b) describes the case of a middle-aged woman, Nancy. A position labelled the ‘child in myself’ emerged as contrasting with her position of ‘independent.’ The ‘child’ position received the most attention from her when reflecting on her daily life. She questioned the egocentric attitude and the unlimited pretensions of the child in herself. Yet, it had received a relatively low place in the formal elicitation and ratings of positions. In discussions, it transpired that Nancy tried to suppress the child in herself, for she felt that it hindered her from fulfilling her ideal of being a sociable and independent person. Jung (1934) might interject here that a ‘complex can usually be suppressed with an effort of will, but not argued out of existence’ (par. 201).
The contents of complexes reflect personal adaptations to a particular milieu; but, in Jung’s later theory, those contents fill containers prepared in the course of the species evolution and historical eons. ‘Endless repetition has engraved [typical] experiences into our psychic constitution, not in the form of images filled with content, but at first only as forms without content, representing merely the possibility of a certain type of perception and action’ (Jung, 1936, par. 99). A corollary of the collective-unconscious hypothesis is that autonomous complexes form around nuclei-like ‘primordial images’ (a term that Jung used interchangeably with ‘archetypes’). The primordial image indicates ‘not only the form of the activity taking place, but the typical situation in which the activity is released’ (Jung, 1954, par. 152). For instance, the biological fact of infants’ dependence on caregivers is a species-typical situation, releasing activities associated with subjective states of being loved versus abandoned. Those states are expressed in ubiquitous motifs associated with Mother and Child archetypes.

We may take from Jung the uncontroversial assertion that human beings experience their social and material environment, as well as own self, within a finite range of what is possible for the human organism. The practical utility of this assertion depends upon what we seek to investigate. Archetypal analyses show us a hero with a thousand faces (to borrow Joseph Campbell’s phrase), but not someone who construes himself as a heroic rescuer of the world, such as the aforementioned Leo. DST ‘counteracts the facelessness of the thousand-faced hero by giving voices to the many ways in which people imagine themselves into their actual life situations’ (Jones, 2007, p. 93).

Whether broached from a Jungian or DST standpoint, multiplicity and differentiation within the self beg the twofold question of unity and continuity. However, the intellectual challenge is construed differently in the respective frameworks. Hermans and Hermans-Konopka (2010, p. 138) identify it as the challenge of conceiving unity and continuity in ways that are commensurable with the premise of diversity and multiplicity. This is met through four concepts central to DST: (1) The concept of ‘I-position’ links the process of positioning and repositioning to the continuity of the I; (2) the possibility of taking a ‘meta-position’ permits an overview of a diversity of other positions; (3) the possibility of engaging in a ‘coalition’ of positions; and (4) the construction of a ‘third position’, in which two different positions merge or fuse. In the Jungian context, at least traditionally, the challenge was not how to reconcile notions of unity and multiplicity – or, rather, the singularity of ego-consciousness with the plurality of autonomous complexes – but
how to understand the psyche’s natural striving towards integration and balance. Jung (1943) claimed that a ‘disunity with oneself is the hall-mark of civilized man’, a cultural ‘pathogenic conflict’ reflecting the ‘progressive subjugation of the animal in man’ due to the growth of culture (par. 17). Jung’s position is historically consistent with what Rieff (1959), describing early-twentieth century psychoanalysis, called the rise of Psychological Man. Placing Jung in that historical context, Homans (1995) summarizes Rieff’s idea: Psychological Man is ‘characterized by inner diffusioness: he can organize or structure the inner, personal, and private dimension of his experience of the contemporary world only through psychology’ (p. 5). Accordingly, the challenge for psychology was seen as that of uncovering the general laws underlying both disunity and unity.

The transcendent function

Broadly paralleling Jungian complexes, DST posits unconscious positions that represent more or less autonomous centres of self-organization. This leads to the idea that the unconscious can become ‘dialogicized’; that is, the ‘suppressed or even split off positions can be taken up in the process of dialogue by giving them a voice, establishing a more symmetrical relation among conscious and unconscious positions’ (Hermans and Kempen, 1993, p. 164). Superficially, the dialogicizing process is similar to a process that Jung regarded as happening naturally in dreams and other products of the imagination. He addressed it in his essay, ‘The Transcendent Function’ (Jung, 1958). The concept encapsulates Jung’s understanding of symbolization as involving the dynamic union of conscious and unconscious factors. He illustrated it with the analogy of a dialogue: ‘The ego takes the lead, but the unconscious must be allowed to have its say too...It is exactly as if a dialogue were taking place between two human beings with equal rights’ (par. 186).

However, Jung’s main point is that the unconscious and the conscious behave in a complementary or compensatory manner. The analogy of interlocutors with ‘equal’ rights merely emphasizes the autonomy of the unconscious (the ego cannot prevent the unconscious from having its say). Jung’s depiction of the process is distinctly Hegelian (Solomon, 1994), and metaphorically more like the union in procreation than in a conversation:

The shuttling to and fro of arguments and affects represents the transcendent function of opposites. The confrontation of the two
The Dialogical and the Imaginal

positions generates a tension charged with energy and creates a living thing, a third... that leads to a new level of being, a new situation. (Jung, 1958, par. 189)

It is a tension such as might arise from simultaneously wanting something and not wanting it. For example, Jung (1935, par. 161 ff.) tells the case of a headmaster who had been offered a post in a university. The man, who knew some psychology, sought counselling because he had disturbing dreams; for example, a train he is about to catch goes around a bend too fast, and is disastrously derailed. To Jung, this and several other dreams consistently warned about the danger of ‘climbing too fast’. The man was not ready for the university post, but he rejected Jung’s advice. He accepted the post, and within several months suffered a severe nervous breakdown. The headmaster’s case illustrates, first, that the unconscious has its say regardless of whether the ego hears it or not. Second, the ‘living thing’ to which Jung refers in the above extract is a concrete symbolic product (e.g., the particular dream), not a new complex or I-position.

The second point indicates a crucial difference between the transcendent function and Hermans and Hermans-Konopka’s (2010) description of the emergence of a ‘third position’. Both concepts are premised on the notion of dialectic – that is, viewing the ongoing interaction between two conflicting factors as determined by their contradiction – and identify an emergent ‘third’ factor. In DST, it is a new personal position that reconciles conflicting positions, thereby serving an integrative function. A case study told by Branco, Branco and Madureira (2008) is a poignant example. A young Brazilian woman, Rosanne, experienced a conflict between understanding herself as a good Catholic and as a lesbian, given the Church’s standpoint on homosexuality. At some point, she started to talk about herself as a Christian woman who helps forsaken and lost people, including many gays and lesbians. As Hermans and Hermans-Konopka (2010) note citing that case, constructing the position of a missionary allowed Rosanne to bridge the gap between two incompatible worlds which tore her apart. The dialectic at play is a culturally specific tension between two social identifications, both of which are conscious and are initially experienced as incompatible. The achievement of a third position does not eliminate the conflicting identities (as they are contingent on external circumstances), but resolves the identity crisis by allowing the person to make sense of the contradiction.

The dialectical process that Jung called the transcendent function pertains not to identity issues, but to the ontological contrast between
known and unknown factors. It attributes the formation of concrete symbols (such as dreams) to a dynamic union of conscious and unconscious contents, somewhat mechanistically. It could be formulaically presented as

\[ S = f(K, U) \]

where K is a known factor and U is an unknown factor (Jones, 2007, p. 32). We may imagine Rosanne at some early stage, before she starts speaking from the I-position of a missionary, having dreams in which the missionary manifests in some symbolic form. In Jungian practice, such dreams may serve as signposts, and subsequently as tools, towards actualizing (in DST terms) the new position.

Jung’s theory generally, and the transcendent function specifically, pertain to a different level of explanation than does DST generally and the concept of a ‘third position’ specifically. The transcendent function is comparable with Valsiner’s (2002) description of auto-regulatory semiotic processes that generate both the meaningfulness of an experiential flow and the meanings that constrain or regulate that flow. Valsiner describes the dialogical self as ‘an autocatalytic system that orients itself towards the future by either enabling or blocking the emergence of its own new states’ (p. 251). This characterization closely parallels Jung’s general understanding of the psyche, which some contemporary Jungians elaborate by reference to dynamical systems theory (as well as objects relations theory). Notably, the analyst Hogenson (2004) posits the self as an emergent phenomenon that derives from ‘the dynamic patterns existing in a complex system’ comprised of the infant’s physiological characteristics, the caregiver’s intentional attributions, and the cultural or symbolic resources constituting the environment – in which context the symbol is conceptualized as ‘a discrete, and in important ways an autonomous, element in the dynamic system’ of the self (p. 67).

Remaining with the ‘basics’ of DST and Jungian theory, the sharpest divergence lies in how each framework channels theorizing about the self. We can ignore Jung’s (1958) dialogue analogy without compromising his idea of the transcendent function. If we were to take ‘dialogue’ out of DST, the whole theoretical model would obviously collapse. Conversely, the quintessentially Jungian concept of the transcendent function has no direct counterpart in DST. It is not particularly missed. Focusing on the extended-self allows postulating I-positions (qua ways of relating to the world) that are unconscious
insofar as they are not realized or ‘owned’ by the person. In contrast, Jung equated the unconscious, not only with aspects of self that are unknown because they are ‘disowned’, but also with factors that are intrinsically unknowable (hence, can be presented to consciousness only in a symbolic form).

In another analogy for the transcendent function, Jung (1958) likens it to complex numbers. Complex numbers are comprised of real and imaginary numbers. An imaginary number is a non-existent quantity involving the square root of a negative number. Similarly, the ‘psychological “transcendent function” arises from the union of conscious and unconscious contents’ (par. 131). He introduced that essay as dealing with the universal question of how we may come to terms in practice with the unconscious, and remarked that this has been the question posed by the philosophy of India, particularly Buddhism and Zen. His remark invites us to think differently about the unconscious: The unknown is akin to nothingness in Zen Buddhism and Taoism. Elsewhere, quoting the Tao Te Ching, Jung (1951) comments, “‘Nothing” is evidently “meaning” or “purpose,” and it is only called Nothing because it does not appear in the world of the senses, but is only its organizer’ (par. 920). If the dialogical dimension ‘invites the image of a handshake’, holding ‘a dialogue with the nothing-therein invokes the sound of one hand clapping’ (Jones, 2007, p. 47).

**Philemon as a case in point**

The chapter may be rounded up with an example illustrating some of the differences between the Dialogical Self and Jungian perspectives. In his autobiography, Jung (1961) described his imaginary companions. One of them is Philemon, who first appeared to him in a dream, looking like an old man with the horns of a bull and the wings of a kingfisher, and holding a bunch of four keys. Jung subsequently fantasized him as a pagan with ‘an Egypto-Hellenistic atmosphere with a Gnostic coloration’ (p. 175–6). He reflects,

Philemon represented a force which was not myself. In my fantasies I had conversations with him, and he said things which I had not consciously thought. ...I understood that there is something in me which can say things that I do not know and do not intend, things which may even be directed against me....I went walking up and down the garden with him, and to me he was what the Indians call a guru. (Jung, 1961, p. 176)
Both perspectives recognize the central role that Philemon played in enabling Jung’s personal development at the time. However, different aspects of the phenomenon come to the foreground as most salient when describing it with a focus on either the dialogical dimension or imaginal realm.

Hermans et al. (1992) cite Jung’s conversations with Philemon as evidence supporting the refutation of the centralized self. The idea that ‘different I positions represent different anchor point that may organize the other I positions at a given point in time’ (p. 29) allows us to construe Philemon as an anchor point that organized how Jung dealt with what was troubling him at the time. The fantasies exemplify self-consultancy, one of several phenomena evincing the basic similarity between addressing another person and addressing oneself. Self-consultancy is not entirely unconscious, as it is ‘highly influenced by and dependent on the questions posed by the conscious mind’ (Hermans and Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 125). Furthermore, Philemon functioned as a promoter position, a category of positions that play a central role in enabling higher developmental levels. Such positions are marked by considerable openness towards the future. They potentially produce a diverse range of more specialized but qualitatively different positions. They integrate a variety of new and already existing personal positions in such a way that may result in a more adaptive self, and in this way have the potential to reorganize the self towards a higher level of development. Promoter positions both safeguard the continuity of the self (by their ability to link one’s past, present and future) and give room for discontinuity by virtue of their function as a source of new positions, thus acting as ‘innovators of the self’ (p. 228).

Viewing Philemon as a denizen of Jung’s ‘society of mind’ describes the dynamical structure of the Jung-Philemon relationship once it was underway. Jung’s analytical psychology provides conceptual tools for understanding its appearance in the first place.

In the idiom of the transcendent function, Philemon is a ‘living thing’ created out of the energized tension between two opposing subjective states, opening up the possibility of a new level of being. Jung (1961) concluded that Philemon represented a force (such as the force of a need, an abstract concept): ‘Psychologically, Philemon represented superior insight’ (p. 176). Philemon is an image in the Jungian sense of a condensed expression of a psychic situation as a whole; that is, not a token or substitute for an interpersonal relationship with a wise person. The image spontaneously appeared at a time of personal turmoil, when
he felt in dire want of guidance and, at the same time, possessed insight that was not yet consciously accessible or ‘owned’ by him. In this context, a salient theoretical point is that the need for insightful guidance is universal, for all humans can experience it at some point in their lives. Hence, its symbolic expressions are found in ubiquitous motifs that take on culturally specific colorations, such as motifs of a wise old man in fairy tales, beliefs in guiding spirits, and the status endowed on gurus. From the Jungian-theoretical standpoint, it is less interesting that the specific imagery of Philemon reflected Jung’s personal associations, and that Jung’s self-consultancy took the form of dialogues. The imaginary figure was not simply an infusion of real others’ voices and tones, downloaded from the social world and then edited into the imaginal space. On the contrary, it was uploaded onto the imaginal space as an original whole entity to which Jung could relate as if it were a person.

However, the readiness in which abstract psychological states, such as the need for guidance, become personified and are entered into the dialogical imaginal-space, is not trivial. It evinces the primacy of social relationships in both structuring and informing how human beings experience their own self.

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In beginnings, before there are differences or separations, although it is chaotic and still dark, it is also rich, fertile and full of possibilities. Attempting to understand the evolution of consciousness through its representation in mythology, and viewing the beginning as wholeness, the Jungian analyst Erich Neumann (1970) suggested that ‘At the stage of the separation of the World Parents, the germ of ego consciousness finally asserts itself’ (p. 1). Significantly, many creation myths from all over the world begin with the dividing into two, such as light and darkness or heaven and earth. A system of consciousness indeed consists of a complex combination of various dichotomies. Therefore, in the process of constructing the world as characterized by order and rationality, it is necessary to exclude, as much as possible, anything that does not meet the rule of non-contradiction; that is, ‘A is not non-A’.

It would not be an exaggeration to say that the development of present-day society owes much to dichotomous thinking. Science in particular is based upon it, and it has brought tremendous benefits to all. On the other hand, even in modern society in highly developed countries, we sometimes find that beneath the surface of the everyday world, there stretches another world full of pre-modern images which usually cannot be accessed by means of rational understanding. Needless to say, it is dangerous if these images gush out suddenly, a danger that is easily understood when we consider the overwhelming images in psychotic states. However, sometimes it can be therapeutic to get in touch with such images attentively within protected situations. Dreams, which come to us from beyond rational thinking, have been considered to provide important clues to the unconscious, and have been used as
therapeutic material in psychoanalytical and Jungian practices. Even when working with patients’ narratives, I have found that sometimes the narratives show development similar to dreams if I try to listen to the narrative as if listening to the patients’ report of dreams; that is to say, uncritically, from a standpoint involving so-called ‘lowering the level of consciousness’ in Pierre Janet’s sense of *abbaisement du niveau mental* as applied by Jung throughout his writings.

First of all, presenting clinical material (Yama, 2003), I would like to show how it could be meaningful to listen to the narrative formed by images that emerge from beyond the world of dichotomy. Then I would endeavour to deepen the insight into the nature of a boundary between two worlds by reference to folklore and old customs.

**Case study**

The patient was a middle-aged woman who appeared exhausted and whose complaint at first was that she could not go out of the house by herself for fear that she might fall down. She grew up in a remote small town in Japan, and came to the city alone at the age of 15, soon after her graduation from junior high school. She acquired some kind of professional skill, got a job, and married. After marriage, she was a housewife for a long time. When her children grew up and needed less looking after than previously, her friend persuaded her to work part time. As soon as she began work, she became physically and psychologically unwell. Just before she started to visit me, she lost her father, who had lived in the hometown. Every session began with her usual words ‘I cannot go out’, followed by saying ‘I am afraid I might fall down. I cannot even go shopping without my family’s help’. Her story throughout the sessions was about how she was suffering from being unable to stand on her feet. Her childhood memories were impoverished and ambiguous. Moreover, when she talked about those days, she spoke as if speaking about somebody else’s experiences.

One day, after complaining as usual that she couldn’t go out, she began to say, ‘When I went to... (name of a place)’, and ‘I met my friend at... (name of a place)’. The inconsistency in her stories, of which she seemed completely unaware, continued for several sessions. At first, I was puzzled, but didn’t dare to say anything about it. I decided to keep listening to her carefully. Then, another day, she spontaneously happened to tell me about her dreams for the first time. She said that, before she began seeing me, she had the recurrent dream that *her eyes didn’t open*, but she did not have it any more. Listening to her, I thought
that she had started to look with her own eyes at what she had avoided seeing for a long time. I also had the feeling that something new was going to unfold, but I remained silent and just waited for it. Then her own story began to form, interwoven with both her dreams and autobiographical accounts.

She began to dream repeatedly of her childhood in the hometown. They were dreams of her mother and her funeral, people in the hometown who had died long ago, visiting graves with flowers, offering incense sticks before the graves of ancestors, and so on. She was not good at verbally describing dreams in detail, and just reported them along the lines of ‘I had a dream of my mother’. Instead of encouraging her to verbalize them and asking her about associations, I concentrated my energy on appreciating the atmosphere of the dreams together in silence, holding the images as they were presented. I could sense some kind of new movement in her inner world, and did not want to destroy the life in the emerging image. I knew from my clinical experience that the image shows autonomous development if we protect its energy.

Gradually, she began to talk tearfully about the sadness she had felt as a child. She began to recall her past, which earlier seemed to have been completely forgotten, as if she were stimulated by those dreams. Then she reported an impressive dream that frozen foods were being defrosted in microwaves. It seemed that what once was frozen in her heart, or what she had had to freeze for a long time, began gradually to thaw.

Originally, she was a woman of few words. Moreover, her narrative was incoherent and out of sequence, as if beyond time and space. She often talked about something that seemed to have no connection with what she had been talking about just before. Usually her narrative was without subjects (though this is not unusual for Japanese). I should add here that I don’t always listen to the patients’ stories in this way, and sometimes I ask them who is the subject, to make precise sense of their stories. This clarification process may bring order to their chaotic psychic contents, which is essential for some patients. But in this case I chose to value the ambiguity and to wait for her imaginative world to be activated, as I could recognize that her ego strength was sufficient to go through the process.

Sometimes her stories were about the animistic world, full of superstitions and magical powers such as the spiritual power dwelling in bamboo bush or some special stones and trees in her town. Those were not unique to her. Many nameless small legends seemed to have been vividly lived in daily life in her hometown in her childhood. They were stories which are seemingly forgotten today, if we look at our everyday
life superficially. Yet, despite Japan being one of the most highly developed countries today, I am sure that pre-modern beliefs and stories are still alive beneath the visible scientific surface of modern society. Although I was completely unfamiliar with her hometown, vivid scenes came up within me. Moreover, it felt as if I was with her in the world she narrated; that is, I experienced her story with her from within.

While telling these stories, her memories seemed to have been gradually revived. Actually, I sometimes found it heartbreaking to listen to her. Her father was absent from home most of the time for no particular reason. Her mother stayed in bed for a long time due to sickness, and died when my patient was only a little girl. She said that she used to play alone around her mother, who was in bed all day. As she was the youngest of many siblings, she was left alone. She couldn’t even feel sadness when she lost her mother. She had to leave her hometown on her own when she was still quite young. Afterwards she did her best.

**Why did she come to see me?**

The question had arisen within me, ‘What on earth did she come to see me for?’ It is a question I always ask myself when meeting a new patient. I would like to mention here that the tasks described in this case were essential for the patient also, as she was just entering the second half of life. As mentioned earlier, she lost her father shortly before our sessions started. Although she hadn’t kept in touch with him very much, I am sure that he was the last link to her hometown and to what the hometown symbolized, such as her childhood, ancestors, and so on. Needless to say, the father’s death became a trigger for her to recall her mother’s death, the memory of which had been shut within her for a long time. Although she was not aware of it, I was certain that she came to work with me mainly as a way of praying for her parents’ souls.

In the sessions, she vividly relived for the first time what she previously had had to repress in order to become psychologically as well as financially independent when she was still quite young. As the sessions went on, functioning as a container, she opened her eyes which (as her dreams told) had been closed for a long time, and began to see with her own eyes what had happened to her. Through having the dream of her mother’s funeral, she seemed to go through the mourning process, holding her mother’s funeral within her in a true sense. She could thus experience her mother’s death with natural sorrow several decades after the event.

She began to recall her early childhood and speak about it little by little with tears, as if the dreams have stimulated her imaginative inner
world and activated her repressed memories. Her dream of frozen foods being defrosted in microwaves may be taken as the suitable image for this process. Only by going through such a tough process could she establish the new inner relationship with her mother. Dreams of visiting the graves of her ancestors and other people in the hometown suggest that she might have been trying to look for her roots, but perhaps was unconscious about it. In general, the realization of being connected to something eternal beyond time would bring us peace of mind, irrespective of which religion we believe in, for it has something to do with fundamental religious experience before we are socialized into a particular creed.

As mentioned, she lost her father shortly before starting therapy. To my knowledge, quite a few people visit psychotherapists soon after their parents’ deaths. Although we do not necessarily die in order of age, parents are likely to be perceived as standing between ‘that world of death’ and ‘this world of life’ while they are alive, as if protecting us, who are meant to stay in this world longer than they, from the world of death, so that we do not have to face death directly. Once they have passed away, however, we cannot turn our eyes away from the theme of death anymore, especially our own mortality. I am certain that the themes that she tackled in the sessions involved the ultimate task in which we all would be absorbed at sometime in our life, that is, how and where to locate death in our cosmology.

Looking at one’s life with only the living side in focus means leading half a life. It is not until the acknowledgement of death is incorporated into the personal cosmology that we can live life as a whole. Edinger (1985) contends, ‘To reflect on death can lead one to view life under the aspect of eternity’, and continues, ‘In fact the origin of growth of consciousness seem to be connected uniquely with the experience of death. Perhaps the first pair of opposites to penetrate the dawning awareness of primitive humans was contrast between the living and the dead’ (p. 168). Ordinarily, we are so absorbed with how to lead a happy life on a practical level, and striving for short-term and concrete benefits, such as earning a lot of money or getting a promotion, that we forget about death. Going deep down into the psyche often begins with the awareness of mortality. It is therefore quite understandable that some people visit psychotherapists when they lose one of their parents. In general, ‘the death’ is at the entrance to the depth.

Although the dead parent is not around anymore as an actual figure, the parent does continue to exist within us as someone who keeps affecting us in life, both unconsciously and consciously. It means that
the relationship with our parents still remains, going on even after they have passed away. Regarding my patient, re-examining the relationship with her father had to be worked out someday, and the relationship with her husband would be the next issue to be addressed, yet these didn’t yet come to the surface at the time described here. As those matters have little to do with the chapter’s theme, I would not touch on them.

Going down to the depth through the boundary between ‘A’ and ‘not-A’

Although in fact she did go out of the house, she kept complaining that she could not go out. It is certain that there is a contradiction. ‘Can go out’ or ‘cannot go out’, ‘can stand on one’s feet’ or ‘cannot stand on one’s feet’, are, generally speaking, ‘A’ and ‘not-A’, mutually exclusive according to the law of non-contradiction. Therefore, if we listen to her at a rational, monolayer level, we may conclude that she is a woman full of contradiction.

What would have happened if I were to point out the inconsistency of her complaint when I first noticed it? It is plausible that we would have had to keep oscillating between speaking about ‘cannot go out’ and ‘can go out’ on a concrete verbal level throughout the sessions. Or, worse, she might have kept silent afterwards. She would have been able to understand her inconsistency at an intellectual level, but at the same time, she would have suspected that I would never listen to her and understand her. It is certain that the case would not have unfolded as it has done. As mentioned, I decided to say nothing about the inconsistency and to listen to her story as if listening to her dreams. As you know, dreams are full of inconsistencies and irrationalities. What I tried to do was to stay within the midst of the opposite phenomena, ‘can go out’ and ‘cannot go out’, abiding in the boundary between ‘A’ and ‘not-A’, and staying there without saying anything, just waiting for the possibility of a new development.

What do her words ‘I cannot go out’ mean?

Now I would like to explore the meaning of ‘going out of the house’ for her. Bearing in mind that she was forced by her circumstances to leave home and be financially and psychologically independent too early in life – that is, to stand on her own feet symbolically – taking her complaints such as ‘I cannot go out’, ‘I am afraid I might fall down’, ‘I cannot stand on my feet’ at a literal level would miss their main point. It is important here to explore the multilayered meaning of her ‘going out
of the house’ and ‘standing on own feet’, and to imagine her feelings concerning them. Symbolically, going out of the house means going out from the protected space, and, especially for small children, could mean leaving the mother’s breast. In general, we experience qualitatively different stages of ‘going out of the house’ at different times before becoming independent in our life. Going through each stage successfully, we would be able to establish a basic trust towards the world. Only with such trust can we comfortably separate from what the house symbolizes.

It is evident that my patient did not have, with her mother or another person in her childhood, experiences that fostered a sense of trust in the world. Therefore, we may assume that she was insufficiently prepared psychologically for her experiences of ‘going out of the house’ and ‘standing on her own feet’ when the circumstances forced her to do so. Above all, separating from her mother through bereavement must have been experienced as brutal and unfair. She recalled that she used to play alone around her mother’s bed, where her mother had to stay even during daytime due to illness, and then suddenly she was deprived even of this modest happiness and security. All she could do was to submit to fate. She protected herself with a defence mechanism of not allowing herself to feel the sadness that she should naturally have felt. To say that she didn’t mourn sufficiently would fail to appreciate the depth of her pain and sorrow. It seems to me that it became necessary for her to establish a new relationship with her parents when she entered into the second half of her life.

Appreciating the multilayered meaning that ‘going out of the house’ has for her opens up the possibility that she cannot go out even though she is out of the house. The inconsistency becomes no longer a mere contradiction. Whether it is a so-called ‘inconsistency’ depends upon the listener’s ‘level’ of consciousness. Even a clear-cut boundary, which seems self-evident in the bright light of conscious attention, may become gradually more ambiguous as we allow ourselves to enter the dim depths, where attention is much lower than in ordinary wakefulness. That which on one level seems to be a contradiction might not necessarily be so if we are trained to be attentive to the depths. We should consider what might emerge at the ambiguous boundary zone, where opposing ‘A’ and ‘not A’ meet, for this may bring to light something meaningful.

According to Leach (1976), in society, a ‘boundary separates two zones of social space-time which are normal, time-bound, clear-cut, central, but the spatial and temporal markers which actually serve as
boundaries are themselves abnormal, timeless, ambiguous at the edge, sacred’ (p. 35). He illustrates it with a diagram of two overlapping circles, where the area of their overlap represents an ambiguous boundary zone, a ‘sacred’ area subject to taboo. He reflects that as the ‘crossing of frontiers and thresholds is always hedged about with ritual, so also the transition from one social status to another’ (p. 35). As the boundary zone is a sacred area, and at the same time subject to taboo, it should be protected. Everything depends upon whether we can keep pouring into it the appropriate energy under adequate supervision. It is the same as in alchemy, where alchemists had to pay special attention to keeping the fire for the alchemical process in the vessel where the opposites meet. Von Franz (1997) emphasized the necessity of perpetual fire to maintain the procedure, wryly saying that you would ‘have to find some simpleton who was willing to stay awake day and night to blow the blowers so as to get the heat, and if the chap went off to have a beer our whole experiment was ruined, and you had to begin again’ (p. 18).

Boundaries in folklores and customs in Japan

Wherever and whenever two different things meet, a boundary emerges. What is taking place there? I would like to try to amplify the image of a boundary and explore its nature by reference to folklore and old customs in Japan.

Boundaries in space

First of all, I would like to present some familiar examples of customs and taboos about spatial boundaries in everyday life in Japan. It is usually regarded as taboo and bad manners to step on lines in the house, such as the threshold of fusuma doors, shoji screens, tatami mats, the front door, and so on. Fusuma are traditional sliding doors, used mainly as room partitions and for Japanese-style closets. Shoji are traditional Japanese sliding doors, consisting of Japanese paper pasted over a wooden latticework. Tatami are floor mats for Japanese-style rooms; the standard size of one tatami is 180 cm × 90 cm, and the room’s size is usually measured by the number of tatami, the layout of which creates marked divisions within the room. Children used to be trained never to step on those divisions.

There are sayings about stepping on those boundaries. Some say that it is the same as stamping on the face of the householder, so we should never step on them when visiting someone else’s house; or that it is
same as stepping on a father’s head, and therefore taken as rudeness to the ancestors. Others say that thresholds divide this world and the next world, and that if you sleep with your head on the boundary line, a ghost might appear, your parent might become ill, or some other misfortune might happen. There is also a strong belief that gods and Buddhist deities live in the thresholds – not necessarily specific gods or deities, for sometimes ancestors are included in the reference – but, in general, entities who should be revered.

Various good examples which refer to boundaries are found in traditional folklore in Japan. I would like to give two illustrations emphasizing fertility and the productive potentiality which the concept of boundary seems to involve.

According to folklorist Akasaka (2002), Dosojin were erected to protect people from ghosts and vengeful spirits that were believed to cause trouble in boundaries such as crossroads, forks, and mountain passes. Dosojin erected at the boundary of a village’s inner and outer limits were guardian stones that defended the village and travellers against evil spirits. The ancient types were often sculpted as a couple, a man and woman, which suggests that at the boundary, opposites meet and may be united so as to bring about something new. Dosojin are also considered to be boundaries that separate here and there, inside and outside, this world and the world of dead, and so on. It was believed that there resided gods and deities (a completely different concept from the monotheistic God of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam). Akasaka deplores modern people’s declining sensibility for boundaries, for he believes that rich stories are buried there.

Another example is Utagaki, an ancient Japanese ritual originating prior to the Nara period (710–894 A.D.). Peasants gathered on special days or in celebration of the beginning of spring or autumn, in special places that had something to do with boundary, such as a mountain-top, beach, or market. They would sing, dance, eat together and recite impromptu poetry for courtship. Finally, they would find their partners. Utagaki is closely associated with harvest rites, and the events are likely to culminate in free sexuality.

From these two examples, it could be surmised that ‘boundary’ involves fertility, as symbolically shown by uniting the opposites, man and woman. In ancient and modern times, all over the world, a boundary is considered to be unstable, ambiguous and chaotic, as well as sacred. It is where wars and conflicts often take place. As we have seen, however, boundaries may involve the potential to produce something new, thereby bringing about creativity.
Boundaries in time

Second, I would like to present examples of temporal boundaries in Japanese culture.

There is a famous traditional festival called *Setsubun*, which literally means ‘seasonal division’. Originally, it referred to the days that precede the beginning of the four seasons according to the old lunar calendar, but today it is usually applied to the day before the first day of spring (around 4 February). In Buddhist temples as well as Shinto shrines all over the country, this special day is associated with a ritual called *Mamemaki*, Bean-Throwing Ceremony, to expel *Oni* (defined in the following). It is usually performed by a *Toshiotoko*, a male born on the corresponding animal year in Chinese astrology. The same ceremony is also performed at each home. People throw roasted soybeans, called *Fukumame* (fortune beans), at a family member wearing an *Oni* mask, outside and inside the house, shouting ‘*Oni wa soto, fuku wa uchi*’, which means ‘*Oni* out, fortune in’. They eat as many beans as their age to bring fortune for the coming year. It is also customary to put up special decoration (a stick of holly with a sardine’s head stuck in it) on the house entrance, so that bad spirits would not enter. It has been believed since the Heian period (794–1192 A.D.) that *Oni* and evil spirits are likely to emerge at the change of the seasons.

What exactly is *Oni*? The word is translated variously as demons, devils, ogres, and so on, but none of these English words seems suitable in their strict sense. As Kawai (1982, 1996) points out, ‘Although an *Oni* may eat humans, it is a multi-faced being quite unlike the devil in Western culture’ (p. 46). They are popular characters in Japanese literature, folktales, art, and theatre. Modern Japanese are most familiar with the *Oni* appearing in the festival of *Setsubun*. It is quite difficult to give a clear explanation about their nature in the context of Western dichotomies such as good/evil, man/woman, human/non-human, and so on. Sometimes they appear as a male figure and sometimes as a female one. Although they are not human, they have a human-like nature, and therefore there is no clear-cut distinction between human and *Oni*. Moreover, according to Origuchi (1930), a famous Japanese folklorist, in ancient religious belief, *Oni* and *Kami* (a Japanese word for a god) and spirits originally meant the same thing.

Another important point about *Oni* is implied in the etymology. The word is speculated to be derived from *On(u)*, which means to hide or conceal. Originally, *Oni* are invisible; that is, invisible when we look for them with our ‘everyday’ eyes. *Oni* has double connotations of concealment and exposure. Kawai (1982, 1996) relates *Oni* to the exposure of
genitals and laughter in the Japanese fairy tale, The Laughter of Oni. It tells how the only daughter of a rich man is abducted by an Oni. With the help of a nun’s advice, her mother succeeds in reaching the Oni’s house. While the Oni is drunk and asleep, the mother and daughter escape by boat on the river. Pursuing them, the Oni begins to drink all the water in order to catch the boat. Just as his hands are about to grab the boat, the women, following the nun’s advice, raise their kimonos. Seeing their display, the Oni bursts into laughter and spews out all the water. The mother and daughter have a narrow escape, and return to this world. The interesting point, according to Kawai, is that the laughter of Oni has to do with the laughter of gods, and here one can see the phenomenon of ‘opening’. Kawai compares the Japanese tale with the Greek myth in which Demeter laughs in similar circumstances, but there it seems a reluctant laugh. In contrast, ‘Oni and Gods in Japanese stories laugh uproariously. The Oni’s laughter, in particular, may be called earthy laughter; and as the above story tells, ‘the laughing reverses completely the superior and inferior position’ (p. 62–3). That is to say, the laugher of Oni may cause a reversal or relativity of values.

In sum, Oni, whom one cannot see on ordinary days, may appear on the special day when the boundary between winter and spring opens up. Oni may open a different dimension, which shakes the order of everyday life and make everything relative.

Another example of boundaries in time is the special expression for dusk in Japanese, oumaga-toki, which literally means ‘the time when we meet Ma’. It is the time between day and night, when it becomes darker and darker, and the outlines of things which have been clear in daylight become vaguer and vaguer. Ma, according to the Japanese dictionary Kojien, comes from māra (Sanskrit), and has meanings of something obstructing good things or happy things, having mysterious power and committing an evil act, or a mysterious power, or mysterious things. The Jungian analyst Yokoyama (1999) points out that the word ma involves the meaning not only of evil, but also of something transcendental and numinous.

There is an interesting expression in Japanese, ‘Ma ga sasu’, which literally means ‘Ma gets into...’. When we commit an act that we ought not to do, and do not usually do, we are unconsciously doing something that disturbs the normative order of the ordinary world as consciously lived in everyday life. From the standpoint of the conscious, it is troublesome if ma gets in; but viewed with the unconscious in mind, it might be inevitable and could have the possibility of bringing about
both destructiveness and creativeness. Whether it becomes destructive or creative depends upon how we treat it. Ma is likely to appear between day/night, light/darkness, and consciousness/unconsciousness. Of course, it should be treated cautiously with proper safeguards. If we want to encounter ma and let it sometimes get in our life, we should lower the level of consciousness, and be aware of what we are doing.

**Conclusion: Her story began to narrate itself beyond dichotomy**

As shown previously, by presenting clinical case material we may be able to catch a glimpse of a pre-modern world full of irrational images between ‘A’ and ‘not-A’. Instead of pointing out the inconsistency in the patient’s accounts, I tried to listen to her narratives by lowering the level of the consciousness just as when listening to patients’ dreams. Then her story began to narrate itself beyond time and space, beyond the boundary of life/death, present/past, here/there (hometown), and so on. We should stay just in between the boundary and keep pouring the energy there under appropriate supervision.

As further discussed, I could find rich images of potentiality and the possibility of producing something new, both creative and destructive, at the boundary of two opposite things, in Japanese folklore and customs. To summarize, characteristic examples are: (1) Gods and Buddhist deities, even ancestors, are believed to dwell in the boundaries (thresholds) in the house. (2) A boundary involves fertility and the potential to produce something new, and therefore may bring about something creative. (3) Oni is not only a so-called evil or demon but also an entity that may cause the reversal of values and the phenomenon of ‘opening’, and may appear in the transition between two seasons, especially winter and spring. (4) On the boundary between day and night, and when our consciousness is lowered, we may be able to encounter Ma, which could be experienced both as evil and as transcendental or numinous.

In the pre-modern world glimpsed between ‘A’ and ‘not A’, one would meet what Ma and Oni symbolise. The most important thing is how we treat them, on which depends whether the experience brings about healing or destruction.

**References**

In recent decades, several psychologists have emphasized the central role that narratives play in human life (Sarbin, 1986; Bruner, 1990; McAdams, 1993; Hermans and Hermans-Jansen, 1995). If, as Bakhtin (1984) argued, ‘to be is to communicate’ (p. 187), narratives are as important to the self as they are for others with whom we relate: One (re)constructs and (re)presents oneself through narrating, being influenced by the dialogical parties we encounter in life. Therefore, a fundamental challenge for psychological science is to find out how the self is constituted and transformed through narratives. Namely, what kinds of narratives empower the self with adaptive resources fostering self-development, and what other kinds block transformation, increasing vulnerability?

According to narrative and dialogical perspectives, some self-narratives may become dysfunctional and constrain personal adaptation if they lack differentiation, flexibility or become too redundant. For example, some self-narratives may express a dominant voice (or a coalition of voices) that silences alternatives (Hermans and Kempen, 1993) or become so saturated on problems that the disempowered self surrenders in helplessness (White and Epston, 1990). Other self-narratives may show a redundancy of themes or contents around hurtful experiences and characters (Hermans and Hermans-Jansen, 1995), indicating a bias towards negative events on autobiographical recall and perpetuating a negative view upon oneself (Gonçalves and Machado, 1999). Other narratives may be too disorganized and
unspecific, failing to articulate a coherent sense of personal agency (Botella et al., 2004; Boritz et al., 2008). These examples illustrate some of the features that frequently characterize problematic narratives exhibited by clients in the beginning of psychotherapy, leading them to seek professional help (see Dimaggio, 2003, for a comprehensive discussion).

Our research program has tried to depict how the elaboration of novelties allows the transformation of problematic self-narratives in the psychotherapy context (Gonçalves et al., 2009; Gonçalves et al., 2010). For that we created the Innovative Moments Coding System (Gonçalves et al., in press) which allows tracking novelties that emerge in the therapeutic conversation. If we consider the problematic narrative presented by a client as a rule, these novelties are all the experiences that are taken as exceptions that contradict it. We call these experiences innovative moments (hereafter IMs; Gonçalves, Santos et al., 2010) to refer to the actions, feelings, intentions and thoughts that express defiance towards the dominance of the problematic narrative. This is inspired by White and Epston’s (1990) notion of ‘unique outcomes’, that is, experiences outside the influence of the problem-saturated stories that clients bring to therapy.

To summarize this chapter’s main assumptions – and adopting the theatre analogy, useful in the dialogical self perspective (Hermans et al., 1992; Hermans, 2001) – we can conceive the problematic self-narrative as the expression of a voice or coalition of voices that monopolizes the floor of the dialogical self and restrains the expression of alternative voices. Consequently, the problematic voice(s) assume the narrator’s position, controlling which self-narratives become possible to express, without relenting its power to non-dominant voices. In contrast, IMs represent the narrative expression of alternative voices that in time take the floor, being heard and developed in psychotherapy, and contest the dominant voices that saturate problematic self-narratives. Every time a meaningful change is noticed in the therapeutic dialogue, alternative voices (new or previously dominated) can come to the foreground and start to develop potential new narrators and more flexible self-narratives.

In the following, we elaborate on different instances of ambivalence between problematic and innovative voices manifested by clients during the change process. We also discuss the potential of developing and expanding the activity of a meta-position in the self as a way to deal with ambivalence and to strengthen the path towards a new self-narrative.
Narrative change in psychotherapy: Elaborating the role of innovative moments

The Innovative Moments Coding System distinguishes five types of IMs: action, reflection, protest, reconceptualization and performing change IMs (see Table 3.1). Although some of our studies look at non-therapeutic change in everyday life (Meira, 2009), our main focus has been on brief psychotherapy process (typically of 12 to 20 sessions per case; e.g., Matos et al., 2009; Mendes et al., in press; Gonçalves et al., in press; Santos et al., 2009).

The findings led to setting up a model of IMs’ development and progression, typically evidenced in successful therapy cases. According to this model (Gonçalves et al., 2009), the initial signs of narrative change that appear in the first half of treatment (initial sessions) assume the form of action, reflection and protest IMs. More specifically, clients may start by talking about new actions, activities and behaviours that were experimented in their daily life and that challenge the usual expectation of acting according to the problem’s prescriptions (‘action IMs’). Usually the elaboration upon these actions feeds new thoughts, feelings, intentions and understandings about the problem and its supporters that were not grasped before (‘reflection IMs’). Sometimes, the person even enacts in the sessions a more explicit attitudinal refusal or overt critiques against the problem or problem supporters (e.g., certain people or groups allowing the problem, parts of the self endorsing it or giving in to it) in the form of ‘protest IMs’. This type of IM facilitates disengagement between the self and the problem, which reinforces more changes. Moreover, these three types of IMs feed each other in the beginning of treatment, increasing its duration, as the person pays more attention to these new experiences and feels more motivated to defy the problematic narrative, through the enactment and articulation of changes.

An important marker in the change process is the emergence and development of ‘reconceptualization IMs’ from the middle of therapy until the end, becoming the dominant type of IM. This is a distinctive feature of successful cases, since reconceptualization IMs are usually absent in unsuccessful cases (to be elaborated in the following). This is understandable when considering the defining features of this type of IM: The person narrates a contrast between self in the past and self in the present – thus, the client is aware of self-transformation – and also describes the processes that lead to this transition, adopting a meta-perspective about him-/herself.
### Table 3.1 Types of Innovative Moments with examples from depressed clients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Innovative Moments (IMs)</th>
<th>Examples (Problematic narrative: Depression)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Action IMs</strong></td>
<td>C: Yesterday, I went to the cinema for the first time in months!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action IMs refer to events or episodes when the person acted in a way that is contrary to the problematic self-narrative.</td>
<td>C: I realise that what I was doing was just, not humanly possible because I was pushing myself and I never allowed myself any free time, uh, to myself... and it's more natural and more healthy to let some of these extra activities go...</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Reflection IMs</strong></td>
<td>C: I am an adult and I am responsible for my life, and, I want to acknowledge these feelings and I’m going to let them out! I want to experience life, I want to grow and it feels good to be in charge of my own life. I am not going to put up with this anymore!</td>
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<td>Reflection IMs refer to new understandings or thoughts that undermine the dominance of the problematic self-narrative. They can involve a cognitive challenge to the problem or cultural norms and practices that sustain it, or new insights and understandings about the problem or problem supporters. These IMs frequently can also assume the form of new perspectives or insights upon the self while relating to the problem, which contradict the problematic self-narrative.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Protest IMs</strong></td>
<td>C: You know...when I was there at the museum, I thought to myself: you really are different... A year ago you wouldn't be able to go to the supermarket! Ever since I started going out, I started feeling less depressed... it is also related to our conversations and changing jobs...</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protest IMs involve moments of critique, confrontation or antagonism towards the problem and its specifications and implications or people that support it. They can be directed at others or at the self. Oppositions of this sort can either take the form of actions (achieved or planned), thoughts or emotions, but necessarily imply an active form of resistance, repositioning the client in a more proactive confrontation to the problem (which does not happen in the previous action and reflection IMs). Thus, this type of IM entails two positions in the self: one that supports the problematic self-narrative and another that challenges it. These IMs are coded when the second position acquires more power than the first.</td>
<td>T: How did you have this idea of going to the museum? C: I called my dad and told him: we’re going out today! T: This is new, isn’t it? C: Yes, it’s like I tell you... I sense that I’m different...</td>
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<td><strong>Re-Conceptualisation IMs</strong></td>
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<td>Re-conceptualisation IMs always involve two dimensions: (a) a description of the shift between two positions (past and present) and (b) the transformation process that underlies this shift. In this type of IM there is the recognition of a contrast between the past and the present in terms of change, and also the ability to describe the processes that lead to that transformation. In other words, not only is the client capable of noticing something new, but also capable of recognising oneself as different when compared to the past due to a transformation process that happened in between.</td>
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Table 3.1 Continued

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<tr>
<th>Types of Innovative Moments (IMs)</th>
<th>Examples (Problematic narrative: Depression)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Performing Change IMs</strong></td>
<td>T: You seem to have so many projects for the future now!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performing change IMs refer to new aims, projects, activities or experiences (anticipated or already acted) that become possible because of the acquired changes. Clients may apply new abilities and resources to daily life or retrieve old plans or intentions postponed due to the dominance of the problem.</td>
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<tr>
<td>C: Yes, you’re right. I want to do all the things that were impossible for me to do while I was dominated by depression. I want to work again and to have the time to enjoy my life with my children. I want to have friends again. The loss of all the friendships of the past is something that still hurts me really deeply. I want to have friends again, to have people to talk to, to share experiences and to feel the complicity in my life again.</td>
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Various studies, with different therapy samples and diverse client problems, evidence the emergence of reconceptualization IMs as an important turning point in the change process (Gonçalves et al., 2009; Gonçalves et al., 2010). This turning point appears to be characteristic of changes achieved through psychotherapy, where an important defining feature is the dialogue with an interlocutor particularly interested in discussing changes and fostering development. The emergence of reconceptualization IMs feeds new action, reflection and protest IMs that act as signs that further transformations are under way.

Finally, performing change IMs emerge after reconceptualization, emphasizing the projection of changes into the future. These IMs also represent further signs that change is being consolidated and rehearsed, this time in the form of new projects, plans and aims that become possible only because the client became a changed person, with new resources and skills. This global model is depicted in Figure 3.1.
Looking at reconceptualization IMs more deeply, we can distinguish them in terms of content, dialogical process and narrative structure.

At the level of content, these IMs present two defining characteristics: (a) contrast in the self (between past and present) and (b) access to the change process, articulated through the viewpoint of a meta-perspective of the self. These characteristics serve different psychological purposes in the developing self. First, the contrast expressed in these narratives implies the recognition of an identity rupture – or, at least, a discontinuity in the self (Cunha et al., forthcoming; Zittoun, 2007). Zittoun argues that these perceived ruptures, interruptions or discontinuities can lead to questioning one’s personal identity (we realize we are no longer the same as before), and trigger efforts to understand what has happened and reconstitute one’s sense of identity, consequently restoring self-continuity. Reconceptualization IMs are attempts to restore self-continuity through disengaging with a previous self-narrative and identifying with a new self-version (Cunha et al., forthcoming; see Figure 3.2).

Such discontinuity can be unsettling and ambivalent, as the person struggles to achieve new self-familiarity (Cunha et al., forthcoming; Zittoun, 2007). Several trials of reconceptualization IMs might be
needed to develop a new self-authorship and consolidate a new self-narrative (see case study in Cunha et al., forthcoming).

Another aspect contributing to the importance of reconceptualization IMs is the enablement of a meta-perspective, or meta-position, in the self. Several authors argue that the potentialities of this meta-perspective view are innumerable for change in psychotherapy (Hermans, 2001, 2003; Gonçalves and Ribeiro, in press). Indeed, this distinguishes reconceptualization IMs in terms of *dialogical process* from other IM types. That is, we have here three positions: the self in the past (old voice), the self in the present (new voice), and a position detached from both and articulating both.

Finally, reconceptualization IMs are distinguishable from novelties like action, reflection and protest by their specific *narrative structure*. As mentioned, the other IMs emerge early in therapy and are usually more discrete and episodic. Through the emergence of reconceptualization, these can become integrated in a more complex narrative that provides a new future orientation, a new sense of agency and authorship grounded in a more positive emotional way of being. Furthermore, it is not rare to notice a positive reframing of problematic or painful experiences (Stiles, 2001; Honos-Webb et al., 2003) within reconceptualization, as these experiences become integrated more constructively, sometimes regarded as learning events or

![Figure 3.2 An example of a re-conceptualization Innovative Moment](image-url)
helpful resources in the adaptation to future challenges (Santos and Gonçalves, 2009).

Mutual in-feeding and ambivalence in the narrative flow

How do people become entrapped in problematic self-narratives? This concern with therapeutic failure is present in almost every model of psychotherapy, and traditionally is addressed in terms of resistance (Arkowitz, 2002). However, there is no consensus across models, as each highlights different sets of dimensions that resistance entails. For example, clients may be reluctant to engage in therapeutic tasks, prescriptions and assignments (behavioural resistance), evade certain conversation topics, explore thoughts and feelings or manifest difficulties in comprehending patterns of problematic experiences and relationships (cognitive and/or affective resistance) (Arkowitz, 2002). Some authors have recently applied an integrative approach (Engle and Holiman, 2002; Messer, 2002; Engle and Arkowitz, 2008). We consider resistance as the client’s multiple manifestations of core ambivalence towards change.

The notion of mutual in-feeding addresses that ambivalence towards change from the perspective of the IM. This concept, derived from Valsiner (2002), refers to the immediate return to a problematic narrative after the expression of an IM (Gonçalves et al., 2009; Santos et al., 2010). In our view, this phenomenon is one of the paths that may lead to a problematic self-stability (or resistance) and ultimately to therapeutic failure. More specifically, mutual in-feeding maintains a dynamic stability between a position and its counter-position (problematic voice and innovative voice), with each feeding the other. This creates a rapid oscillation between opposing positions that, despite being dynamic and interchangeable, is not developmental: ‘It becomes developmental only if the relation between parts can permit new parts – and relations between parts – to emerge’ (Valsiner, 2002, p. 260). Therefore, this oscillation keeps the person stuck in the movement between innovation and the problematic narrative (Gonçalves, Ribeiro, Conde et al., in press). An example of mutual in-feeding could be: ‘I would like to be able to drive again [Reflection IM, an innovative voice in a driving phobia] but I can’t bear the fear [return to the problematic narrative].’

Empirically, such return to the problem may be signalled by return-to-the-problem markers (RPMs; Gonçalves, Ribeiro, Conde et al., in press), which are utterances appearing immediately after and denying an IM (such as but-sentences). Studies by Gonçalves, Ribeiro, Conde et al. (in press) show that RPMs are more likely to follow IMs in unsuccessful
cases than in successful ones, and these differences are visible since the beginning of therapy. Moreover, RPMs frequently followed certain IMs types – such as reflection and protest – which seem more vulnerable to mutual in-feeding. RPMs were less likely to follow reconceptualization and performing change IMs, probably because these are markers of sustained change.

The concept of mutual in-feeding conceptualizes resistance as a way to maintain a status quo centred on the problem. Engle and Arkowitz (2006, 2008) have similarly explored clients’ ambivalence, referring to these instances as resistant ambivalence. Like mutual in-feeding, resistant ambivalence highlights a conflict between changing and remaining the same (see also Arkowitz, 2002; Engle and Holiman, 2002). Ambivalence may appear after the motivated client has already experienced some changes, though its timing in the process may be a little surprising. Nevertheless, these instances of ambivalence should not be looked at negatively as enemies of change (Messer, 2002) but instead as forms of self-protection (Engle and Holiman, 2002). Engle and Arkowitz (2006, 2008) delineate in detail several reasons for not changing. For our purposes, we simplify their elaboration. Resistant ambivalence (or mutual in-feeding) may be evoked by:

(a) fear and anxiety experienced in the process of changing from something familiar into something unknown;
(b) conscious or unconscious faulty beliefs about oneself and change;
(c) a reactance to the pressure to change that others may apply (feeling that one’s personal freedom is restrained);
(d) secondary functions or gains produced by the problematic behaviour (such as others’ attention and care); and
(e) fear of becoming overwhelmed by negative emotions evoked by problematic experiences.

Enabling a meta-position to deal with ambivalence

Recently, it has been emphasized that psychotherapeutic change is the result of developing the client’s self-observation skills (Dimaggio et al., 2003; Dimaggio, 2006). Dialogical Self Theory associates such skills with the activity of a meta-position (Hermans and Kempen, 1993; Hermans, 2001, 2003), sometimes referred to as ‘observer position’ (Leiman and Stiles, 2001) or ‘meta-perspective’ (Gonçalves et al., 2009). The emergence and expansion of such a position is considered as an important step for promoting healthier dialogues and narratives within the self.
Hermans and Kempen (1993) define a *meta-position* as ‘a perspective from which the client phrases the linkages between several significant positions in a self-reflective way’ (p. 133). It provides an overarching view upon different aspects of the self, thus taking a step back from the problematic experience and fostering self-observation: ‘A well-developed metaposition ... enables clients to separate themselves from the ongoing stream of experiences and to place themselves as authors, considering themselves as actors in specific situations’ (Hermans, 2003, p. 122–3). This process creates psychological distanciation: ‘The individual psychologically moves away from the object of perception, such that the object becomes distinct from the self’ (Abbey, 2004, p. 32). Acquiring a perspective disengaged from the problematic voice also enables the recognition of one’s ambivalences, tensions and conflicts. Therapists’ efforts to acknowledge and explore difficulties may provide an opportunity for the emergence of something new. As clients are freer to reflect upon the origin and adequacy of voices resisting change, they may adopt a different attitude to change (Cunha et al., forthcoming). Clients could also understand which valuable needs the voices of ambivalence communicate to the self, welcoming them into dialogue (Greenberg et al., 1993; Engle and Holiman, 2002). Thus, ambivalences can be converted into something productive for the therapeutic process.

Moreover, Hermans (2001) argues that a meta-position can evaluate alternative positions that might have remained hidden or underdeveloped in the shadow of the problematic self-narrative (like *shadow voices* in the self; Gonçalves et al., 2009). This movement of understanding the relation and contrast between positions and how they are integrated (or cast aside) in the dialogical self provides further opportunities to discover or promote relevant linkages among alternative positions and personal history (Hermans, 2001, 2003). We can draw a connection with the functions of reconceptualization mentioned previously, in particular the efforts to restore continuity and unity in the self after the disengagement with the problematic position. In addition, this type of meta-level reflexivity may facilitate the directionality of change into the future, inaugurating a new authorship where new self-positions and possibilities may be construed, including the renewal of self-narratives (Cunha et al., forthcoming; Hermans, 2001; Gonçalves et al., 2009).

**Case examples**

We present three successful cases of clients admitted to brief emotion-focused therapy for depression under the York I Depression Project.
Transforming Self-Narratives in Psychotherapy

(Greenberg and Watson, 1998). Several authors present case studies of these clients (Cunha et al., forthcoming; Honos-Webb et al., 1998; Honos-Webb et al., 1999; Leiman and Stiles, 2001; Honos-Webb et al., 2003; Gonçalves et al., 2010). Below, we look only at their first reconceptualization IMs (expanded in Mendes et al., in press). The selected excerpts represent moments when the self re-evaluates itself and deals with different forms of ambivalence. We have edited these excerpts to eliminate repetitions and speech hesitations, due to space constraints. In all the excerpts, IMs are signalled in bold.

Case 1

‘Sarah’ was a 35-year-old German immigrant in Canada (expanded in Cunha et al., forthcoming; Honos-Webb et al. 2003). She attended 18 therapy sessions. As a part-time college student, recently divorced, she searched for help with her depressive symptoms and increasing sense of isolation. Her main complaints regarded her difficulties of being assertive and of clearly realizing her feelings, and frequently doubting herself. She focused too much on pleasing others and frequently dismissed her own needs.

In the extract below, taken from Session 7, Sarah begins by expressing how she has already achieved some changes in interpersonal situations. She presents herself as more assertive, which triggers a reconceptualization IM. She highlights the contrast between present and past. She also elaborates upon what is different even though some problems remain (I still find it hard to get going in the mornings). Her therapist acknowledges these difficulties but leads Sarah to explore innovation. This is performed afterwards in several turns of the conversation. Sarah reports changes, denotes some remnants of the problem, but proceeds to expand the elaboration upon innovation; the therapist acknowledges difficulties, but proceeds to pointing out and clarifying what is different:

Therapist: So how do you feel?

Sarah: Well I’m not too bad, I don’t try to sweep away things that much anymore. [Meta-position emerges, observing the self.] That’s I guess one major change which I really like, even so I still find it hard to get going in the mornings [remnants of the problematic narrative] but...

Therapist: It’s hard to get going, but what did you say, you don’t? [Therapist explores innovation.]

Sarah: Like before well it would get to the point where I would get up and do really basic things and then take
a lot of breaks and rest during the day. And that has
not really disappeared, but it’s simply because I’m so
busy, I don’t have the chance. And I guess the sudden
change – well, it was kind of gradual, I suppose – it
leaves me pretty tired for things. But it’s kind of a
nice change of things.

Therapist: So it’s hard to get started but once you’re into it, it
keeps you moving through the day.

Sarah: Yeah and I guess the thing really is that, if I’m on my
own, I really let it go, let myself go. So I’m trying to
keep myself busy and involved, especially with other
people. If I have to do something on my own at home,
it’s just really difficult to get a move on things and
well... I don’t know, it’s just how it works right now.

Therapist: So it sounds like you’re trying to give yourself some
structure that helps you. (Sarah: Mm-hmm) You know
you have to be at certain places at certain times.
[Therapist discriminates what is different, helping the client to
become more aware and acquire control upon the changes.]

Sarah: Mm-hm, yeah, that kind of puts that certain amount of
– I don’t know, pressure is maybe not the right word –
but I’m aware of what’s going on and what’s the best
way to deal with it. (Therapist: Mm-hm.) So that really
helps and also I’m kind of getting the hang of it, like
what makes me uncomfortable when I’m with other
people and really try my best, as soon as I notice it
[discomfort in interpersonal situations] to deal with it. To
let them know that ‘No, this is not acceptable to me’
or ‘No, I can’t deal with it for whatever reason’ but it’s
just too much and it works really well (laughs).

Therapist: So it sounds like two things are different: One is that
you’re able to notice it quicker (Sarah: Mm-hm.) or
you are able to make sense of something making you
uncomfortable, and then you come out and set your
limits and do something about it.

Sarah: Mm-hm, even though this creates (interrupts with
a small pause, letting the therapist infer about some
negative feelings) at the time, I know ‘Ok, right now
this is it. I have to do or say something, otherwise
it’s going to happen again [...] So I get kind of tense
about it but then I say or do whatever it is. And it’s
just, I can’t believe how difficult I find it to do this, like to be assertive (Therapist: Mmm.) about things. [Reconceptualization IM – Ambivalence expressed by a meta-position in the self, reflecting upon the self as changing.]

Therapist: So it feels like it shouldn’t be so difficult.
Sarah: Yeah because I feel kind of guilty about it. (Therapist: Mm-hm.) Um, for somewhere around a day almost [questioning, doubting herself]. Was I entitled really to do this? You know, did I hurt the other person? [Mutual in-feeding – Return to the problematic narrative, as self-doubt appears.]

Therapist: Mm-hm.
Sarah: It’s always like I’m more concerned about what I do to the other person then saying ‘Well, this is me, I have to look at myself first, other people are doing it and I have to let them know where the limit is, that they have to look for a different approach or that they definitely overstepped it’. [Meta-position, observing the self.]

Therapist: It sounds like at the time you’re able to do that, to set your limits and yet you’re left with this disconcerting feeling like ‘Maybe I shouldn’t have, maybe I hurt them’, that kind of thing? [Therapist acknowledges difficulties and mirrors the ambivalence to Sarah.]

Sarah: Yeah, but then the next time when I encounter them I notice in their behaviour that they know and acknowledge it. [Meta-position differentiating.] I put something forward and they just have to live with it, to acknowledge it. I kind of staked out the border or indicated the limits, how far they can go. I mean, there are a few things happening last week and this week and, now when I think about it, ‘My gosh, I’m just so glad I did it!’ And I guess it’s a start.

Therapist: So, you’re saying, the guilty feeling in a way doesn’t last too long. In the end, when it’s all said and done, you’re happy. [Reflection IM.]

It is then that a more pronounced marker of ambivalence to change emerges in the midst of reconceptualization: Although adopting a meta-reflective stance and observing herself as a changed actor, Sarah discloses to her therapist how she never thought that acting in the desired, changed way, would be so difficult (I can’t believe how difficult I find it to do this, like to be assertive). The therapist is responsive to her
difficulties and proceeds to explore them (*it feels like it shouldn’t be so difficult*). Now, the ambivalence fully differentiates into the process of mutual in-feeding, circumventing reconceptualization: Sarah returns to the problematic narrative, manifesting guiltiness and self-doubts (*I feel kind of guilty about it*).

Yet, this step back into the usual problematic functioning is not long, as the client’s meta-position evolves to noticing how others react to a changing Sarah and moves along to an assertion of her own needs, this time, in the form of a reflection IM. And despite the fact that Sarah’s therapist keeps acknowledging her difficulties and mirroring the ambivalence to her (*yet you’re left with this disconcerting feeling like ‘Maybe I shouldn’t have’*), Sarah is already in motion in a reinvigorated emphasis on change (*I’m just so glad I did it! And I guess it’s a start*) that motivates further innovation in the process.

**Case 2**

‘Jan’ was a 42-year-old white female, working as a sales person (expanded in Honos-Webb et al. 1999; Gonçalves and Ribeiro, in press). She attended 16 therapy sessions, and was considered clinically depressed. The most important symptoms to her were lack of motivation at work, and some psychosomatic complaints such as hives (urticaria) and difficulties swallowing. During therapy, Jan understood that her symptoms were frequently signs of the burden she placed on herself in work and family environments, as she took extra responsibility for taking care of everyone and catered too much to others’ needs.

In the next extract, taken from Session 4, Jan discloses that her hives came back after a brief remission in the first weeks of psychotherapy. By this time, Jan had already made some progress towards change and the symptoms return troubles her:

Jan:   My hives came back this week again – I thought they were sort of gone but I had two, three days where, you know, they were back. I still have them but that two, three days were worse than before. So that caused, you know, sort of a little bit of worry. [*Ambivalence starts to emerge implicitly in the form of a negative feeling.*]

Therapist:  Mm, about?

Jan:   That they’re going to come back as bad as they were before, and I’m not getting anywhere. [*Ambivalence in the form of fear of failing to change – Problematic narrative.*]

Therapist:  Mm-hm, so the hives kind of tell you that maybe...
Jan: I think that’s a trigger point. [Meta-position, observing the self] (Therapist: Yeah.) I think I’ve accepted it that the hives are something that subconsciously my body is telling me – that I have to do something – um, make some changes (Therapist: Mm-hm.) you know, whichever they are.

Therapist: That’s sending you a message.

Jan: Mm-hm. I just have to listen to it and not ignore it like I have in the past.

Therapist: Mm-hm. So it’s kind of an important sign that something’s going on. [Therapist reinforces Jan’s insight.]

Jan: Yeah, I think that’s the only thing, really the hives are the only thing that’s really triggering it for me, because it’s visual.

Therapist: Mm-hm, so you can really see that something’s going on.

Jan: Mm-hm. I can’t ignore it as much as (Therapist: Mm-hm.) you know, I can ignore a headache or a pain in my neck or something like that. [Reconceptualization IM]

As Jan talks about the hives, she expresses how these symptoms triggered some negative feelings again (worry) and ambivalence towards change starts to emerge implicitly. This ambivalence could have evolved to a case of mutual in-feeding but, in this case, Jan’s concerns are more focused on a fear of failing to change despite her efforts and therapeutic help. Her therapist, acknowledging these difficulties, leads Jan to explore them further. And this is where the meta-position appears, and Jan elaborates a reconceptualization IM. Through this meta-position, Jan discovered something new about her problems (I think that’s a trigger point) which allows a reframing of the symptoms: They are, after all, bodily signs that indicate a need to persevere and keep changing (I just have to listen to it and not ignore it like I have in the past), instead of a marker of failure. This interesting movement towards constructing the symptom as an important, positive sign is the result of an intersubjective process between client and therapist (initiated in earlier sessions), whose interventions reinforce and validate Jan’s view (So it’s kind of an important sign that something’s going on).

Case 3

‘Lisa’ was a 27-year-old woman with an Italian background, married and with two children (expanded in Gonçalves, Mendes et al., in press;
Honos-Webb et al., 1998; Leiman and Stiles, 2001). She attended 15 therapy sessions. Lisa was considered clinically depressed, and her main complaints regarded sadness, resentment and guilt towards her husband and his gambling problem.

Lisa presents reconceptualization IMs from Session 1, as can be seen in the following. Here she explores her difficulties with her husband and children. The therapist tries to explore her emotional experiences in the marriage. This triggers a meta-position, as Lisa starts observing herself in her marital relationship (I feel like I’m the provider; There’s no way of escaping). The therapist keeps helping Lisa to explore emotions associated with this relationship and, as she further observes herself, the first reconceptualization IM appears. From this point on, and with the therapist’s help, it is clear that Lisa wants to disengage from her husband’s problems and to focus more on herself, in contrast with what she used to do.

Therapist: And yet, it’s still there, like somehow there’s this feeling of... [...] Can you talk about that a bit, just what it’s like?
Lisa: Um, [Meta-position emerges, observing the self] I feel like I’m the provider, I’m there [in the marriage] for only that reason. (Therapist: Uh-huh.) Not so much that, you know, he [husband] wants to be with me, it’s more that the kids are here and this is the way it’s got to be and (Therapist: Uh-huh.) and that’s, there’s no way of escaping that [...] 
Therapist: So you start almost feeling helpless.
Lisa: That’s right, I’m helpless about it, I can’t do anything.
Therapist: Feels like there’s just no way out [...] Because you still end up feeling hurt inside
Lisa: Yeah, the feelings are very much there even though I understand the disease [the gambling habit] and the character in him (Therapist: Yeah.) and I believe that he can be helped but he doesn’t see it or he doesn’t want it. And I’ve stopped changing him, I don’t want to change him anymore, because you know I’m just looking at my own problems.
Therapist: Uh huh, so rather than try to control his behaviour, it’s more like...
Lisa: Right, I don’t do that anymore, I don’t do that as much as I used to.
Therapist: **You just focus on yourself and what you feel.**

Lisa: **Yeah, myself and what's happening at that moment.** (Therapist: Mm-hm.) **[Reconceptualization IM]**

Lisa: When he says I'm going out or like last Sunday [describing how her husband had arrived late to a scheduled activity with the children and then she questioned him about that] he said 'Oh, I was having a card game' and that just brings the feelings back, like you know, your family and kids come first!

Therapist: Mmm, so there's almost a feeling of resentment.

Lisa: Yeah, it's very strong, and I don't cut him up or anything, I never have.

Therapist: Yeah, you don't want to start yelling at him [...]. So I guess it just kind of feels like, even though there's this boiling kind of feeling inside 'I'm not going to tell him because (Lisa: Yeah) it's not going to do any good, it's not my responsibility anymore' [...]. So it sounds like you've gone and given up.

Lisa: Yeah, I do at this point.

Therapist: He's not going to change.

Lisa: No, I don't see it. Um, **I don't know if I should be out there trying harder but I think I've given up.** [Reflection IM – Ambivalence appears in the form of self-doubt] (Therapist: Uh-huh) In that sense, I've kind of let God take over.

Therapist: Uh-huh, so there's a feeling of 'I gave up' and somehow there's sadness that comes to mind. (Lisa crying: Mm-hm.) Sort of as if you've lost something, I'm not sure.

Lisa: Yeah, I don't know what, **but failure comes up to me.** [Mutual in-feeding – Remnants of the problematic narrative]

Therapist: Uh-huh, it feels like you should have been able to.

Lisa: Yeah, something doesn't connect.

Therapist: Um, like you're not connecting with him, you're not getting through to him. Um, it's like trying to get close to a brick wall.

Lisa: **Yeah, and I just don't want to get too close because (crying), I guess I don't want to be hurt more.** (Therapist: Uh-huh.) Maybe that's why I've given up. [Reconceptualization IM]
Nevertheless, when Lisa talks about when her husband was late to something he had planned with their children, we see that rage and resentment towards her husband are still very much present in their daily life. The therapist introduces the notion of giving up old patterns, while trying to specify what has been changed in the way the couple interact (So it sounds like you’ve gone and given up). Here Lisa starts expressing some ambivalence. She begins by doubting her decision to distance herself from her husband’s problems (I don’t know if I should be out there trying harder), but immediately repositions herself, refusing responsibility (I’ve kind of let God take over). The therapist opts not to pursue this distancing movement, but explores further the ambivalence, looking for negative emotions. This activates mutual in-feeding, as traces of the problematic narrative emerge (failure for not being able to change her husband) in the form of a self-critical voice. Through this, we notice that Lisa is still very linked to the usual functioning of the relationship. But then the therapist introduces a powerful metaphor (it’s like trying to get close to a brick wall) that reactivates Lisa’s meta-position, potentiating another reconceptualization IM and a new insight about the problem (I just don’t want to get too close because I don’t want to be hurt more.).

Synthesis
As the three vignettes show, ambivalence is a common companion of the therapeutic process as clients readjust their own identity trying to accommodate recent changes. Despite this commonality, we believe that these three excerpts present different types of ambivalence, emerging at different moments of the change process and playing different roles in it.

In Sarah’s case, the first reconceptualization IM appeared in Session 7; that is, in the middle of the psychotherapy process. The client initiated the therapeutic dialogue in this session by presenting herself as a changed person (i.e., more assertive). Despite her acknowledgement of some difficulties, there was a perceived rupture in the self, created by the identification with a new way of behaving. Along the elaboration of this innovative way of acting and being, Sarah’s therapist intervened by validating the changes and by helping Sarah to understand how these have been set in motion. In her case, ambivalence emerged at the end of reconceptualization, as she adopted a meta-position and started reflecting upon how she felt during and after the performance of the changes. Thus, we believe that the type of ambivalence exhibited by this client was expressed by a meta-position as a reaction to some unexpected difficulties concerning the enactment of changes. The ambivalence
expressed by this meta-perspective was seen as a cue by her therapist who decided to explore these difficulties, instead of pursuing the elaboration around changes, as she did before. The acknowledgement of difficulties lead, then, to a full return to the problem – the process of mutual in-feeding – as the client disclosed feeling guilty to act assertively and doubting her right to change in her interpersonal relationships. Yet, as soon as Sarah revisited the problematic position, she immediately repositioned herself again as changed, initiating a reflection IM, where she reaffirmed her right to express herself and other people’s duty to acknowledge her views. Therefore, we consider that the ambivalence and mutual in-feeding seen in this excerpt acted as recursive movements of revisiting the past (i.e., the problematic narrative) that, instead of perpetuating problems, renovated the motivation in the direction of further changes (i.e., the adoption of an innovative position and a new self-narrative).

In contrast, in Jan’s case, the first reconceptualization IM appeared in Session 4; that is, in the initial phase of the psychotherapy process. Given that she had already experienced some changes in the form of a symptomatic reduction during the first four weeks of therapy, the fact that the hives came back again triggered implicit ambivalence towards the possibility of effective change. In this case, we believe that the client’s ambivalence – expressed as a vague apprehension towards the meaning of the symptoms’ return – was the manifestation of a fear of failure and of remaining powerless to overcome the problem despite personal efforts to change and seek therapeutic help. The fact that Jan was then able momentarily to disengage from these doubts, and adopt a meta-position towards the event, led to an interesting insight about the symptom that reframed the meaning Jan had attributed to it. Specifically, whereas before the hives could mean the problem regaining control in her life, from that moment on Jan was able to construe the possibility that the symptoms actually act as basic expressions of unattended affective and bodily needs. Consequently, this inter-subjective reframing of the symptoms’ meaning promoted a renewed hope in her and encouraged her to persevere towards change.

Finally, in the third case, the first reconceptualization IM emerged in the first session, the very beginning of the psychotherapy process, in distinct contrast with the other cases. In this case, the meta-position emerged initially, with Lisa reflecting upon her role in the marriage and on how she used to react to her husband. The therapist helped her to understand how she needed to focus more on herself and her feelings. As Lisa tried to distance herself from her husband’s problems in her first
reconceptualization IM, we saw her taking the first steps to hold him accountable for his gambling habit and parenting choices. However, this initial assertive movement led to the emergence of ambivalence, appearing under the form of a self-critical voice that questioned her right to emphasize her needs, and eliciting the sense of failure as a wife giving up on her husband. In an attuned emphatic movement, Lisa’s therapist sensed how poignant these negative feelings were, and acknowledged them, giving room for their expression and exploration in the therapeutic dialogue. Yet, it was the use of a powerful metaphor that resonated with Lisa’s internal experience (like getting close to a brick wall) that restored the path to narrative innovation, potentiating another reconceptualization IM in the client. We consider that this challenging movement was very productive in the repositioning of Lisa back to a focus on herself and the reaffirmation of the legitimacy of her needs.

Given these cases, we may consider three different types of ambivalence: (1) mutual in-feeding, as clients doubt whether to change or remain the same (exhibited by Sarah and Lisa); (2) ambivalence related to the fear of failure in the path to change (Jan); and (3) ambivalence expressed by a meta-position, related to the difficulties triggered by changes (Sarah). Furthermore, ambivalence may appear before (Jan), after (Lisa) or during (Sarah) a reconceptualization IM, when the client adopts the meta-position. In turn, the meta-position can also appear before (Lisa) or more usually during the reconceptualization IM (Sarah and Jan). Regardless of the onset of the meta-position, all the vignettes illustrate that the differentiation and elaboration of the meta-position’s perspective permitted the dissolution of ambivalence, and frequently led to further innovation (in the form of reflection or another reconceptualization IMs). This interpretation is in line with other authors’ arguments for the developmental potential of a meta-position as facilitating therapeutic change (Hermans, 2001, 2003; Leiman and Stiles, 2001; Engle and Arkowitz, 2006; 2008; Gonçalves et al., 2009).

Despite the specific therapeutic interventions exhibited in these situations, we would probably benefit from a more systematic analysis of specific interventions that are more fitted to address ambivalence and transform it productively, promoting a differentiation of the meta-position and facilitating a positive evolution of the therapeutic process. Therefore, an interesting avenue of research in the future could be the pursuit of more intensive case studies and a systematic comparison of therapeutic episodes in them. This could lead to a more precise discrimination of therapeutic interventions more fitted to match certain types
of ambivalence, in order to engage the opposing voices in dialogue and to enhance self-observation skills in the client, facilitating the development of a meta-position and psychological distancing from problems.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we claimed that ambivalence is a persistent feature of the change process, acquiring multiple shapes throughout therapy evolution. Thus, therapists need to be prepared to recognizing the different forms ambivalence can materialize in dialogue – either the mutual in-feeding between problematic and innovative voices or other forms of ambivalence towards change, mainly gravitating around fear and uncertainty towards the future.

We have argued that the differentiation and development of a meta-position in the self is an important tool to deal with this ambivalence and resistance to change, though more systematic studies are needed in order to understand its development and function. This position can not only help to understand ambivalent voices in psychotherapy, acknowledging the underlying self-protective needs that this ambivalent voices can express, but also, most importantly, discover how to surpass them and to foster further changes. It is then, in the delicate balance between old and new, gradually abandoning old voices and rehearsing new ones, where new self-narratives become a possibility and self-development becomes a fact.

Acknowledgements

This chapter was supported by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (FACT), by the Grant PAD/PSI/72846/2006 (Narrative Processes in Psychotherapy, 2007–10) and by the PhD Grant SIR/BD/30880/2006. We are very grateful to Leslie Greenberg and Lynne Angus from York University (Toronto, Canada) for allowing us the use of transcripts from the York Depression Project I. We are also very grateful to Inês Mendes and António Ribeiro for coding the innovative moments in these cases, which allowed to produce this paper.

References


Can a psychological theory be free of the theorist’s self? Or is it possible to demarcate the boundary between the psychological theory and the theorist’s self? This is the central question that has motivated this chapter. Although not with a specific focus on the self of the theorist, this question has been taken up in many earlier explorations. Jung (1933) himself believed that a theory reflects the personal history of its creator and stated that any psychology is a personal confession, well reflected in his widely quoted statement that ‘our way of looking at things is conditioned by what we are’ (p. 119). Maduro and Wheelwright (1977) extended this idea, maintaining that no psychology escapes the elements of its founder’s personal psychology, and thus reflects a subjective bias, even in the very questions it selects to ask and in how it sets out to answer them.

Along these lines, it is proposed here that the theorist’s self plays a vital role in the origins of a psychological theory, and the dynamics within the self impel forward the theory with its concepts and central tenets. However, an exploration of this assumption requires one to understand the self of the theorist and the processes by which it gets represented in the concepts, suppositions and notions of the theory. This chapter explores the assumption using Dialogical Self Theory (DST) to analyse the dynamics of Jung’s self, as it appears in his autobiography, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, and its manifestation in analytical psychology.

Dialogical Self Theory is a response to earlier paradigms that viewed the self as a static, single, bounded and stable entity. It considers the self as socialized, contextualized, historical, embodied and decentralized with a multiplicity of positions that has the potential of engaging in
dialogical relationships with each other (e.g., Hermans, 2001a, 2004). The theory’s two conceptual elements, dialogue and self, build upon Mikhail Bakhtin and William James, respectively (also see chapter 1, this volume). Briefly, the conceptualization of ‘self’ refers to James’s distinction between the ‘I’ (self as knower) and ‘Me’ (self as known). James described the ‘Me’ as everything that a person can call his or her own. This posits the self as extended into the environment, and as open to contrasts, oppositions and negotiations by others who are part of one’s environment. DST goes beyond James’s notion of the extended self in suggesting that opposing others could also be internal, that is, other ‘I’ positions within the person. This refers to the ‘dialogue’ element of the theory, which is best understood in view of Bakhtin’s (1929/1973) notion of a decentralized dialogue, as expressed in a polyphonic novel. The polyphonic novel comprises several independent and mutually opposing viewpoints, embodied in characters involved in dialogical relationships. Similarly, in real life, new meanings emerge both between and within people as a result of dialogical relationships. I-positions are not restricted to internal positions but also encompass the external positions as parts of the person’s extended self in the environment.

In the dialogical self, the ‘I’ takes multiple perspectives, or ‘voices’, which interact with one another. Central to the idea of multiple I-positions is the assumption that the positions could be external or internal. Internal positions are felt as part of oneself (e.g., ‘I’ as a mother, ‘I’ as an enjoyer of life), whereas external positions are felt as part of the environment (e.g., my children, my friend, etc.) (Hermans, 2001a). External positions are internalized ‘voices’ of others in one’s environment; for example, the voice of one’s mother, father, friends, religious community, political community, and so on (Gillespie, 2008). External positions refer to people and objects in the environment that are relevant from one or more internal I-positions. Conversely, internal positions receive their relevance from their relation with one or more external positions (e.g., I feel as a mother because I have children). Internal and external positions receive their significance as emerging from their mutual transactions over time (Hermans, 2001a). Dialogical relationships between I-positions are established insofar as the positions function like ‘voices’ of characters interacting in a story. With changes in context and time new voices may be introduced and earlier positions may be overpowered.

Dialogical Self Theory guides us in systematically exploring the voices that arise within the person’s thoughts and the way in which the person positions him-/herself in relation to these voices. The method
by which this exploration is carried out is called Personal Position Repertoire (PPR) (Hermans, 2001b). The outcome is a matrix of internal (rows) and external (columns) positions filled with prominence ratings (the extent to which a particular internal position is prominent in relation to a particular external position, on a 0 to 5 scale), which on analyses becomes valuable in understanding the organization and content of the self. Considering autobiography as a verbal discourse that can be subjected to a dialogical analysis (Wertsch, 1991), this study draws on the works of Gillespie (2005, 2008) and Wagoner (2008), both of whom have applied Hermans’s notion of positions to explore the author’s self in a narrative such as an autobiography.

The study reported in the following has subjected Jung’s (1965) Memories, Dreams, Reflections to a dialogical analysis, exploring Jung’s positions or ‘voices’, and their reflections in his analytical psychology. At the outset, it mapped out all of Jung’s internal and external positions as given in the narrative. In a second stage, all the internal positions were coded for their importance and intensity in relation to external positions, depending upon the frequency and intensity with which each internal position aligned itself with the external positions. In the final stage of the analysis, the dynamics of the positions were explored in terms of transient and established positions, hegemonic and weak positions, coalitions, conflicts, and associations of different positions. The enduring positions – noted for their continuance from Jung’s childhood memories to later life memories – were focused upon for their relevance in the making of his theory.

**Memories, Dreams, Reflections**

Widely held as the most comprehensive account of Jung’s life, Memories, Dreams, Reflections (henceforth: MDR) is a detailed autobiographical account of his childhood, personal life, and explorations into the psyche. The book’s opening lines present the reader with the fundamental theme of his life, namely, self-realization. Essentially, the book is an account of his intellectual, philosophical and psychological attempts to reconcile with his own inner self: ‘My life is a story of the self-realization of the unconscious. Everything in the unconscious seeks out outward manifestation, and the personality too desires to evolve out of its unconscious conditions and to experience itself as a whole’ (MDR, p. 3).

The pages of MDR are filled with vivid images, dreams, allegories, symbols and visions, representing Jung’s intimate experiences, all of
which help the reader to behold Jung’s life and works in their fullness. This aside, two features of the book make it particularly valuable for this chapter’s theme. First, MDR is at once both chronological and thematic. Like a typical autobiography, it tells Jung’s life story in a chronological sequence from his earliest memories until close to the end of his life. But the narrative is also presented as a thematic organization which subdues the linear history, so as to construct an argument for his unique psychological perceptions (Rowland, 2005). Thus, it also expounds Jung’s sporadic and scattered intellectual journey, based on his overwhelming psychic experiences, which is more than a mere recording of events in a chronological order. Second, although told as a monologue in the first person, the autobiography is not just a narrating ‘I’ telling about various ‘me’. It is also replete with various external voices that crowd Jung’s dialogical self. Together, these features render the book a perfect choice for investigating the tricky and complex boundary between the theorist’s self and the theory’s contours.

As a memoir, MDR is a class apart from many other autobiographies, for Jung, in narrating his life, does not position himself as a mere narrator, recorder or witness of the events that get unfolded in his life. Rather, we see an active and deliberate interpreter observing, analysing and interpreting each and every event that unfolds; the narration is about the reactions and positionings that are generated in his self in response to those events.

**Jung and analytical psychology: A dialogical analysis**

Analytical psychology was partly a protest against nineteenth-century rationalistic and scientific ‘Psychology without the Psyche’ (Jung, 1934, p. 660). Disregarding the prevalent conceptualization of mind as wholly dependent on material causation, Jung passionately advocated a psychology with psyche. Largely experiential, his attempts at exploring the mysterious depths of the unconscious brought him closer to the conviction that ‘consciousness is a late born descendent of the unconscious psyche’ (Jung, 1933, p. 191). Synthesizing a wide variety of fields of thought, such as philosophy, psychiatry, Gnosticism, alchemy, Kabala, Buddhism, Hinduism and more, through the filter of his personal outlook, he arrived at the central concepts of analytical psychology, such as the collective unconscious, archetypes, personality types, and more. These concepts were put forward at various times during his life, but have converged into the central precept of analytical psychology; namely, self-realization, which Jung maintained is achieved through
the process of individuation. This is considered to be an overarching goal of analytical psychology, and is ascertained by Jung to be of critical importance to human beings and modern society. Analytical psychology is distinctive in its systematic understanding of the human psyche by way of experiential and yet rationalistic exploration of the world of dreams, myths, symbols, folklores and so forth.

Reading MDR, it is striking how complexity within Jung’s self has brought about a comprehensive psychological theory. From the dialogical self perspective, this complexity can be understood as an evolution of a compound array of I-positions that functioned in myriad ways to help Jung make sense of his inner as well as outer worlds. Reading through the book, we notice perpetual and stable positions, the emergence and disappearance of ephemeral transient positions, voices that get caught in the dynamics of dominating, authoritative, and hegemonic positions and counterhegemonic voices, and the synthesis and coalition of positions.

Any discussion of Jung’s dialogical self should start with the position of ‘Observer’, or meta-position, that captures the reader’s attention from the Prologue to Retrospect, the concluding part. It is one of several stable positions, and so central that its presence and impact on the making of analytical psychology must not be overlooked. Thus, in any randomly picked chapter or paragraph, the reader may notice this omnipresent position. On superficial reading, however, this position might easily be mistaken for the narrating ‘I’. The distinction lies in the voices generated by those positions. While the narrating ‘I’ merely functions as a reporter and chronicler without any deliberate attempt to observe the other positions, the meta-/observer-position assumes the primary function of observing the dynamics of other positions. Unlike the surfacing of a meta-position in a gradually maturing self, Jung’s meta-position is not one that emerged in the later phases of his life, but was quite peculiarly present from his very early days on:

I found that they [schoolmates] alienated me from myself. When I was with them I became different from the way I was at home....It seemed to me that the change in myself was due to the influence of my schoolfellows, who somehow mislead me or compelled me to be different from what I thought I was....[Although] nightly prayers did...grant me a ritual protection...the new peril lurked by day. It was as if I sensed a splitting of myself, and feared it. My inner security was threatened. (MDR, p. 19)
Many a time, the meta-position was instrumental in keeping check of the inconsistencies and conflicts among a number of dual positions in his integration of the many voices generated by different fields of thought and philosophies. ‘Schopenhauer and Christianity would not square with one another’, he recalls one inner conflict; and adds in the same context, concerning the two conflicting personalities that he observed in his self (No. 1 and No. 2),

No. 1 wanted to free himself from the pressure or melancholy of No. 2. It was not No. 2 who was depressed, but No. 1 when he remembered No. 2. It was just at this time that out of the clash of the opposites, the first systematic fantasy of my life was born. (MDR, p. 80)

The meta-position prevented surrender to any particular position in the sphere that generated insight into the dynamics of positions, and influenced his interpretation of many dreams, visions and psychic experiences. Ultimately, this seems to be the central position that has rendered the perfect balance between empiricism and phenomenology, which is characteristic of the major postulates of analytical psychology. Despite being saturated with many fields of thought and philosophical paradigms, Jung’s self was never taken over by any particular position or disharmonized due to the cacophony of voices, which owes much to the ‘observer’ meta-position.

Nonetheless, two other stable positions, ‘I as integrating’ and ‘I as interpreting’, deserve equal attention in that regard, for their indomitable presence in Jung’s self has also played a great role in delivering a theory as thorough and comprehensive as analytical psychology is. Although present from his earlier days on, these two positions had gathered a considerably greater momentum during his student days as well as work years. Often, these two positions functioned in unison with each other, which helped Jung meaningfully to integrate his dreams, fantasies, visions, deliberations, and so on, with the knowledge he acquired from various fields of thought, hence to formulate the different postulates he put forward in advancing his theory.

Jung’s integrator position and its reflection in analytical psychology are particularly evident in the following excerpt: ‘The material of analytical psychology, its principal facts, consists of statements – of statements that occur frequently in consistent form at various places and at various times’ (MDR, p. 217). In one instance, the Biblical figures of Elijah and Salome, which appeared in his dreams, were likened to figures in Gnostic traditions. From Elijah developed his imaginary
Philemon, who had a great influence on Jung’s understanding that elements of the psyche have a life of their own. The figure of Philemon, which he understood as a reflection of superior insight, was compared to the Indian idea of ‘Ghostly [spirit teachers] gurus’ (MDR, p. 184). Philemon was later relativized by the emergence of ‘Ka Soul’, influenced by his readings of ancient Egyptian mythology. The two figures were then integrated through his studies of alchemy, which has been one of the major influences in his understandings of the unconscious.

Many similar instances, in which Jung integrates the contents of his dreams and visions with knowledge gathered from various disciplines (such as Gnosticism, alchemy and psychiatry), have helped him to strengthen the concepts of analytical psychology, especially the concept of the collective unconscious. It might not be an overstatement to say that the concepts of individuation and synchronicity owe much to the integrator position in Jung’s self. The process of individuation entails (i.e., one’s encounter with the unconscious and its symbols, and the eventual reconciliation of dual, opposite or disparate positions in oneself) may be influenced by, as well as likened to, the mechanism of the integrator position. The following excerpt clearly elucidates this assertion:

Only after I had familiarized myself with alchemy did I realize that the unconscious is a process, and that the psyche is transformed or developed by the relationship of the ego to the contents of the unconscious. In individual cases that transformation can be read from dreams and fantasies. In collective life it has left its deposit principally in the various religious systems and their changing symbols. Through the study of these collective transformation processes and through understanding of alchemical symbolism I arrived at the central concept of my Psychology: the process of individuation. (MDR, p. 209)

In a similar vein, the conjecture of synchronicity – which Jung posited as the principle behind psychological processes that meaningfully relates two causally unrelated events (with particular reference to one’s connection to the unconscious) – is possibly influenced by this overarching position:

I had very soon seen that analytical psychology coincided in a most curious way with alchemy. The experiences of the alchemists were, in a sense, my experiences, and their world was my world. This was,
of course, a momentous discovery: I had stumbled upon the historical counterpart of my psychology of the unconscious. The possibility of a comparison with alchemy and the uninterrupted intellectual chain back to Gnosticism, gave substance to my psychology. (MDR, p. 205)

Some of the other dominant positions evident in Jung’s self are characteristic of a scholar-philosopher’s self. Throughout the autobiography we encounter dominant positions such as (‘I as...’) sceptical; analysing; retrospecting; synthesizing; conforming/nonconforming; contemplative; confronting; spectating; inquiring; self-examining; insightful; arbitrating; arguing; investigating; comparing/contrasting; critiquing; introspecting; and so on.

However, the concept of numinosity (i.e., a certain psychic energy or quality that influences people without their conscious will), which is so central to analytic psychology, should be attributed to some of Jung’s distinctive positions in his childhood and formative years. These include (‘I as...’) dreamer; ethereal; imaginative; related; solitary; God’s image; Christian; religious; Baseler (native of Basel); nature lover; experiencer; supernatural; superstitious; eternal; universal; reticent or secretive; curious; sensitive; psychic; spiritual; Oriental; meta-physical; history seeker; occult investigator; anti-materialistic; Goethe admirer; Schopenhauer admirer; Kant admirer; alchemist; Gnostic believer; intuitive; instinctual; and so on. At least some of these positions, if not all, require discussion, given their prominence in the position repertoire and their involvement in the concepts of analytical psychology.

One of the typical positions in Jung’s self, which assumed much significance in the position repertoire, was the ‘I as related’ position. This is indeed reflected in the theory of the personality types, which he said was an ‘effort to deal with the relationship of the individual to the world, to people and things’; and in his monograph, Psychological Types, which ‘discussed the various aspects of consciousness, the various attitudes the conscious mind might take toward the world, and thus constitutes a psychology of consciousness regarded from what might be called a clinical angle’ (MDR, p. 207).

Jung’s position of ‘I as nature lover’ is another voice that emerged as significant. As expected, it has played a crucial role in his relationship with nature, the mystery of which he held in high regard. This is reflected in many of his understandings concerning the collective unconscious, especially his belief that human beings are connected with fellow humans and with nature in general. One may also note...
the interest he later developed for disciplines such as zoology, animal psychology, and so on, in his attempts to explore the depths of the unconscious.

The ‘I as a Baseler’ is a quite frequently exposed position, especially in his student and work years, and his profound inclination for Romantic philosophy can at least be partially attributed to this position. Douglas (1997) has also observed the relevance of Jung’s native country to the formation of his character. The influence of a theologically grounded Baseler mother and a protestant Baseler father (Van der Post, 1975; Hannah, 1976; Wolff-Windegg, 1976), and the contrast between the Swiss austerity and pragmatism, on the one side, and the abstraction of Basel’s romantic topography, on the other, is indeed reflected in the inseparable blend of rationalism and mysticism evident in his personality and works. Describing pictures that hanged in the house where he lived as a child, he tells,

There was another old painting in that room, which now hangs in my son’s house: a landscape of Basel dating from the early nineteenth century. Often I would steal into that dark, sequestered room and sit for hours in front of the pictures, gazing at all this beauty, it was the only beautiful thing I knew. (MDR, p. 16)

For as long as he could remember, Basel remained his intellectual and emotional refuge throughout his life, even while, at times, he felt weighed down by its conventionality. This is quite earnestly narrated in his student years’ memoirs, in the context of his stay in Zurich. Recounting his resistance against his stereotyped life in Basel, he notes that the ‘intellectual atmosphere of Basel seemed to me enviably cosmopolitan, but the tradition was too much for me’; and contrasting it with Zurich,

[In Zurich] you were not weighed down by the brown fog of the centuries, even though one missed the rich background of culture [Basel]. For Basel I have to this day a nostalgic weakness, despite the fact that I know it no longer as it was. (MDR, p. 111)

Jung was quite aware of the influence of Basel’s intellectual and historical atmosphere on his work and thoughts and, he notes, in the course of his reflections on Sigmund Freud. As may be seen from the following excerpt, his Basel upbringing and its environment, which shaped his interests in philosophy and history, eventually influenced
the development of a theory grounded in historical understandings\(^1\) and Romantic philosophy. Contrasting his intellectual attitude with that of Freud,

I had grown up in the intensely historical atmosphere of Basel at the end of nineteenth century, and had acquired, thanks to reading the old philosophers, some knowledge of the history of Psychology. When I thought about dreams and the contents of the unconscious, I never did so without making historical comparisons; in my student days I always used Krug’s old dictionary of philosophy. I was especially familiar with the writers of the eighteenth and nineteenth century. Theirs was the world which had formed the atmosphere of my first-story salon [in the ‘house’ dream]. (MDR, p. 160–1)

Certainly, analytic psychology, as well as Jung’s character, is, to a great extent attributable to the Baseler position, for the perfect blend of intellectualism and Romanticism evident in the concepts.

However, that blend is more directly a representation of two conflicting positions, which he called Personality No.1 and Personality No.2. These positions emerged somewhere in the beginning of his school years, and continued throughout his life. Although equally potent, the rational and enlightened Personality No. 1 often triumphed over the idealistic, mysterious, numinous, hidden and melancholic Personality No.2. The following clearly show the presence as well as Jung’s awareness of these two conflicting personalities (i.e., positions) in his self,

In fact it seemed to me that the high mountains, the rivers, lakes, trees, flowers, and animals far better exemplified the essence of God than men with their ridiculous clothes, their meanness, vanity, mendacity, and abhorrent egotism – all qualities with which I was only too familiar from myself, that is, from personality No.1, the schoolboy of 1890. Besides his world there existed another realm, like a temple in which anyone who entered was transformed and suddenly overpowered by a vision of the whole cosmos, so that he could only marvel and admire, forgetful of himself. Here lived the ‘Other,’ who knew God as a hidden, personal and at the same suprapersonal secret.... I therefore sought the peace and solitude of this ‘Other,’ personality No.2. (MDR, p. 45)

It may be noted that Jung had intense awareness of the above facet of his self, which he often considered as his true self. Further examples:
The play and counter play between personalities No.1 and No.2, which has run through my whole life, has nothing to do with a 'split' or dissociation in the ordinary medical sense. On the contrary, it is played out in every individual. In my life No.2 has been of prime importance, and I have always tried to make room for anything that wanted to come to me from within. (MDR, p. 45)

I continued to waver between science and humanities. Both powerfully attracted me. I was beginning to realize that No.2 had no pied-à-terre. In him I was lifted beyond the here and now; in him I felt myself a single eye in a thousand-eyed universe, but incapable of moving so much as a pebble upon the earth. No.1 rebelled against this passivity; he wanted to be up and doing, but for the present he was caught in an insoluble conflict. (MDR, p. 75)

These opposing positions, in association with a whole array of their respective parallel positions, continued their dynamics throughout Jung's life, with alternating transitory moments of victory for either of the two. What is important to note here is that the conflicts between these two positions would have gone unnoticed – and consequently a great deal of the insights of analytical psychology would have gone into obscurity – if it were not for the 'observer' position. Jung arrived at his preliminary understandings of the collective unconscious and the archetype of the shadow from the conflicts that had arisen out of those two positions. The following exemplify the dynamics of their conflict,

Through No.1's eyes I saw myself as a rather disagreeable and moderately gifted young man with vaulting ambitions, an undisciplined temperament, and dubious manners, alternating between naïve enthusiasm and fits of childish disappointment, in his innermost essence a hermit and obscurantist.... No.2 regarded No. 1 as a difficult and thankless moral task, a lesson that had to be got through somehow, complicated by a variety of faults such as spells of laziness, despondency, depression, inept enthusiasm for ideas...[etc.]. No.2 had no definable character at all;... When No.2 predominated, No.1 was contained and obliterated in him, just as, conversely, No. 1 regarded No.2 as a region of inner darkness. No.2 felt that any conceivable expression of himself would be like a stone thrown over the edge of the world, dropping soundlessly into infinite night. But in him (No. 2) light reigned, as in the spacious halls of a royal palace whose high casements open upon a landscape flooded with sunlight. (MDR, p. 86–7)
He had a dream that illustrated these dynamics. In the dream, he is walking in a windy foggy night in an unknown place, his hands cupped around a tiny light that might be extinguished at any moment, feeling that everything depended on keeping that little light alive, and then a terrifying presence comes up behind him. He reflects,

This dream was a great illumination for me. Now I knew that No.1 was the bearer of the light, and that No.2 followed him like a shadow. My task was to shield the light and not look back at the *vita peracta*; this was evidently a forbidden realm of light of a different sort. (MDR, p. 88)

The message, he concludes, is,

I must leave No.2 behind me, that was clear. But under no circumstances ought I to deny him to myself or declare him invalid. That would have been a self-mutilation, and would moreover have deprived me of any possibility of explaining the origin of dreams. For there was no doubt in my mind that No. 2 had something to do with the creation of dreams... (MDR, p. 89)

Subsequently, ‘a schism had taken place between me and No.2 with the result that “I” was assigned to No.1 and was separated from No.2 in the same degree, who thereby acquired, as it were, an autonomous personality’ (MDR, p. 89–90).

Despite the schism between No.1 and No.2 personalities, each in its own way contributed to analytical psychology. We see a rational No.1 that carefully maps the theory and presents its empirically grounded psychotherapeutic agenda, and No.2 with its interests in the psyche’s heights and depths, the unconscious, mysteries and the hidden, whether in hermetic science and religion, in the occult, or in fantasies and dreams (Douglas, 1997). Indeed, analytical psychology still reels under the impact of the two opposing positions, not being able to reconcile between mysticism and rationalism.

The opposing positions of Personalities No.1 and No. 2 gathered greater strength in Jung’s later years with the emergence of conflicting positions, represented in opposites such as (‘I as...’) positivist/romanticist; objective/subjective: scientist/artist; pro-concrete/pro-abstract. Although Jung was influenced by positivism to a great extent, the subjective, pro-abstract, and romanticist selves often dominated and this may be considered a possible explanation for the rather sceptical stance
he took towards scientifically validating his ideas. Understandably, it also explains why Jung often ‘sought confirmation for his theory in myths, legends folklores, dreams and fantasies of his patients’ (Hjelle and Ziegler, p. 177).

The deep rift between those opposing positions also underpinned Jung’s theoretical falling out with Freud. Worthy of special mention is that Jung understood ‘libido’ differently than Freud,

My idea was to escape from the then prevailing concretism of the libido theory – in other words, I wished no longer to speak of the instincts of hunger, aggression and sex, but to regard all these phenomenon as expressions of psychic energy. (MDR, p. 208)

Concretism could be viewed as corresponding to a characteristic of Personality No.1, while his abstract concept of ‘psychic energy’ could be linked to No. 2.

The objective-positivist and subjective-romanticist voices warred throughout Jung’s career, frequently with the subjective-romanticist voice emerging as the hegemonic one. On many occasions in his work life, the romanticist and Personality No. 2 positions formed a merge, and this strengthened his notion of archetypes and the collective unconscious as numinous (rather than empirical) phenomena. Thus, analytical psychology, instead of being a psychology based in rigorous scientific enquiry and empirical research, rather is driven by the irrational, inner, individual reality, exploring the unknown and enigmatic. However, scientific objectivity and reason were not completely lost in the conflicts that ensued, possibly due to the interference of other positions, such as the sceptic, reasoning, rational, and logical voices. This has rendered the postulates of analytical psychology as a dialectical synthesis of reason and subjectivity, in which reason is applied to establish the reality of the irrational.

In contrast with the above conflicting positions, conflicts that often took place between the ‘I as a scientist’ and ‘I as a creative artist’ resulted in the former emerging victorious. Hence, on many occasions, the dominating voice of the scientist position weakened the creative artist voice, which is why we now see Jung as a theorist and not as an artist, despite the fact that he was artistically talented and possessed aestheticizing tendencies. The following gives a good example of an instance in which the scientist voice emerges victorious,

I wrote these fantasies down first in the Black Book; later, I transferred them to the Red Book, which I also embellished with drawings. It
contains most of my mandala drawings. In the Red book I tried an aesthetic elaboration of my fantasies, but never finished it. I became aware that I had not yet found the right language, that I still had to translate it into something else. Therefore I gave up this aestheticizing tendency in good time, in favour of a rigorous process of understanding. For me, reality meant scientific comprehension. (MDR, p. 188)

Whilst conflicts between positions imply the active presence of all the voices in question, there are dynamics or dialogical relationships which result in the deactivation of certain positions. From a dialogical self perspective, Jung’s self is no exception to this, and indeed certain positions that we come across in early chapters of MDR seem to wane off, with no outlets or voices, in later stages of his life. In particular, some positions which are indisputably present in his early years (such as ‘I’ as inadequate, self-doubting, powerless, inferior, etc.) are rarely chanced upon in the narratives of his later years. However, a position of that category that has persisted to the later stages is ‘I as vulnerable’. We often see it in opposition to another voice that has been instrumental in all his confrontations with unconscious, namely, ‘I as daring’. It is this position that has negated all other opposing positions, including an ‘I as a conventional psychiatrist’ position, in following an uncertain path to the depths of his own unconsciousness.

The examination of internal I-positions and their dynamics, as outlined previously, provides a fairly good picture of the functioning of the self, but it would be an error to ignore the unfolding of those positions in relation to external I-positions, that is, others’ voices as internalized by the person. The external positions that resonate in Jung’s internal positions include, prominently, his father, mother, maid, Jesus, Goethe, Satan, Freud, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Schiller, Nietzsche, Scholmen, Faust and patients.

Among the positions calling for deeper analysis is his mother, in whom Jung perceived a duality,

There was an enormous difference between my mother’s two personalities. That was why as a child I often had anxiety dreams about her. By day she was a loving mother, but at night she seemed uncanny. Then she was like one of those seers who is at the same time a strange animal, like a priestess in a bear’s cave. Archaic and ruthless; ruthless as truth and nature. At such moments she was the embodiment of what I have called the ‘natural mind’. (MDR, p. 50)
It could be speculated that Jung’s own duality, Personalities No. 1 and No. 2, is a re-enactment of that split. As predominant voices in his self, the split positions of his mother also lead to two inferences in analytical psychology. First, analytical psychology’s underlying principle of a ‘natural’ mind can be best understood as a manifestation of his (‘I’ as my) ‘uncanny mother’ (position), which he considered an embodiment of ‘natural mind’. Second, a reconciliation of opposites, a theme so very often recurring in Jung’s self as well as his theory, is perhaps an outcome of his inherent need to reconcile the contrasting voices presented by his mother positions internalized by him. Interestingly, Satinover (1985) has pointed out that Jung’s experience of his mother was later transformed to his concept of anima (the feminine in men).

However, the experience and conceptualization of anima can be firmly attributed to another of Jung’s prominent external positions, his maid. This position and her voice evoked the qualities of anima as he later conceptualized it. One of his earliest memories is how his maid looked after him when his mother was away: ‘I still remember her picking me up and laying my head against her shoulder’; her physical appearance, which was quite different from his mother’s, seemed to him ‘very strange and yet strangely familiar’.

It was as though she belonged not to my family but only to me, as though she were connected in some way with other mysterious things I could not understand. This type of girl later became a component of my anima. (MDR, p. 8)

The present selective attention to the powerful voices of split mother and the maid should not be taken as suggesting that other positions were insignificant. Each of the positions mentioned earlier too have prompted their own dynamics, and added to the totality of Jung’s self and its whole dynamics. But such a comprehensive analysis is beyond this chapter’s scope. Furthermore, the repertory of positions mentioned so far did not remain static. The positioning, re-positioning and emergence of new voices continued in ceaseless flux. The aim here has been to capture and present the most salient voices and their generally observable dynamics.

Undoubtedly, it is these ceaseless dynamics that bring forth the emergence of new positions in Jung’s self, positions that were once ideas drawn out by the particular orchestration of former positions. Thus, at many a point in the narrative, we come across instances in which Jung’s shadow, anima and other archetypal figures are in dialogue with
former positions in his self. For example, the anima voice took a concrete manifestation later in his adult life. In a famous incident, when he was writing down some fantasies he was having, he heard a feminine voice from nowhere telling him that what he was doing was art. He responded, ‘I said very emphatically to this voice that my fantasies had nothing to do with art, and I felt a great inner resistance. No voice came through, however, and I kept on writing’ (MDR, p. 185–6). Then the voice asserted again that it was art, and Jung prepared for an argument; but when none came forth, ‘I reflected that the “woman within me” did not have the speech centres I had. And so I suggested that she use mine. She did so and came through with a long statement’ (MDR, p. 186). Understanding this voice as his anima,

At first it was the negative aspect of the anima that most impressed me. I felt a little awed by her. It was like the feeling of an invisible presence in the room. Then a new idea came to me: in putting down all this material for analysis, I was in effect writing letters to the anima, that is, to a part of myself with a different viewpoint from my conscious one. (MDR, p. 186)

Concluding thoughts

In sum, the narrative in Memories, Dreams, Reflections shows Jung as being caught in a flux of many complementary, competing and sometimes contradictory voices; and this flux has favourably resulted in the comprehensive theory of analytical psychology.

The above analysis of Jung’s self and its reflection in analytical psychology is by no means comprehensive or complete. It has been based on a single source, that is, Jung’s autobiography. Jung’s works are so vast in scope, depth and extent, that it requires a more profound way of approaching the task. Nevertheless, the present study is valuable in that it gives insight into the many voices that populated Jung’s self, and eventually have shaped analytical psychology. There is perhaps no other psychological theory that bears the characteristics of its author’s self to such a great extent as does analytical psychology. The dynamics in Jung’s psyche (visions, mystical experiences, dreams, etc.) often caused dramatic twists and turns in his theorizing, and resulted in his theory being subjected to many revisions and substantial changes. Over the course of its development, it has come to incorporate new elements, at times even conflicting propositions, so as to accommodate Jung’s ever-new experiences and reflections.
Indeed, this is what makes DST particularly appropriate in this context. No other approach may do justice in capturing the richness and essence of the dynamics of Jung’s voices that resulted in analytical psychology.

Notes

1. Elsewhere Jung takes pride in Basel’s rich traditions, especially the carnival Fassnacht. He commented that it is ‘an amazing thing in a modern town. These things originate before mind and consciousness. In the beginning there was action, and only afterwards did people invent opinions about them, or a dogma, an explanation for what they were doing’ (Jung, 1984, p. 331). The reference to the collective unconscious cannot be overlooked.

2. Jung’s understanding of a ‘natural mind’ is clearly mentioned in one of his works: ‘The mind is not cultivated for its own sake but usually remains in its original condition, altogether primitive, unrelated, and ruthless, but also as true, and sometimes as profound as nature herself’ (Jung, 1972, p. 23). Indeed, it is these very characteristics that he attributed to the (position) of ‘uncanny mother’ (archaic and ruthless, ruthless as truth and nature), which he also supposed was the embodiment of ‘natural mind’.

References


—— (1932) ‘Psychotherapists or the clergy’ (CW.11).
—— (1934) ‘Basic postulates of analytical psychology’ (CW Vol. 8).


Creativity has intrigued theoreticians and researchers of the psyche for a long time. Besides the voluminous body of Jungian and psychoanalytical work, there are many psychological models of creative processes. Psychological inquiries tend to focus on the forms in which this process manifests (Taylor et al., 2002–3; Blanche, 2007) and the required conditions (Amabile, 1985; Jamison, 1989; Post, 1994; Pohlman, 1996; Kohanyi, 2005a, 2005b). Drawing upon Hubert Hermans’s theory of the dialogical self, this chapter looks at how dialogicality enters the creative process in literature, philosophy and science.

**The dialogical self: The theory and the inspirations behind it**

In the past two decades, the dialogical self has become one of the most intensively developed psychological theories. In developing his concept, Hermans draws upon William James’s view on the self and Mikhail M. Bakhtin’s notion of the polyphonic novel (e.g., Hermans et al., 1992; Chapter 1, this volume).

William James’s (1890) distinction between the ‘I’ and the ‘Me’ is a classic idea in the psychology of the self. The ‘I’, the self-as-knower, continuously organizes and interprets experiences in a purely subjective manner. We realize the ‘I’ in the experiences of continuity, distinctness, and volition. The ‘Me’, the self-as-known, is defined as the empirical self. In its broadest sense, it is everything that the person can call his/her own, ‘not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, his lands and horses, and yacht and bank-account’ (James, 1890, p. 291). This implies that the empirical self
is extended towards specific aspects of one’s environment (Hermans, 2003, 2004).

Bakhtin’s concept of the polyphonic novel identifies a unique principle underlying a literary genre that he has found in Dostoevsky’s works:

A plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousness, a genuine polyphony of fully valid voices, is in fact the chief characteristic of Dostoevsky’s novels. What unfolds in his works is not a multitude of characters and fates in a single objective world, illuminated by a single authorial consciousness; rather a plurality of consciousnesses, with equal rights and each with its own world, combine but are not merged in the unity of the event. Dostoevsky’s major heroes are, by the very nature of his creative design, not only objects of authorial discourse but also subjects of their own directly signifying discourse. (Bakhtin, 1961/2003, p. 6–7)

Thus, the essential feature of the polyphonic novel is the confrontation between different points of view, represented by characters who are involved in dialogical relationships with each other, even with the author. Dostoevsky steps back from the role of an omniscient narrator, and instead lets his characters see the world with their own eyes as independent thinkers, each with their own worldview, authoring their own ideology (Bakhtin, 1961/2003; Hermans, 1999a, 2003, 2004).

The dialogical self is similarly conceptualized as a dynamic multiplicity of relatively autonomous I-positions in an imaginal landscape of the mind (Hermans, 1996, 1999a, 2003, 2004). As the intentional subject, the ‘I’ can move, as in space, from one position to another in accordance with situational and temporal changes. The ‘I’ has the capacity to imaginatively endow each position with a voice, so that each of them has a story to tell about its own experiences from its own stance. In that sense, each position is like the author of its own story. Because the ‘I’ fluctuates between different positions, the voices function like interacting characters in a story, involved in a process of question and answer, agreement and disagreement (Hermans et al., 1992; Hermans, 2003, 2004). These imaginary interactions between positions are called inner dialogues.

Each of one’s I-positions can become an internal interlocutor. Internal and external positions may be distinguished. An internal position is experienced as a part of myself (e.g., ‘I as a mother’, ‘I as somebody who
likes to play the piano’), whereas an external position is experienced as a part of the environment which could be referred to as ‘mine’ (e.g., ‘my child’, ‘my music teacher’). The dialogical self has permeable boundaries between the internal and external positions, and it is also open to the outside world. This is how some new positions may enter the self-space. For example, when a child goes to school for the first time, she meets a teacher (external position) and finds herself in the new position of being a pupil (internal position). Generally, we can say that newly met people may create new positions within our selves, insofar as they are admitted to our self-space (in other words, we perceive them as ‘my ...’). However, it does not necessarily mean that the ‘I’ adopts the other person’s perspective. Rather, the dialogical self permits us to construct another person as a position representing an alternative perspective of the world. That perspective may or may not be congruent with the actual perspective of the other person. Sometimes the position of the other might be totally imagined (Hermans et al., 1992; Hermans, 2001, 2003).

The following propositions seem to be the most relevant towards understanding creativity in the light of the Dialogical Self Theory (DST):

- The dialogical self has open boundaries, thus allowing new I-positions to enter the self-space.
- I-positions are relatively autonomous in terms of how they think, act and experience themselves and the outer world.
- I-positions differ from each other in their emotional and possibly also cognitive characteristics.
- I-positions are involved in dialogical relationships with each other and, resulting in the creation of new meanings.

**Dialogicality in literary creativity**

According to DST, the fictional character that comes into being in the creative process could be treated as a special kind of I-position. This proposition is supported both anecdotally and theoretically.

Some literary writers admit that a character created by them is part of themselves – either expressing a potential for thinking and acting that has not been realized by them, an alternative to own lives which never became fact, or their own voice which is barely audible or even totally drowned out in their ordinary lives (Jaworski, 1993;
Żurawska-Żyła, 2008). The Czech-born writer Milan Kundera told Antoine de Gaudemar (1987) in one of their interviews,

To write, I have to imagine situations that are not experienced, and to appeal to the characters that are my experimental ‘ego’. That is why the novel... is more than personal: in its characters a writer perceives his own abilities, he sees people who he could have been or who he could become. (Online)³

Similarly, the French writer Julien Green said about one of his works, ‘In this novel, like in all the others, autobiographical fragments are innumerable, although it seemed to me that I had made up everything’ (Jaworski, 1993, p. 77).

According to Bakhtin (as described in Todorov, 1983), two steps are involved in every creative act: (1) empathy, in which the writer puts him-/herself in the place of the character, and (2) exotopy (‘outsidedness’), in which the writer returns to the authorial position, and is able to complete the character’s consciousness with elements that are external to it and, at the same time, indispensable for that consciousness’s existence. Although Bakhtin uses different terms, his ideas appear to concern the same processes described by DST. Put in Hermans’s terminology, Bakhtin’s empathy means that writers put their ‘I’ in a position representing a given character, and in this way endow that position with a voice. Exotopy means that the writers return to their own I-position, from which they can write down the character’s words and create descriptive characteristics. Translating Bakhtin’s ideas into Hermans’s framework leads to the conclusion that the writer’s movement between two (or more) points of view is a necessary condition for creating a credible fictional character. Thus, it is probable that literary creativity involves the same mechanism people use in everyday imaginary dialogues.

Bakhtin’s view of the creative process and Hermans’s approach to internal dialogues share an emphasis on the relative autonomy of fictional characters or I-positions, respectively. In the dialogical self, the autonomy of an I-position means that if it presents a hitherto unvoiced viewpoint, the person can discover information that might be surprising but, at the same time, apt and helpful, for example, seeking a solution to a personal problem (Hermans and Kempen, 1993; Hermans, 1996, 1999a).

To Bakhtin, the autonomy of characters in literary fiction was not immediately obvious, but derived from his analysis of Dostoevsky’s works (Todorov, 1983). He subsequently theorized the dialogical character of
creativity in literature. Initially, Bakhtin assumed that human beings cannot be understood in isolation from the relationships which they have with others. As a consequence, the other is necessary to complete, at least temporarily, the perception of oneself, which otherwise is only partially realized by the individual. Only the activity of the other can create a personality which is externally finished. If the other does not form it, this personality cannot exist. Everything in the human consciousness which concerns a person comes from the outside world. Human beings only become aware of themselves as individuals when they get to know themselves in relation to others, through these others, and with the help of these others. This conception led to Bakhtin’s assumption that during the exotopy phase, the writer’s consciousness completely encompasses the character, and ‘lets a reader always know where the truth is’ (Todorov, 1983, p. 464). Thus, the writer functions as an omniscient narrator, who knew every character’s step before it happens. In analysing Dostoevsky’s works, Bakhtin perceived ‘the crisis of authorship’ which manifested itself in characters dominating the authorial voice. This was first treated as indicating the writer’s incompetence, and was sharply criticized. Soon, however, Bakhtin radically changed his opinion about Dostoevsky’s novels, coming to the conclusion that his exotopy surpassed that of other writers,

because it does not close the hero within the author’s consciousness, and calls into question the very concept of the supremacy of one consciousness over another. Dostoevsky’s character is an imperfect, unfinished and heterogeneous being, but that is the issue of its superiority, since we are all...only imperfect. (Todorov, 1983, p. 465–6)

This means that, finally, Bakhtin not only concedes the characters’ autonomy but also notices its great literary potential. The equal treatment of the writer’s and character’s consciousnesses gives rise to a new quality in literature, namely the polyphonic novel. On this basis, Bakhtin formulates his theory of the dialogical nature of literary creativity,

There are some events which, by their nature, cannot be developed within the limits of one and the same consciousness, but which demand two unidentical consciousnesses. Their essential, constitutive element is the reference of one of them to the second, just as to another one. This is characteristic of all the homogeneous and irreversible creative events which bring about something new. (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 133)
In this sense, creativity requires that writers do not define their characters, but treat them as separate persons, to whom one can talk and not know in what the mutual exchange of thoughts may result; that writers regard the character as a personality who is able to surprise its creator. This is epitomized in Dostoevsky’s works.

Dostoevsky’s characters have such an autonomy, which attracts readers, but at the same time was a source of trouble for the writer. It is worth noting the example of Ivan in *The Brothers Karamazov*. Cary (1958) suggests that, in accordance with Dostoevsky’s intentions, the ‘Pro and Contra’ chapter was meant to assert the inadequacies of atheism as compared with orthodoxy. However, the meaning of this part of the novel seems to be highly contrary, due to Ivan. Dostoevsky had originally intended to give Ivan’s statement the quality of hypotheses, but in writing it turned out that Ivan expressed them with utmost conviction. Consequently, the writer’s prior concept of what that chapter would mean was compromised. Although Ivan’s argumentation contradicted the writer’s intention, he yielded to the character’s pressure. It should also be pointed out that the novel was published in instalments in the magazine *Russkiy Vestnik*, and the anti-religious segment might have evoked a violent reaction from the government censors. Dostoevsky was terrified. He reportedly wrote to all his religious and orthodox friends to tell them that, in the next instalment, he would bring in the saintly Father Zossima to answer Ivan. ‘He spent weeks on those fifty pages which were to give the refutation. And, after all his work, he failed most dismal’ (Cary, 1958, p. 41).

Less dramatically, but similarly, other writers experience the autonomy of their characters. Enid Blyton describes how, in the process of writing, her characters let her know what is going on, rather than the other way around,

I shut my eyes for a few moments, with my portable typewriter on my knee – I make my mind blank and wait – and then, as clearly as I would see real children, my characters stand before me in my mind’s eye. I see them in detail – hair, eyes, feet, clothes, expression – and I always know their Christian names, but never their surnames… I don’t know what anyone is going to say or to do. I don’t know what is going to happen. I am in the happy position of being able to write a story and read it for the first time, at one and the same moment… Sometimes a character makes a joke, a really funny one, that makes me laugh as I type it on my paper – and I think, ‘Well, I couldn’t have thought of that myself in a hundred years!’ And then I
think, ‘Well, who did think of it, then?’ (Blyton, quoted in Watkins, 1986, p. 96–7)

An anecdote about Alexandre Dumas provides another example for the autonomy of a character’s life and fate. Once, Dumas came out of his study sobbing, ‘I killed my Portos! I killed my Portos!’ (Jaworski, 1993, p. 69).

Bakhtin’s (1986) ideas regarding the process of developing a fictional character corresponds to Watkins’s (1986) view on imaginary companions. According to Watkins, imaginary figures are not immediately independent of their creator. They develop an increasing autonomy in four dimensions: (1) the degree of animation; (2) the degree of articulation of psychological properties; (3) the degree of complexity of the perspective on the character; and (4) the degree of specification of the identity of a character.

Taylor et al. (2002–3) investigated the extent to which fiction writers experienced their fictional characters as having independent thoughts, words or actions, a phenomenon that the researchers have called the Illusion of Independent Agency (IIA). Having interviewed 50 fiction writers about the development of their characters, they found that 92 per cent of the sample reported some experiences of IIA. Moreover, those who had published their work reported more frequent occurrences and gave more detailed reports of the phenomenon, which suggests that the IIA could be related to expertise.

Although the above study confirms that writers may experience characters they create as autonomous, it leaves open the question about the dialogical relationship between the character and its creator. In search of an answer, Żurawska-Żyla (2008, in press) carried out a study with six fiction writers, using a semi-structured interview and a modified version of Hermans’s Self Confrontation Method. An additional technique enabled participants graphically to represent the relationship between themselves and their characters. Findings cannot be generalized for all writers, given the idiographic nature of the study, but nevertheless reflect some regularities. In particular, the study explored and confirmed a differentiation of three forms of internal dialogical activity – monologue, dialogue and a change of perspective (Puchalska-Wasyl, 2006, 2010, Chapter 6 in this volume) – in the context of literary creativity. In an inner monologue, only one I-position is speaking, the other position is a silent but active listener who influences the utterances of the speaking position. In an inner dialogue at least two I-positions are voiced and interact as interlocutors. A change of perspective means taking the
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point of view of somebody else (i.e., another I-position) without necessarily voicing it. Żurawska-Żyła noted that each of the six writers in the study used all three forms of internal dialogical activity in the process of creating characters, though in different ways.

Furthermore, Żurawska-Żyła’s study revealed three types of writers in terms of their predominant (or most frequent) relationship with own characters,

(1) *The author-omniscient expert:* Writers prefer the monologue as a literary form and for communicating with their own characters. The characters are understood as an expression of the author’s personality and own outlook. There are few disputes and arguments among characters in works by such writers.

(2) *The author-partner:* Writers consider themselves equal to their characters. They are willing to accept the characters’ points of view and be involved in dialogues with them. Mutual interaction, discussions and confrontations with different points of view are also more typical of their characters than of those created by other types of writers.

(3) *The author-spectator:* These writers do not take up any direct confrontation or dialogues with their characters. At the same time, they are not dominant, but respect the characters’ autonomy and distinctiveness, and take on their points of view. Narration from the third-person perspective is preferred in works by this type of writer.

This pioneering research requires further validation, but at least one preliminary conclusion may be drawn. Namely, that dialogicality in literary creativity has three different forms. Żurawska-Żyła’s findings seem to indicate that writers do not (and cannot) invariably maintain a relationship with their characters which is dialogical in its linguistic structure (i.e., question and answer, statement and acknowledgement/negation). A conversation-like dialogue is just one type of dialogical contact. The writers participating in the study were of the opinion that it was a difficult and exhausting form of contact, which might explain why it was reported as less frequent than the other forms. It was preferred by only a few; the rest tended more often to put their own words in their characters’ mouths. There were also writers who willingly allowed characters to speak with their own voices, but avoided juxtaposing the characters’ points of view with those of others. However, out of the three forms of internal dialogical activity, only the inner dialogue, in the strict sense, was regarded by the writers as a source of new
ideas and innovations. This indirectly confirms Bakhtin’s (1986) standpoint, according to which the emergence of new ideas always requires the confrontation of two consciousnesses (see also Hermans, 1999b).

**Dialogicality in philosophy and science**

Bakhtin’s (1961/2003) theory of the dialogical nature of literary creativity was first published in 1929. About half a century later, the Russian philosopher of consciousness, Vladimir Bibler (1982) broadened its scope by claiming that every creative thinking act is based on dialogue. It is the dialogue with oneself which, in its form, is a conflict between radically different logics of thinking.

Bibler assumed that all the initial statements of logic demand justifications, given the principle that only that which has been logically justified is logical. However, if the starting point itself does not have a logical justification, it cannot justify the ensuing argument. Searching for a solution to this conundrum, he came to the conclusion that it is necessary for a logician to assume that there is

a ‘dialogic’, a radical dispute with oneself in which each of my selves (internal interlocutors) has its own logic – not a worse one, not a better one, not a more legitimate one, than the logic of the other self. Therefore, no ‘meta-logic’ is needed (which would be situated somewhere above my dispute with myself), since the very being of my logic – in the form of a ‘dialogic’ – determines its permanent progress, which means that in the response to an internal interlocutor’s rejoinder, I unfold and fundamentally transform, improve my argumentation and, simultaneously, the same occurs in my other self (alter ego). (Bibler, 1982, p. 59)

Bibler does not contest the assumption (which is commonly accepted in philosophy and science) that reality is governed only by one Logic (logos, the order of the world). This Logic is understood as the totality of the fundamental laws applicable to every possible object (e.g., the law of identity, $x = x$). In speaking of many logics, Bibler refers to a multiplicity of logical positions, each expressing a person’s level of participation in the one Logic, since the human mind does not grasp it in its entirety. When people think, they formulate equally what they understand regarding the subject matter and what they do not, and what is illogical about it in the light of the logic already attained by them. Thus, our partial logic clashes within us with the logic of what
we do not understand. Owing to this confrontation, we are sometimes able to discover a new element of the Logic of the world.

From a psychological perspective, an individual logical position (which Bibler calls the logic of thinking or, simply, the logic) could be considered as the totality of the person’s cognitive schemas, ways of thinking, ability to use laws implied by different logical theories, and so forth. This raises the question of whether Bibler’s concept of a ‘logical position’ converges with I-position as proposed by Hermans.

It would be inaccurate to say that the two conceptualizations are identical. The idea of I-position corresponds to the Bakhtinian concept of ‘voice’, which means a ‘speaking personality’; that is, the subjective perspective of the speaker, together with all the resources of his or her concepts, intentions and outlooks. There is empirical evidence that I-positions have their own emotional characteristics (Puchalska-Wasyl, 2005a, 2005b, 2006; Puchalska-Wasyl et al., 2008) – a quality that, surely, Bibler’s logical positions are lacking. On the other hand, the fact that I-positions have their specific ways of logical thinking cannot be ignored. As mentioned earlier, DST draws on William James’s idea of the empirical self with the assumption that everything which persons call their own can become an I-position. According to James (1890), one’s thinking is an element of the empirical self (he called it the Spiritual Self). This implies that thinking can be treated as an aspect of every I-position. Thus, the I-position appears to be a broader concept than Bibler’s logical position, and, at least partially, includes the latter. In this context, DST can be seen as a useful background for analyses of creative processes within the confines of philosophy and science.

Bibler is of the opinion that a transgression of one’s logic – that is, the act of going beyond a logical position that is hitherto occupied in order to take on a new one and subsequently to confront both logics – is crucial to the development of human thought. A conspicuous example is Socrates’s maieutics, the method of teaching by helping someone articulate ideas already in their mind. It is premised on the belief that the truth is latent in everyone’s mind due to innate reason, but has to be ‘given birth’ by answering intelligently asked questions. Socrates’s maieutics requires an ability to anticipate an interlocutor’s answers. Intending to lead his dialogical partner to the truth, Socrates takes account of his interlocutor’s intellectual ability, and divides the path of reasoning into stages that are simple enough for the interlocutor to answer Socrates’s questions, eventually arriving at the correct conclusion. This process rests on the capacity to take the interlocutor’s logical position, his cognitive schemas, and to answer one’s own questions
from his perspective. This exchange is the starting point for the next question (e.g., Plato, 1997). In this sense, Socrates's maieutics makes the most of the dialogical nature of human beings.

Dialogical processes are also reflected in the field of science, which is exemplified in Galileo's (1632/1967) *Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, Ptolemaic and Copernican*, in which the basic concepts of classical mechanics are introduced. The dissertation is constructed as a dispute amongst three people: Salviati, Sagredo and Simplicio. For Galileo, the choice of such a form seemed to be the best way to avoid the accusation of heresy because, according to the Inquisition’s regulations, since 1616 the heliocentric theory could have been taken into account only as a hypothesis useful for the mathematical calculation of planets’ movements, not as scientific truth. If Galileo had directly subscribed to Copernicus’s theory, he would have shared Giordano Bruno’s fate. Being aware of that, he decided to present his ideas as one of three viewpoints in the discussion. Each of the three characters in Galileo’s work represents a different logical position. Simplicio opts for traditional scholastic philosophy, full of reverence for an unquestionable Aristotelian authority, and claims that Copernicus’s point of view, which contradicts the Aristotelian one, is nonsense. Salviati holds the opinion of Galileo himself, a follower of the heliocentric theory. Sagredo, a pragmatist, does not know the latest discoveries in the fields of mathematics or astronomy, but his remarks help to remove all ambiguities from the discussion. It is characteristic of the *Dialogue* that Galileo is not only able to raise objections to the heliocentric theory from the perspective of his opponents (Simplicio or Sagredo), and rebut them from his own point of view (Salviati), but also that he can take the logical position of his adversary to prove the validity of his own logic. In this sense, he acts like Socrates.

Galileo assumed that an apparent balance in the dispute would guarantee his safety. However, it does not seem likely that the dialogical form of work was merely a defence against *Sacrum Officium*. Research by Kuchinski (1983) suggests that the correct generalization from knowledge necessitates a complex inner dialogue. A discussion appears to be the most natural, and therefore the most adequate, form for expressing Galileo’s thoughts. It is well known that the astronomer started to lean towards the heliocentric theory many years before publishing his work, when the facts he had observed turned out to be inexplicable in the light of what was known at the time. He wanted to be sure of the correctness of the heliocentric theory in order to be able to defend it. Before trying to convince others (Simplicio, Sagredo, and the readers of his book), he
had to assure himself of the validity of Copernicus’s thesis. He therefore began to search for empirical arguments in its favour. At the same time, he had to find arguments against it in contemporary knowledge, and then either (1) rebut these counter-arguments, (2) prove that they were not at variance with the heliocentric theory, or (3) modify his own ideas under their influence. Those mental operations are consistent with the functions of internal dialogues as proposed by Kuchinski. He calls them, respectively, (1) the structuralization of the given point of view (as opposed to the rebutted one), (2) the formulation of prerequisites for a synthesis of the points of view involved in the dialogue, and (3) the correction. As well as the cognitive functions, he emphasizes regulative ones which result in a person’s action being subordinate to dialogues using it for verifying or falsifying a given point of view. To extrapolate here, Galileo’s inner dispute may have also helped him to search for empirical arguments for the heliocentric theory. According to Kuchinski, these forms of mental activities, in which an internal dialogue is of great importance, are vital for theoretical cognitive work.

**Dialogical self theory and creativity**

Both the Bakhtinian thesis about literary creativity as a consequence of the confrontation between two consciousnesses, and Bibler’s idea of clashing logical positions inside us, imply that the creative person is a ‘multi-personal subject’, a thinking micro-society. Viewed thus, it could be asked how an inner dialogue is possible, and how to explain that one is able to take on different mental perspectives – indicating that there are many selves inside oneself – and, at the same time, retain an individual identity.

The dialogical self conception provides an answer to the above conundrum. It posits that the human being is able to perceive the world, and act, from various perspectives. At the same time, it emphasizes that, in healthy dialogicality, the ‘I’ (as the intentional subject) ultimately decides on taking a given point of view. Even if a point of view is taken on without the person’s awareness, but rather automatically in response to the situation’s requirements, the intentional subject is always able to change the position it occupies. Admittedly, in accordance with the metaphor proposed by Hermans (1996, 1999a, 2003; Hermans et al., 1992), the ‘I’, moving in mental space, takes up diverse positions which can change the perception of reality; however, in each of these situations it is still the same ‘I’ which (like James’s concept) is the source of the person’s experiences of continuity, distinctness and volition.
In addressing the difficult question implicitly posed by Bakhtin and later by Bibler, DST contributes to understanding creativity. A further merit of the theory is that it draws attention to psychological processes that have been previously regarded as being beyond the field of psychology. Before DST, internal dialogues were generally regarded as psychopathological symptoms rather than healthy activity. In the light of the dialogical self concept, it could be stated that ‘normal’ people are able to create internal interlocutors in accordance with the same psychological process that enables literary writers to bring a fictional character into being, or lets an author of a scientific theory imagine its opponents. In such cases, the imaginary figure could be regarded as an I-position that is able to become increasingly more autonomous and gain characteristics (thoughts, feelings and actions) that differ from those of its creator. DST further emphasizes that a given internal interlocutor’s point of view can interface with other points of view, and the dialogue between them may result in the renegotiation of hitherto accepted meanings, leading to the emergence of a new outlook with personal or social significance.

In evaluating the contribution of the dialogical self concept to understanding creativity, it should also be noted that some of the facts asserted within this theory are, at the same time, inexplicable within its limits. Although we know that a literary character can gain autonomy from the author, the theory cannot answer what makes it possible, or give a clear-cut answer to the question of why the writer endows a particular I-position, and not another, a voice. Sometimes, as in Galileo’s case, the choice of I-positions involved in the dialogue is understandable in view of the work’s historical context, the scientific output at that moment in history, and the need to confront the then-current knowledge with new interpretations. However, in many cases, the reason why specific characters arise remains unclear even for the writer. Writers claim that a figure frequently appears in their mind as a ready-made entity, spontaneously and unexpectedly (Żurawska-Żyła, 2008). This phenomenon was probably taken into account by Elizabeth Bowen when she emphasized that the term ‘creation of character’ is misleading, for the character pre-exists, and is only found by the author (quoted in Watkins, 1986, p. 92). DST does not explain this process in its entirety. An explanation for that aspect of creativity could possibly be found in Jung’s theory and its notions of intuition, active imagination and archetype (e.g., Jung, 1931). In juxtaposing these perspectives in inquiries about the creativity process, they might transpire as complementary rather than mutually exclusive standpoints. Pointing to the dialogical aspects
of creativity allows us to see this process against the backdrop of dialogical phenomena experienced by everyone.

Note

1. All quotations from sources in Polish in this chapter are my translation.

References


—— (in press) Schematy wewnętrznych organizacji Ja a typy autorów w twórczości literackiej. [Patterns of the internal organization of the self and types of authors in literary creativity]. In E. Dryll and A. Cierpka (Eds), *Narracja – teorie umysłu, tożsamość, twórczość* (in Polish) [Narrative – Theories of Mind, Identity, Creativity].
Dialogicality is not a new topic. Marková (2005) is of the opinion that thinking in antinomies came to the fore in the nineteenth century, when the concepts of evolution, relativity and interdependence of various phenomena in the natural, human and social sciences required a new theoretical underpinning. In post-Hegelian social science, the idea of dialogicality was established by a number of scholars. Mead (1934) and Vygotsky (1962, 1978) are recognized as the pioneers of this theme in psychology. The functions of internal dialogues were also appreciated by Jung (1961) and representatives of the Gestalt theory. Recently, Hubert Hermans’s conception of the dialogical self has contributed to the growth of interest in the phenomenon.

Dialogical Self Theory (DST) was inspired by William James’s notion of the self, and by Bakhtin’s metaphor of the polyphonic novel (chapters 1 and 5, this volume). According to Hermans (1996, 2002, 2003; Hermans and Kempen, 1993; Hermans et al., 1993), human beings are able to personify the different points of view taken by them. A point of view endowed with a voice becomes an I-position – a component of the dialogical self. Dialogical I-positions can be divided into internal and external ones. Internal positions can be treated as personified personal beliefs; thus, they are felt to be a part of oneself (e.g., ‘I as an idealist’, ‘I as an opportunist’, ‘I as a fighter’, ‘I as a doubter’, ‘I as dependent’, ‘I as independent’, etc.). External positions result from the personification of standpoints represented by other people, and they are felt as being a part of the social environment (e.g., my husband, my friend, my boss, a TV personality). The I-position not only gives expression to those specific beliefs, feelings and motives typical of that point of view, but it is also able to create the narratives and be involved in the dialogue with the other external or internal I-position. That is why, for example, people
can test their own arguments concerning their promotion during an imaginary talk with their boss, or they can take up a polemic with a TV personality. They can also discuss a personal problem, confronting the outlooks of the idealist and the opportunist whom they find within themselves. All these imaginary interactions between I-positions can be defined as internal dialogical activity.

The broad phenomenon of internal dialogical activity does not seem to be homogeneous. In the light of Hermans’s theory, one can distinguish three subgroups of processes: (1) monologue, (2) dialogue and (3) a change of perspective. An internal monologue can be defined as a situation where only one I-position of the dialogical self is speaking, and the other one is a silent but active listener who has a great influence on the utterances of the first I-position. During an inner dialogue at least two I-positions are voiced and interact as interlocutors. A change of perspective means taking somebody else’s point of view (I-position) without necessarily voicing it.

A study by Josephs (1998), which has focused on constructing the image and voice of the deceased at the graveside, provides examples of imaginary communication which seem to confirm the above differentiation between forms of dialogicality. Sixty-six-year-old Lena, who had lost her husband Max about one year earlier, had monologues and dialogues with him standing at his graveside, and she often took his point of view as well. Monologues, called ‘one-sided communication’ by Josephs, were statements that Lena addressed to Max not expecting his answer (e.g., ‘Hello, here I am’, ‘Something very good has happened to me. I must tell you’, etc.) (p. 187). Dialogues, as two-sided conversations, were the expression of her own thoughts and emotions, but at the same time they included Max’s imagined answers (e.g., she: ‘Oh boy, that went completely wrong, I spoiled everything’; he: ‘Don’t take it so seriously... it is not such a catastrophe’) (p. 187). Lena’s ability to take Max’s perspective found expression in imagining her husband’s standpoint or emotional reaction to a given situation (e.g., ‘In arranging the grave, I consider Max’s taste... and I think: He would like it’) (p. 188).

According to Hermans’s concept of the dialogical self, human nature is potentially capable of internal dialogical activity. On the other hand, Josephs’s analyses allow us to speculate that some individuals may prefer monologues, whereas others may more willingly enter into a dialogue with a figure who is absent in reality. This raises a question about the main factors underlying the postulated differences. What are the personality differences between people who prefer inner dialogues as opposed to those who have mainly monologues?
Monologue and dialogue as forms of dialogicality and their trait correlates

The author has carried out an empirical study in order to investigate the relationship between patterns of dialogicality and personality differences. The monologue and dialogue were chosen for comparison as they are extremely different forms of internal dialogical activity. The internal dialogue seems to be the most complex form of dialogicality, because it demands two abilities: to give a voice to the I-position, and to exchange one I-position for another. The monologue is the simplest one. Two questionnaires were administered, as described in the following.

The Initial Questionnaire (Puchalska-Wasyl, 2005a, 2006, 2007, 2010; Puchalska-Wasyl et al., 2008) is based on the assumption that there are three types of internal dialogical activity: (1) change of perspective: taking somebody else’s point of view, (2) monologue: addressing statements and comments to a silent listener and (3) dialogue: not only an expression of one’s own standpoint, but also a formulation of the imaginary interlocutor’s answer. The purpose of the questionnaire is to induce the subject’s self-reflection, and to determine which I-positions are the respondent’s imaginary interlocutors, which are the internal listeners, and which of them give new and different points of view to the person. The method includes a list of potential I-positions (e.g., my mother, my father, my dear, my friend, my enemy/opponent, my guardian angel, a TV personality, my imaginary companion, somebody who is dead, ‘I as a pessimist’, ‘I as an optimist’, ‘I as an idealist’, ‘I as an observer’, ‘I as a child’, my masculine side, my feminine side). Some of them stemmed from the Personal Position Repertoire by Hermans (2001). The participants can choose from these I-positions, and can add their own to the list. Because the questionnaire identifies the types of dialogical activity taken up by a person, the responses enabled us to assign participants to particular groups. Those who reported at least one figure as an interlocutor in their inner conversations (regardless of the other indicated figures) were assigned to the group of dialoguing people. Those who were not able to point to any particular interlocutor, but declared at least one internal listener, were classified as people preferring monologues.

The Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO PI-R; Costa and McCrae 1992) is a questionnaire consisting of 240 items. Scores are presented on a T-scale (M = 50; SD = 10); scores between 45 and 55 (M ± SD/2) can
be treated as average scores. The NEO PI-R measures five general factors (Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to Experience, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness), and six facets for each general dimension; that is, 30 particular traits. A Polish version (Uchnast, 2000) was used in the present study. It had temporary standards based on the study of a group of 1076 people. The split-half reliability established for five domains was, respectively: N = 0.82; E = 0.68; O = 0.65; A = 0.79 and C = 0.86. The indexes for Cronbach’s α were quite similar, and ranged from 0.82 to 0.62.

The study’s sample consisted of 94 people between the ages of 19 and 32 who were not familiar with Dialogical Self Theory. They were divided into two groups on the basis of the Initial Questionnaire. In Group 1 were 63 participants who have inner dialogues (31 female, 32 male; of them, 53 were university students and 10 graduates M_age = 23.05; SD = 2.65). In the Initial Questionnaire, they marked at least one I-position that was reported as an interlocutor. They were also able to have inner monologues and/or change points of view. In Group 2 were 31 participants who indicated that they conduct mainly internal monologues (17 female, 14 male; 26 were university students and 5 graduates; M_age = 22.43; SD = 3.37). In the Initial Questionnaire, these participants pointed to I-positions that were silent listeners in their inner monologues. Sometimes they also claimed that they changed their points of view, but generally they were not able to determine (either by choosing from the list or by adding to the list) any I-position involved in an internal dialogue. The small number of people in this group reflects the difficulties in finding respondents who would meet the aforementioned preconditions. According to a preliminary assessment, the conditions were met only by one in every six people.

All the participants were asked to describe their own personality traits by means of NEO PI-R. Next, both groups of respondents were compared using the Student t-test. The results are presented in Table 6.1. Participants having inner dialogues scored significantly higher on Openness and its facets, such as Fantasy, Aesthetics and Feelings; higher on Self-Consciousness as a component of Neuroticism; and lower on Assertiveness as a component of Extraversion, than people having internal monologues. This means that people entering into imaginary dialogues, in comparison with those having mainly monologues, are characterized by a more vivid and creative imagination (Fantasy), a deep appreciation of art and beauty (Aesthetics), and a receptivity to inner feelings and emotions (Feelings). They are curious about both
the inner and outer worlds, and their lives are experientially richer. They are willing to entertain novel ideas and unconventional values, and they experience positive, as well as negative, emotions more keenly (Openness). At the same time, these people are more disturbed by awkward social situations and are uncomfortable around others, sensitive to ridicule, prone to feelings of inferiority (Self-Consciousness) and prefer to stay in the background and let others do the talking (Assertiveness).

### Types of internal dialogues and personality traits

The results presented in the preceding raise the intriguing question as to whether types of dialogues, distinguished with respect to some formal criteria, would also be related to the different personality traits. Are personality traits reflected in the manner of conducting inner dialogues? In other words, are there relationships between types of internal dialogues and the characteristics of people having them?

A procedure for evoking inner dialogues was administered in order to investigate these questions, exploring the topics and capturing the imaginary conversations in their natural progress. The present description of the procedure is limited to those elements necessary for understanding the results presented below. Group 1 as previously designated participated in the extended study. That is, any participant who had

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trait</th>
<th>Type of internal dialogical activity</th>
<th>Differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dialogue ( (n = 63) )</td>
<td>Monologue ( (n = 31) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Consciousness (N4)</td>
<td>50.21 ( 10.97 )</td>
<td>43.35 ( 12.09 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assertiveness (E3)</td>
<td>49.81 ( 11.70 )</td>
<td>54.97 ( 10.81 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fantasy (O1)</td>
<td>54.85 ( 9.41 )</td>
<td>49.10 ( 11.65 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aesthetics (O2)</td>
<td>52.47 ( 10.97 )</td>
<td>46.35 ( 16.15 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feelings (O3)</td>
<td>53.84 ( 10.27 )</td>
<td>47.29 ( 14.69 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness to experience</td>
<td>56.97 ( 9.28 )</td>
<td>50.87 ( 13.87 )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table includes only the scales and/or the subscales in which significant differences were noted.
reported internal dialogues in the Initial Questionnaire was given the following instruction:

I would like you to think about a question that is important/difficult/problematic for you. It can be a problem that has recently arisen and which currently absorbs you. It can be also a problem from your distant past; however, it still bothers you, and you would like to talk about it or listen to something concerning this difficult question... Now, if you find the problem, try to conduct an imaginary dialogue on this topic. You can choose any interlocutor. If you want to have the dialogue aloud, it can be recorded. You can also write it down. In that case, you should conduct the conversation and write it down simultaneously. You do not have to worry about the form of the dialogue. The most important thing is to follow one's own thoughts and not to modify statements that spontaneously arise during the dialogue.

In the next step, the participants read or heard their own recorded dialogue. If it were too long, the participant shortened it to eight to ten utterances, paying attention to preserving the essential meaning of the dialogue. Finally, the participant was asked to choose one of these utterances as a so-called ‘key statement’. This was one that was the most difficult for the person to accept, and which was associated with the most intense emotions. An example of such a dialogue is given in the appendix to this chapter.

Sixty-two imaginary conversations were collected in the above procedure, and have been grouped on the basis of nine formal criteria in order to compare their authors’ personality traits. Eight of these criteria revealed significant differences between the groups. In this chapter, three criteria are presented as examples:

1) Who chooses the topic of the inner dialogue?
2) Do the participant and the imaginary interlocutor cooperate to solve the problem under discussion?
3) Who makes the key statement of the dialogue?

The Student t-test was administered for each criterion.

Regarding Criterion 1, two types of imaginary conversations were distinguished: dialogues in which the topic was chosen by the participant, and dialogues in which the topic was chosen by the inner interlocutor. The dialogue presented in the chapter’s appendix represents the
second type, as the discussion concerning the problem is started by the internal interlocutor (the participant’s father). The statistical analyses showed that the trait differentiating authors of the first type of dialogues from those of the second type was Gregariousness, a component of Extraversion (see Table 6.2).

Participants who allowed their inner interlocutors to choose the topic of the dialogue scored significantly lower on Gregariousness by comparison with those who, unaided, decided on the question to be discussed. At the same time, their score was below average. According to NEO PI-R, Gregariousness is understood as the preference for other people’s company. Low scorers tend to be loners who do not seek, even actively avoid, social stimulation (Costa and McCrae, 1992). In the present context, it could be tentatively concluded that the manner of conducting inner dialogues reflects actual social behaviour. In other words, people who dislike social contact tend rarely to discuss their problems with others, not only in real interpersonal situations but also in imaginary ones. If such discussion takes place, it seems generally to be on the inner interlocutor’s initiative.

Regarding Criterion 2, the internal talks were divided into those characterized by cooperation between the participant and an imaginary interlocutor towards solving the problem under discussion, and those characterized by the absence of cooperation. The dialogue in the appendix represents the second type, as the (imagined) father makes it impossible to solve the problem by denying that it is his fault. The statistical analysis revealed that participants who tended to cooperate with their inner interlocutor scored significantly higher on Openness to Experience and its two facets, Actions and Aesthetics. It should be noted that the scores for Openness and for Actions were above average (see Table 6.3).

Costa and McCrae (1992) describe Openness as a dimension characterized by a tendency to seek out and positively value unknown experiences, tolerance for novelty and intellectual curiosity. The Actions subscale expresses the active seeking of new stimuli, while Aesthetics refers to an interest in art and appreciation of beauty. In the present context, it could be surmised that higher scorers on Openness try to cooperate with their imaginary interlocutor when a personal problem is taken up in their inner dialogue as cooperation makes it easier to achieve a constructive solution that, being a novelty, is conducive to a positive evaluation of the experience. The finding that the same participants have scored higher on Actions suggests that they are willing imaginatively to discuss their own problems so as freely to create possible
scenarios for a further course of action. People who prefer cooperation between the parties of their inner dialogues are also higher scorers on Aesthetics. They may have a greater need for harmony, which demands satisfaction not only in the area of art, but also in daily life.

Criterion 3 has allowed distinguishing between dialogues in which the key statement was formulated by the participant or by the imaginary interlocutor. As previously explained, the key statement was chosen by participants out of their own dialogues as being the most difficult one to accept and the one associated with the most intense emotions. The dialogue presented in the appendix represents, again, the second type, as the participant chose a statement made by the father. In terms of personality differences, participants who chose one of their own utterances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trait</th>
<th>Dialogue characterized by</th>
<th>Differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient of cooperation (n = 40)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aesthetics (O2)</td>
<td>54.60 10.37</td>
<td>2.12 60 0.05 0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions (O4)</td>
<td>56.08 10.18</td>
<td>2.57 60 0.05 0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness to experience</td>
<td>59.28 8.16</td>
<td>2.78 60 0.01 0.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table includes only the scales and/or the subscales in which significant differences were noted.
Małgorzata Puchalska-Wasyl

in the inner dialogue as the key statement scored higher than average on Depression and Self-Consciousness (facets of Neuroticism), higher on Deliberation (a component of Conscientiousness), lower on Extraversion and its facets, Assertiveness and Activity, and lower on Achievement Striving (a component of Conscientiousness). Additionally, the mean score on Straightforwardness (a facet of Agreeableness) differentiated these individuals from those who chose an utterance made by their imaginary interlocutor, and who tended to score below average (see Table 6.4).

In view of the definitions of the NEO PI-R domains and their facets (Costa and McCrae, 1992), it seems that people who find the most painful statement among their own utterances have a tendency to experience guilt, sadness, hopelessness and loneliness (Depression). They can be uncomfortable around others, sensitive to ridicule and prone to feelings of inferiority (Self-Consciousness), but generally they are frank, sincere and ingenuous. Sometimes they are even socially naïve (Straightforwardness). They may seem aimless and devoid of ambition (Achievement Striving). Their actions lack tempo, vigour and energy (Activity). At the same time, they tend to think carefully before acting (Deliberation). By comparison, people in whose dialogues the

Table 6.4 Comparison of traits in authors of dialogues distinguished on the basis of Criterion 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trait</th>
<th>Key-statement formulated by</th>
<th>Subject (n = 13)</th>
<th>Interlocutor (n = 49)</th>
<th>Differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depression (N3)</td>
<td>58.15</td>
<td>15.25</td>
<td>48.33</td>
<td>13.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-consciousness (N4)</td>
<td>55.54</td>
<td>10.42</td>
<td>48.80</td>
<td>10.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assertiveness (E3)</td>
<td>43.00</td>
<td>13.66</td>
<td>51.61</td>
<td>10.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity (E4)</td>
<td>40.08</td>
<td>12.89</td>
<td>51.14</td>
<td>10.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Straightforwardness (A2)</td>
<td>54.31</td>
<td>14.00</td>
<td>44.37</td>
<td>8.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement striving (C4)</td>
<td>39.62</td>
<td>17.96</td>
<td>51.20</td>
<td>12.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliberation (C6)</td>
<td>58.00</td>
<td>11.63</td>
<td>50.82</td>
<td>10.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraversion</td>
<td>45.15</td>
<td>14.94</td>
<td>53.24</td>
<td>11.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table includes only the scales and/or the subscales in which significant differences were noted.
interlocutor’s statement was a source of pain, anger and other negative emotions, might be more likely to stretch the truth, be guarded in expressing their true feelings and capable of manipulating others (Straightforwardness).

A content analysis of the key statements supports the expectation of a relationship among personality traits, patterns of imaginary conversations and problems discussed therein. Key statements voiced by the participants generally focused on justifying their life choices, explaining their actions and sometimes confessing their mistakes or weaknesses. Fear, anxiety and doubts were often expressed. Dilemmas concerning the necessity to make a decision were also considered, and arguments were tried out. In contrast, key statements voiced by opposing inner interlocutor usually involved criticism, accusation, blackmail, blame or admonishing directed at the participant. Frequently, these internal figures tried to show their superiority and to evade responsibility. On the manifest level of the dialogue, those utterances attacked the participant, while a negative image of an aggressive interlocutor was created on a latent level.

**Dialogical activity and traits**

The results presented in the preceding paragraphs should be taken with caution, as they represent innovative research that requires further corroboration. Therefore, any conclusion which may be drawn from the study is a preliminary one. However, it could be stated that there is a relationship between internal dialogical activity and personality traits. In particular, by comparison with people preferring monologues, people entering into internal dialogues seem to score higher on Self-Consciousness as a facet of Neuroticism, Openness to Experience, Fantasy, Aesthetics and Feelings as its components, and to score lower on Assertiveness as a component of Extraversion. A higher level of Self-Consciousness, typical of people prone to over-criticize themselves and with low self-esteem, suggests the prevalence of specific internal conflicts or dilemmas that, in turn, are taken up in inner dialogues. On the one hand, internal conflicts can be worked through and resolved by means of the inner dialogue. On the other, a higher level of feelings of inferiority might be stimulated by dialogical thinking, especially when the person confronts two or more identity-relevant I-positions.

It is consistent with common sense that people entering into internal dialogues have a more vivid and creative imagination (Fantasy) and are also able to differentiate emotional states and appreciate
them as an important part of inner life (Feelings). In general, they are curious about the inner as well as outer world, and their lives are experientially richer. They are imaginative and individualistic, creative and innovative in thinking, intuitive and empathic (Openness to Experience). The relationship revealed between internal dialogues and Openness clearly fits Hermans's description of dialogicality in terms of a healthy and creative exploration of the self (Hermans, 2002, 2003; Hermans and Dimaggio, 2007). However, the fact that people having imaginary dialogues score highly on Aesthetics is an unexpected result. Watkins's (1986) view of the dramatic or poetic nature of the human mind may shed light on this finding. Everyone has the capacity to create imaginary figures, but artists, especially writers and poets, painters and sculptors, are considered to have this potential most prominently. Assuming that the same sensibility underlies everyday internal dialogues and artistic activity, the connection between a tendency to carry on imaginary conversations and openness to art is understandable.

Dialoguing people are also less assertive than are people who tend to have monologues. In related studies (Puchalska-Wasyl, 2005b, 2006), it was noted that one of the functions of internal dialogical activity was to test one’s own arguments during an imaginary conversation. Therefore, it could be tentatively assumed that feelings of shame, embarrassment and a lack of self-confidence, which are typical of people who score low on Assertiveness, might bring about a necessity for preparing oneself for a real discussion by means of an inner talk. Monologues, however, seem to be more characteristic of persons who are assertive, firm and self-confident, because in a monologue their statements can be clarified but are not subject to modifications.

The second research question has focused on the relationships amongst the types of internal dialogues and the traits of the individuals having these dialogues. The imaginary conversations were grouped with respect to different formal criteria, and several particular relationships were obtained. All of them can be summarized by stating that personality traits are reflected in the way of conducting dialogues, not only real but also imaginary ones.

The above conclusion seems to be indirectly supported by Shotter’s (1999) analysis of Voloshinov’s works. In the context of that work, it is noted that what we call our thoughts are not organized first at the inner centre of our being (in a nonmaterial ‘psyche’ or ‘mind’) and later are given an adequate outer expression. Rather, they become ordered and organized only through similar linguistically mediated negotiations.
such as those we conduct in our everyday dialogues with others. In other words, our thinking reflects the dialogical relationships between people. Voloshinov’s standpoint is consistent with Vygotsky’s (1978) view that ‘Every function in the child’s cultural development appears twice:... first between people (interpsychological), and then inside the child (intrapsychological). ... All the higher functions originate as actual relationships between individuals’ (p. 57). Neither Voloshinov nor Vygotsky referred directly to traits, only to external activities. However, because personality traits are reflected in people’s external activity, these must also be reflected in people’s thinking, given that thinking is internalized speech-actions. As Cooper (2003) rightly pointed out, drawing upon Buber’s ‘I-Thou’ concept, our internal dialogues have the same characteristics that are typical of our actual interpersonal relationships. Hermans’s (2002) idea of the dialogical self as a ‘society of the mind’ fits well with those viewpoints.

Research conducted by Oleś, Batory, Buszek, and colleagues (2010) corroborates a particular aspect of the present study’s findings. Comparable results were obtained despite using different instruments, procedure and samples. Their study, as did mine, sought a relationship between the involvement in internal dialogues and personality traits. Two scales were used: the Polish adaptation of NEO PI-R (Siuta, 2006) and the Internal Dialogical Activity Scale (IDAS; Oleś, 2009). The IDAS assesses the intensity of the phenomenon of inner dialogues, both in general and within its different aspects. It was found that the tendency to have internal dialogues was positively related to Openness to Experience, Fantasy, Aesthetics, Feelings and Self-Consciousness, and negatively related to Assertiveness. Additionally, their study revealed a number of specific links between traits and different forms of internal dialogues as measured by the IDAS. Particularly worth noting is a relationship between the general inclination to enter into inner dialogues and a high score on Neuroticism (Oleś et al., 2010). In a study by Puchalska-Wasyl et al. (2008), a stepwise analysis of regression revealed that 28 per cent of the variance in the IDAS was explained by a linear combination of Openness and Neuroticism in the situation where five personality factors were defined as independent variables in a regressive model. An analogical analysis of regression on a level of 30 facets brought even more spectacular findings: 39 per cent of the variance in the IDAS was explained by a linear combination of four particular traits: Self-Consciousness, Aesthetics, Feelings and Self-discipline as a component of Conscientiousness (negatively). Thus, the results obtained are, to a large extent, consistent with the study presented in this chapter,
although discrepancies indicate that the field of dialogicality requires further exploration.

Some remarks about other potential predictors of internal dialogues

Taking into account that traits explain 39 per cent of the variance in the results of the scale measuring an involvement in internal dialogues, it is worth considering other potential predictors of such mental activity.

It should be noted that in the study presented in this chapter, the group of people entering into imaginary dialogues was balanced in terms of gender; however, the personality profiles of these participants, by comparison with those preferring monologues, seems to be more effeminate. Therefore, psychological gender could be of certain importance regarding the tendency to conduct inner dialogues.

The tendency to conduct internal dialogues could be explained also by reference to Baldwin’s (1992, 1995; Baldwin et al., 1990) conception of the relational schema. The relational schema consists of three elements linked in an associative network: an interpersonal script, a self-schema and an other-schema (pertaining to the self or the other in a particular type of interaction, respectively). The interpersonal script is a cognitive structure representing a sequence of actions and events that defines a stereotyped relational pattern. It includes declarative knowledge as well as procedural. The latter, being the ‘if-then’ nature of the script, could be used to generate interpersonal expectations (about the thoughts, feelings and goals of both the self and the other), and to plan appropriate behaviour. Schemas for the self and the other are generalizations or theories about the self and the other in certain relational contexts that are used to guide the processing of social information.

In the light of Baldwin’s concept, imaginary dialogues could be treated as a reconstruction of the utterances and internal states included in an interpersonal script. It means that every person is able to conduct inner dialogues, because everyone has some relational schemas. At the same time, it should be added that there are at least three levels of schematicity and three groups of people, respectively. A person may be considered as truly aschematic if he or she has had no experience with, and has no representation of, a certain type of interaction. An individual may be considered highly schematic if he or she has a cognitive structure for a type of relationship, and often uses this schema to understand social situations. Between these two extremes are people who have the targeted relational schemas available in memory, but for whom these
schemas are not chronically accessible in their day-to-day processing of social information. If their context or stimulus characteristics are strong enough, they could activate the normally non-accessible schema, and may produce the same results as a group of highly schematic persons. That is why these people might be termed relatively schematic (Baldwin, 1992). Assuming that the ability to conduct internal dialogues is a natural consequence of having relational schemas, it could be concluded that people who are aschematic or relatively schematic with respect to the majority of interpersonal scripts may be less willing to take up imaginary conversations by comparison with highly schematic persons who may effortlessly generate possible scenarios for a further course of anticipated situations.

In addition to personality traits, psychological gender and the level of schematicity, being aware of one’s inner dialogues might be a factor underlying individual differences in the reported frequency of the phenomenon as experienced in the person’s everyday life. In Baldwin’s (1992) view, interpersonal scripts are largely based on procedural knowledge, which is less accessible to conscious awareness than declarative knowledge, and therefore might often be activated automatically. Consequently, many highly schematic people who have a multiplicity of scripts might not be aware of their own internal dialogues. It is reasonable to assume that there are people who do not have as many easily cued scripts as do highly schematic people, but are able to notice their imaginary conversations more often because they are more self-reflective. If, as Hermans and Josephs (2003) claim, not all dialogical processes are scripted to the same extent, it is also possible that the processes of inferring from interpersonal scripts are modified by the level of self-reflection. It follows that more self-reflective people might produce more creative scenarios of internal dialogues. This could be interpreted as indicating that a multiplicity of chronically accessible scripts might be conducive to taking up inner dialogues with ease, but being aware of having those dialogues and their creative production might be more strictly connected to self-reflection (rather than the person’s schematicity).

Baldwin’s concept may also explain why people’s characteristics are reflected in the manner of conducting their inner dialogues. As mentioned, internal dialogues could be treated as a phenomenon that accords with a sequence of actions and events consistent with an activated interpersonal script. Such a script would inevitably be linked, in an associative network, to a self-schema and an other-schema, which are generalizations about the characteristics of the self and the other in particular
types of interaction. According to the idea of conjoint priming, it could be expected that, if one element of a relational schema is primed, the other two elements should be accessible as well (Baldwin, 1992). This implies that an internal dialogue demanding an activated interpersonal script cannot be conducted without the simultaneous activation of associated schemas for the self and the other, which are used also to guide processing social information in actual everyday situations.

Indeed, as Markova (2005) claims, dialogicality is not a new topic. Nevertheless, when we think about internal dialogical activity, we still have more questions than answers. The ideas presented in the last part of the chapter are only hypotheses, awaiting investigation. They indicate directions for further research that may explore, in addition to personality traits, other personality correlates of internal dialogical activity.

Appendix: An example of an internal dialogue (extract)

The participant is a 26-old-woman, taking the daughter position. The father is an imaginary interlocutor in this conversation. The key statement (selected by the participant) is in bold.

**Father:** It isn’t true that I rejected you. Why did I drink and why did I treat you in that way? You don’t know how I felt then and what I experienced at work. Why don’t you ask Mum why she rejected me?

**Daughter:** I know it wasn’t easy for you. You never spoke of your feelings... You were never able to confess to anything.

**Father:** I wasn’t a bad father; I bought you everything you wanted. I loved you, I cuddled you. You were the most important person in the whole world for me.

**Daughter:** But it has nothing to do with that, that isn’t enough. I know in this way you showed me your love. But I know this now, I didn’t then. You were drunk, you gave me money and you thought that made everything all right. And don’t say that you were a good father: Mum went out and you left me. You asked me, if I would manage and you left. A good father doesn’t do this.

**Father:** But I bought you a fishing rod! I had nothing as a child. Nobody bought me anything. I didn’t get any presents. Nobody remembered about my birthday.

**Daughter:** Quite so! The thing is that you still think you didn’t do anything wrong. Still the same.
Father: If your father does not suit you, change him. What do you want from me? Why do you pick on me?

Daughter: I’ve been trying to say it for several minutes. You would probably tell me that I am vicious and cheeky. It isn’t true. But you feel great.

Father: Who told you that I felt great? I am tired of you, get out. Get out of here immediately. Now my granddaughter is the most important for me.

Note
The study on which this chapter is based was supported by the State Committee for Scientific Research and by the Foundation for Polish Science.

References
Costa, P. T. and McCrae, R. R. (1992) Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO PI-R) and NEO Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI). Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources.


Contemporary applications of the ancient imperative ‘Know Thyself’ implicitly prescribe confronting one’s ‘self’ or, rather, the ‘other’ in oneself. Methods differ. The Self-Confrontation Method, associated with Dialogical Self Theory, involves eliciting (and rating) clients’ narrative valuations of their life situations (Hermans and Kempen, 1993). In contrast, Jungian psychotherapy explores dreams and other fantasies, such as produced in ‘active imagination’ (Jung, 1958). Whereas both use material generated by the client, bibliotherapy utilizes published literary fiction. Shechtman (1999) identifies two forms. In cognitive bibliotherapy, the therapist suggests literary material, leaving clients to draw from it information, experiences and solutions relevant to their needs. In affective bibliotherapy, clients reconnect to their own feelings and experiences through their identification with the characters, the focus being on the enhancement of experiencing through the ‘richness of human life, characters, situations, difficulties, and problems that the literature presents’ (p. 40).

All those and similar practices guide people in the deliberate, conscious quest for self-realization. This chapter concerns instances of being unexpectedly confronted with one’s own self upon reading a novel (or watching a movie, etc.) for reasons other than therapy or self-knowledge. Proust characterized the literary work as an ‘optical instrument’ offered by the author, for ‘every reader is, while he is reading, the reader of his own self’ (cited in Genette, 1980, p. 261). Yet, as readers, we might see ourselves reflected in fiction as if in a mirror darkly, not realizing that it is happening.

It could also happen when reading other people’s autobiographies. For the present purposes, the relevant criterion is not whether the text tells about real or fictional events, but rather that an as-if is involved.
We must imagine the actors, actions, events and settings told about in someone else’s autobiography. We also imagine the outlooks of the author and the protagonists in both fiction and nonfiction. Bakhtin (1986) averred that a text’s ‘true essence always develops on the boundary between two consciousnesses’ (p. 106). One consciousness is the reader’s; that is, a position from which, upon getting the text’s semantic meaning, the reader ‘simultaneously takes an active, responsive attitude toward it...either agrees or disagrees with it’ (p. 68). The other consciousness is discovered in the text, but is it also the reader’s own, a projected ‘other’.

The present theme could be linked to various fields across the human sciences, but such a synthesis is beyond this chapter’s scope. It presents preliminary notes towards ‘framing’ the topic from a standpoint that cuts across Jungian and dialogical-self perspectives. Such framing should be differentiated from how the topic would be approached in traditional academic psychology. A recent study exemplifies the latter. Proulx et al. (2010) tested the hypothesis, predicted by a so-called ‘meaning maintenance model’, that absurdist art, literature and humour would evoke compensatory affirmation efforts. Participants were randomly assigned to read a story by Kafka, an Aesop’s parable, a Monty Python parody prefaced with or without a caveat, or to look at representational, abstract or surreal artworks. Those who were exposed to the absurd or unexpected tended to make stronger identity commitments afterwards. However, insofar as the finding is based on averaging aggregate responses, the study merely reveals the behaviour of a statistical entity, the ‘average’ person. In contrast, Jungian and dialogical-self perspectives draw attention to idiographic meaning making. For instance, we may ask readers who feel disturbed by Kafka or offended by Monty Python what they could learn about themselves from those reactions.

Both perspectives invite asking how literary experiences may open up opportunities for the reflexive dialogue, although they differ in their foci (chapter 1, this volume). They also share an emphasis on the role of affect in communicating the meaningfulness of something to oneself. Hermans (1999) contends that the person is ‘not simply a storyteller, but a passionate storyteller’, for clients typically tell those parts of their life story that ‘arouse affect or even strong emotions’ (p. 1193). The acknowledgement of affect is built into the elicitation of narrative valuations in the Self-Confrontation Method: ‘A valuation is any unit of meaning that has a positive (pleasant), negative (unpleasant) or ambivalent (both pleasant and unpleasant) value in the eyes of the
individual’ (Hermans and Kempen, 1993, p. 148). Clearly, the definition applies also to the value of a literary work for particular readers. Jung (1928) elaborated a framework for referring to the intensity and direction of affect associated with elements of experience. His concept of psychological value is often misconstrued, partly because he retained the terminology of ‘psychic energy’ (confounded by the Freudian concept of libido). However, as discussed in Jones (2001), Jung’s concept parallels Lewin’s (1935) idea of valences or the ‘invitation qualities’ (Aufforderungscharakter) of things. A story’s positive valence would be evident in ‘approach’ behaviour (the person rereads it, ruminates about it, and so forth), whereas a negative valence would be evident in avoidance (Jones, 2010). In the subsequent discussion, the bipolarity of affect is explored with particular reference to Freud’s idea of the uncanny and Jung’s concept of the numinous (to be defined).

A further theme is that literary works serve readers’ reflexive dialogue differently than does either telling their own autobiography or writing fiction, as briefly introduced in the following.

Three kinds of a dialogue with oneself

In a seminar given in 1925, Jung told how, whilst travelling on a train in the autumn of 1913, he was writing down disturbing fantasies that he had. He wondered at the time,

‘What is this I am doing, it certainly is not science, what is it?’ Then a voice said to me, ‘This is art.’ This made the strangest sort of an impression on me, because it was not in any sense my conviction that what I was writing was art. (Jung, 1989, p. 42)

Jung would not accept it. ‘Well, I said very emphatically to this voice that what I was doing was not art’ (1989, p. 42). He felt that the voice ‘had come from a woman’, for the notion that there are only two alternatives, art and science, ‘is the way a woman’s mind works’ (p. 42) and later construed the voice as his anima (Jung, 1963, p. 178 ff.). Within a few years, Jung developed the technique of active imagination, described in an essay originally written in 1916 (though published much later). In that essay, he also posited the transcendent function as a dynamic union of unconscious and conscious content (Jung, 1958). He illustrated it, inter alia, by analogy to a conversation: ‘It is exactly as if a dialogue were taking place between two human beings’ (par. 186), and related it to people who hear voices.
While Jung’s own voice-hearing episode is a concrete example of a dialogue in which the unconscious (literally) has its say, the act of telling about it exemplifies another kind of a dialogue with oneself. Postmodern narratologists regard autobiography as a dialogue that the narrators conduct with themselves, a dialogue enabled by the ‘distance between the now of the writing and the then of the narrated past’ (Gullestad, 1996, p. 5). In the ‘now’ of his telling in 1925, Jung retrospectively construes the fantasies he had in 1913 as foretelling the horrors of World War I. He prefaces the account of hearing the voice with the disclaimer that in 1913 he did not know about active imagination — thus signalling to his audience how he now understands it. In this way, his account gives the past meanings that were not there at the time.

Olney (1980) contends that the life around which an autobiography forms itself is ‘atemporal, committed to a vertical thrust from consciousness down into the unconscious rather than to a horizontal thrust from the present into the past’ (p. 239). In his characterization, the unconscious seems to have a role insofar as certain memories are selected and reconstructed so as to explain the past in a way that makes sense to the autobiographer in the now of the writing. Jung’s approach generally centres on a vertical thrust in the opposite direction. Whereas scholars of autobiography typically use the analogy of a dialogue to highlight the explanatory function of narrative, Jung’s (1958) dialogue analogy highlights the expressive function of ‘spontaneous’ fantasy. The latter function is served also in the kind of creative writing in which works ‘come as if fully arranged into the world... positively force themselves upon the author; his hand is seized, his pen writes things that his mind contemplates with amazement’ (Jung, 1922, par. 110). The unconscious reaches up to consciousness in a process of symbolization, whereby fragments of things seen, heard, and so forth coalesce so as to create a new content that symbolically represents the subjective here-and-now situation.

In contrast, an autobiographical narrative explains the personal past by rearranging particular events, relationships and circumstances, and placing oneself in relation to those. The following may illustrate. Towards making certain theoretical points about autobiography, Freeman (2003) told how, in his youth, his relationship with his father used to be distant and strained. Yet once, when his father picked him up from college, they talked at length and openly on the way home. The fact that his father passed away soon afterwards has made the drive home highly significant for Freeman in retrospect. His theoretical point is that the meaning of an event depends upon its placement...
in a narrated sequence of events. The narrative reconstructs personal history by juxtaposing events which might be causally unconnected (the ride home was not connected to the father’s death), and in this way creates a meaning that was not originally there; and yet the narrative is not fictive, Freeman contends. That is, it is not a fabrication. My point, at a tangent to his, echoes Ricoeur’s (1992) characterization of literature as thought experiments. Imagine a parallel universe in which Freeman and his father do not get a chance to open up to each other before the father passes away. Many years later, this other Freeman writes a story describing a heart-to-heart talk on a journey-that-never-happened as a thought experiment to figure out unresolved personal issues.

Scholars of autobiography often cite Socrates’s adage: *The unexamined life is not worth living*. This is usually taken literarily as involving a direct conscious reflection on one’s life. For example, Freeman (1997) analyses *The Death of Ivan Ilych* by Tolstoy to illustrate how someone’s life becomes understood near death. Tolstoy’s protagonist realizes certain truths about himself—his ignorance and superficiality, his uncaring and unkind acts, and so forth—and the realization makes redemption possible (as Freeman interprets the story). Freeman’s focus is on the specific way in which the narrative pulls together Ivan Ilych’s reminiscences.¹ His analysis remains entirely within the make-believe world of Tolstoy’s story, discussing it as if it were a case study of a real dying man.

When analysing the same story as a piece of literature, however, we might ask what had impelled Tolstoy to write it. Olney (1972) suggested that Tolstoy’s existential angst had found an expression in the creation of a dying Ivan Ilych: ‘In the midst of life, Tolstoy had the peculiar experience of feeling himself always in death, and that changed for him the very meaning of life itself’ (p. 102). In other words, Tolstoy invented Ivan Ilych so as to understand dying. Similarly, in *The Psychology of Art*, Vygotsky (1971) quotes another scholar, ‘Shakespeare created Othello...to apperceive the idea of jealousy. ...Shakespeare has brilliantly explained jealously, first to himself, and then to all of us’ (p. 31). Some creative writers make similar assertions. In an interview, the Czech novelist Milan Kundera (2005) described one of his characters, Tereza, as ‘overcome by vertigo...wishes to grow even weaker, wishes to fall down’; and told the interviewer that, while this is a key to understanding her, it is ‘not the key to understanding you or me. And yet both of us know that sort of vertigo at least as...one of the possibilities of existence. I had to invent Tereza, an “experimental self,” to understand that possibility’ (p. 31).
Novelists put on display, as it were, their own self-confrontation as expressed in an array of experimental selves. Kundera (2005) began that interview with the statement that ‘all novels, of every age, are concerned with the enigma of the self’ (p. 23), and ended it declaring that a novelist is ‘an explorer of existence’ (p. 44). A convergent statement is made in the following, spoken by a middle-aged businessman who discovered a passion for creative writing late in life:

The creative product, I’ve heard, is a plea for recognition. And some say, it is due to dreading the lack of meaning, due to inability to accept that there is no inner order behind things. The pressure builds up, impelling the attempt to organize the chaos... Pretty soon it became clear to me: I have nothing to offer but myself. (Kahana-Carmon, 1966, p. 238)

The speaker is a fictitious character in a short story by the Israeli writer Amalia Kahana-Carmon. In terms of life story, ethnicity, let alone gender, he has little in common with his creator; and yet, he speaks in her voice about the motivation to write. Her fiction is about herself without being autobiographical. Arguably, her fiction is deeply personal precisely because it is not autobiographical (Jones, 2002). Speaking to a university audience about the creative writer in general, she identified the compulsion to write as stemming from a personal inability to talk about something of great importance: ‘Regarding the matter that... captivates and occupies him above everything else, he is mute’ (Kahana-Carmon, 1991, p. 1). In sum, writing fiction serves the examination of one’s life in a different way than does autobiographical telling.

In passing, it is worth considering the context of Socrates’s adage. On the eve of his execution, Socrates responded to those who suggested that he hold his tongue and save his life, stating that to ‘let no day pass without discussing and examining both myself and others is really the very best thing that a man can do, and... life without this sort of examination is not worth living’ (Plato, 38a/1961, p. 23). Socrates refers to philosophy (not autobiography). Without the freedom to examine universal truths about moral being, his life is not worth living, he implies. Musicians may feel the same about the prospect of being denied playing music for the rest of their lives, painters about losing hope of ever painting again, dancers about dancing, and poets or novelists about writing.

For a reader, the possibility of self-confrontation mediated by fiction begins with emotional responses. The emotional experience could be
Fiction and the ‘Uncanny Valley’ of Self-Confrontation

viewed as an entrance into a reflexive dialogue that is qualitatively different from that presented in the preceding, at least in how the emotion is understood. For instance, feeling sorry for the protagonist of someone else’s story could be viewed as compassion, but a similar emotion for the protagonist of one’s own autobiography is self-pity. This could be explored in terms of the aesthetic experience, broadly defined (with Freud, 1919/1985) as the qualities of feeling.

Conventionally, the aesthetic experience has been understood as an intrinsically pleasurable response to beauty, which is unrelated to rational or moral judgements. In this vein, Freeman (1997) suggests that Tolstoy’s Ivan Ilych demonstrates that ‘narrative integrity is not merely harmony of proportion or beauty of form but the soundness and depth of one’s ethical commitments’ (p. 388). If Ivan Ilych was real and his dying reflections could somehow be recorded, we would hardly be concerned with their stylistic aspect. However, dismissing aesthetics as irrelevant for the study of the self overlooks the significance of the aesthetic experience in its own right. Freeman’s use of the ‘case’ of Ivan Ilych to make theoretical points could be contrasted with the use of another literary source in an account of an actual case study of an elderly woman approaching death, as told by her therapist, Carvalho (2008). To convey his patient’s melancholia, he quotes from ‘The Setting of the Moon’ by Giacomo Leopardi, who had died in his thirties after many years of ill health:

undiminished is desire, hope extinct
dry the wells of pleasure, pain
ever growing, and good withheld
forever. (Leopardi, cited in Carvalho, 2008, p. 7)

The poem communicates a meaning through the mood it creates. If we succumb to the mood, we might end up melancholically ruminating on our own mortality. As Bachelard (1958/1994) put it, the poetic image becomes our own, ‘takes roots in us...becomes a new being in our language’ (p. xxiii). Through the poetic image we may ‘experience resonances, sentimental repercussions, reminders of our past’; and, in this way, ‘the image has touched the depths before it stirs the surface’ (p. xxiii).

In psychological terms, a poetic image becomes our own through cognitive and emotional reactions. Those modes are (to some extent) independent from each other. We can intellectually interpret a poem (novel, etc.) while remaining emotionally untouched by it. Conversely,
it might have a powerful emotional impact, and yet its meaning (or the significance of our emotional reaction) would elude us. On the cognitive side, we make objective judgements – ‘objective’ in the sense of ontological detachment, for even when the judgement is entirely personal (so-called ‘subjective’), detachment is inherent in the split between the subject (I) who knows that this is ‘my opinion’ and the known object (i.e., the opinion). If I feel passionate about my opinion, I am related to that opinion as to an ‘external’ text. On the emotional side, the poetic image either grabs us or doesn’t. Zajonc (1980) pointed out that affective reactions are inescapable. We can choose to make a cognitive judgement about something; but the emotional reaction occurs whether or not we want it. Moreover, whereas cognitive judgements deal with properties of the object about which the judgement is made, affective judgements implicate the self (as Zajonc put it), for they identify one’s own state in relation to the object of the judgement. In a way, the emotional impact of a poetic image is not simply a case of an externally presented content taking roots in us, but of something already within us germinating under the favourable conditions of the presented material.

The next section takes a closer look at the reader’s aesthetic experience.

The uncanny as the unhomely versus the mistaken

‘It is only rarely that a psychoanalyst feels impelled to investigate the subject of aesthetics’, declares Freud in the opening sentence of ‘The “Uncanny”’ (1919/1985, p. 339). To him, aesthetics means ‘not merely the theory of beauty but the theory of the qualities of feeling’ (p. 339), and indeed his essay concerns ‘the opposite feelings of repulsion and distress’ (p. 340). It commences with lengthy dictionary quotations, tracking the etymology of words translated as ‘uncanny’ in several languages. Ignoring most of those, and settling upon a specific meaning which he finds in Schelling, Freud defines the uncanny as ‘that class of the frightening which leads back to what is known of old and long familiar’ (p. 340). The essay’s German title, Das Unheimliche (literally, the unhomely), captures his theme: Something that is familiar appears in the outwardly unfamiliar.

Freud expands the theme in terms of a general psychoanalytical principle, labelled ‘the recurrence of the repressed’, which he illustrates with an analysis of E. T. A. Hoffmann's short story, Der Sandmann. Hoffmann's sandman is a nightmarish character who throws sand in the eyes of children who would not sleep, causing their eyes to fall out,
and then feeds their eyes to his offspring. The protagonist believes that his father’s sinister associate is that sandman. Freud dwells upon the macabre leitmotif. He interprets the protagonist’s fear of losing his eyes, and the thematic connection with the father, as representing a fear of castration. He suggests that Hoffmann’s tale is disturbing because it returns readers to their own castration anxiety. It is not clear (to me) how his explanation applies to women who find the idea of children losing their eyes highly disturbing. There might be a simpler explanation. Whilst reading, we tend to visualize what the text describes. The scenario formed in our mind makes us cringe, as if witnessing the horrid event for real. Such reaction, in which the mind responds to mental imagery as if it were real sensory input, should be distinguished from being emotionally moved by personal resonances of a poetic image. A skilful storyteller may induce the audience to feel as if they are ‘in’ the story, but aesthetic realism alone does not suffice for evoking personal resonances in the reader.

Freud’s (1919/1985) exposition challenges any one-to-one relation between motif and emotion. For example, whereas the ‘story of a severed hand in Hauff’s fairytale has an uncanny effect’, according to Freud, ‘no trace of uncanniness is provoked by Heredotus’s story’ in which a severed hand tries to hold fast to a thief (p. 368–9). A tale of a supernatural event per se does not suffice to bring about feelings of unease, for we readily accept the impossible in fiction. As Freud puts it, fantasy ‘is not submitted to reality-testing’, and in fairy tales ‘the world of reality is left behind from the very start’ (p. 373). Rather, the ‘uncanny’ effect is contingent on how the depicted event connects to other thematic elements within the story. In the Heredotus story, our focus is on ‘the superior cunning of the master-thief’ (p. 375). However, Freud implies that tales may be objectively classified as uncanny or not. Arguably, it would be better to ask who experiences a particular tale as uncanny, and under what conditions.

Freud (1919/1985) picked up the theme of the uncanny from a 1906 essay by Jentsch, ‘On the Psychology of the Uncanny’. Freud’s essay has become a classic in literary studies (e.g., Morlock, 1997), while Jentsch’s essay waited 90 years to be translated into English and has suffered the curious fate of a living dead: It is well known, but is known mainly or solely through its citation by Freud. Jentsch (1906/1997) had called for the investigation of ‘how the affective excitement of the uncanny arises in psychological terms, how the psychical conditions must be constituted so that the “uncanny” sensation emerges’ (p. 8). Superficially, Freud might seem to respond to that call; but he doesn’t, for he discards the very
phenomena to which Jentsch had drawn attention. Jentsch had suggested that doubts about whether an apparently living being is actually animate, and conversely whether something lifeless is in fact animate, would be associated with sensations of weirdness. To put it in jargon, there is a perceptual validation error. It is as if our mind totters at the Höffding Step between perception and conception, having associated sensory input with the wrong ideation. The mistaken catches us unaware, the world is suddenly less predictable, and this is associated with felt startle and unease.

Anecdotal examples abound. The uncanny effect of wax dolls, such as in Madame Tussaud’s in London, is well known. Mori (1970) gave the example of a prosthetic hand that is deceptively real, but unpleasant and cold to the touch when we shake it, causing us to feel repulsion when suddenly realizing its lifelessness. Freud (1919/1985) himself gives a few examples. For instance, he tells how, when travelling on a night train, he momentarily mistook his own reflection in the door’s glass for a stranger standing there (p. 371). However, Freud argues that those instances of the mistaken are not ‘unhomely’, for they do not involve a recurrence of repressed content. Perceptual errors do not enter the principle posited by him. On the contrary, experiencing the uncanny through fiction suggests correct apperception of something about ourselves that we would rather not see. Freud might be wrong about the psychoanalytical significance of Hoffmann’s sandman (see Rand and Torok, 1994), but we may take from him the general point that there are different routes to similar emotional experiences: The unhomely is not the mistaken.

Furthermore, the revulsion we feel at the thought of children having their eyes stolen is an involuntary embodied reaction before and apart of any intellectual interpretation, moral evaluation or stylistic judgement of the tale; and is irrational (we know that Hoffmann’s tale is a fantasy). Such reactions put us ‘in’ the story. Freud’s theme concerns instances in which we find ourselves reacting to a story as if it is about something in us. I once met a woman who had a strong aversion to Alice in Wonderland. When I asked her why it disturbed her so much, she replied that she had no idea because she couldn’t bring herself to read it. She had been in therapy several years at the time. Whatever life experiences had brought about the negative association, her avoidance illustrates an ‘uncanny’ effect of fiction.

Beyond the uncanny valley

The phrase ‘uncanny valley’ was coined by the robotics engineer Mori (1970), who hypothesized that an increase in the realism of humanlike
artefacts would be associated at some point with a drop in a sense of familiarity. The suddenly unfamiliar object would elicit feelings of weirdness and unease. Then, the correlation between familiarity and positive affect would resume. This appears like a valley in an otherwise upward graph line, drawn by Mori. On the left, Mori placed industrial robots (least humanlike, low in familiarity). Moving to the right are stuffed toys and humanoid robots. Further to the right are corpses, zombies, and prosthetic limbs – objects low in familiarity, despite their increased human-likeness. Likewise, we may imagine a positive correlation plotted as a function of a text’s verisimilitude or truth-likeness (y-axis) and salience or personal relevance (x-axis), where salience is communicated in emotional intensity or attachment to the story. Stories that have an ‘uncanny’ effect – such as cited by Freud (1919/1985) or Alice in Wonderland for my acquaintance – belong to the valley. 

Beyond his valley, rising on both familiarity and human-likeness dimensions, Mori (1970) placed Bunraku puppets and, at the highest point, the living human being. However, opening a workshop 35 years later, he recanted,

> Once I positioned living human beings on the highest point of the curve in the right-hand side of the uncanny valley. Recently, however, I came to think that there is something more attractive and amiable than human beings in the further right-hand side of the valley. It is the face of a Buddhist statue as the artistic expression of the human ideal. You will find such a face, for example, in Miroku Bosatsu (Maitreya Bodhisattva) in Kohryuji in Kyoto, or in Miroku Bosatsu in Chuguji and in Gakkoh Bosatsu (Candraprabha) in Yakushiji in Nara. Those faces are full of elegance, beyond worries of life, and have aura of dignity. I think those are the very things that should be positioned on the highest point of the curve. (Mori, 2005, online)

His amendment brings to light something latent in his 1970 formulation. It takes us past the physical living human – which wax dolls and androids resemble – and in the direction of what William James (1890) had called the Spiritual Self, the result of ‘our having become able to think of subjectivity as such, to think ourselves as thinkers’ (p. 296). The suspicion that, already in 1970, Mori tacitly graded objects in terms of their approximation to the Spiritual Self is supported by the placement of Bunraku puppets beyond the valley. In traditional Japanese
theatre, Bunraku puppets act out chanted dramatic narratives. The puppet appears lifelike when seen in action, moving on stage, although it is less realistic than a prosthetic hand, as Mori (1970) pointed out. At the time, he attributed the absence of an ‘uncanny’ effect to the fact that movement is usually a sign of life, and went on to discuss engineering implications. There might be a simpler explanation. The puppeteers are visible on the stage, sometimes three men to a puppet. Seeing them manipulate the puppet cancels out any ambiguity about its animate status.

In any case, Mori’s (2005) amendment upturns his original assumption about the significance of movement. Statues of Buddha do not move. Yet, like the performing Bunraku puppets, they can move us. Miroku Bosatsu is a slim, unadorned, wooden statue, smaller than life size, dated to the seventh century and believed to be Korean in origin. Moran (1958) described the one in Nara: ‘Its gracious expression, with closed eyes and sweet smile, gives a sense of dream-like reverie. Its appeal is direct and powerful... this Miroku has a pervading sense of intimacy, a tenderness that is warmly human’ (p. 179). The same description applies to the Miroku in Kyoto. The temple is off the beaten tourist track. We went there because I had read Mori and was curious to see it. After surveying the numerous wonderfully crafted statues displayed in a museum-like hall, we sat down on a bench in the presence of Miroku Bosatsu. There was a small but steady stream of Japanese visitors coming in, paying their respects to the Buddha, lingering a while in contemplative silence, and leaving. We stayed for no particular reason. We grew inexplicably happier. It was unexpectedly a moment of profound serenity and deep contentment for both of us. When we reluctantly decided to leave, we were astounded to find that a whole hour had gone by.

People who feel ‘tenderness that is warmly human’ emanating from a wooden statue that is less humanlike in appearance than a wax doll are not mistaken about whether the artefact is animate or not. Rather, in such moments, we may experience a quality of feeling that Jung called ‘numinous’. In ancient Roman religion, numen referred to the power of a deity or a spirit present in places and objects. Jung (1938) psychologized it by redefining numinosum as ‘a dynamic existence or effect, not caused by an arbitrary act of will. On the contrary, it seizes and controls the human subject’, and is often experienced as external in origin, ‘either a quality of a visible object or the influence of an invisible presence causing a peculiar alteration of consciousness’ (p. 4). I hesitate to use the term, for the terminology itself sometimes ‘seizes
and controls’ the Jungian discourse, and speaking of the numinous slides into mystification that obfuscates the psychological issue at hand. The issue is apprehending subjectivity as such. In James’s (1890) formulation, whereas the Material and Social Selves refer to experiencing oneself as extended into the environment, the Spiritual Self deals with turning inward. A numinous experience might be replicated for many people (many are moved by Miroku Bosatsu), but is nevertheless solitary self-confrontation. Similarly, a novel, let alone religious scriptures, may inspire many readers; but the tacit dialogue is with oneself.

There is a dark side to the numinous. A relevant historical example is the so-called ‘Werther Effect’, a wave of suicides that followed the publication in 1774 of Goethe’s The Sorrows of Young Werther (the protagonist commits suicide due to unrequited love). Reflecting on those copycat suicides, and other historical cases of novels influencing lives, Sarbin (2004) drew attention to the power of the imagination as necessary for readers’ identification with the protagonist. To go a step beyond Sarbin, while it takes imagination to find an analogy between one’s situation and fictitious circumstances, it takes something else to feel the analogy so powerfully that one’s destiny ends up mirroring the fate of a non-existent being in an imaginary world. For sure, various causal factors had converged to bring about the Werther Effect. At least some suicides were probably influenced by reports of antecedent suicides attributed to reading the novel, combined with personal susceptibility to contemplating suicide (Phillips, 1974). However, the self-confrontation ‘effect’ is not a causal concept. Rather, it is a statement of a meaning-relationship that may exist between a particular reader and the given text at a given moment (in Jones, 2010, I elaborate the idea in terms of ‘affordances’). Sometimes upon reading a novel, personal ambivalences or anxieties become clearer, are given a voice by proxy. In such instances, the reader’s identification with the protagonist is not simply the recognition of parallels (‘Werther is like me’), but a construction of one’s own identity as inferred from realizing the novel’s meaning (‘This novel explains so much about my situation, I’m just like Werther’).

Notes on the allure of poetics

Certain existential struggles resonate with particular audiences, sometimes with profound personal and social effects, as historical cases of influential novels may attest. Yet, the reality of those effects (e.g., the tragedy of young men committing suicide in the wake of The Sorrows of Young Werther) does not make the artistic depiction of social reality
necessarily true, morally desirable, or a testimony to its author’s astuteness. In his famous attack on the poets, Plato provocatively argued that they mislead their audience; they merely hold a mirror to nature, ‘creating appearances, not actual real things’ (*Republic*, 596e/1993, p. 346). Modern literary writers are typically viewed as holding a mirror to human existence, but a similar mystique persists and is reproduced in the romantic rhetoric of the ‘poetics’ or narrativity of selfhood.

For instance, Rorty (1989) has expressed his ‘hope that culture as a whole can be “poeticized” rather than as the Enlightenment hope that it can be “rationalized” or “scientized”’ (p. 53). Presenting his thesis as the ‘triumph of the poets’, he takes from Nietzsche the view that only poets can truly appreciate the contingency of human life, its infinite variability and uncertainty. The rest of us are ‘doomed to spend our conscious lives trying to escape from contingency rather than, like the strong poet, acknowledging and appropriating contingency’ (p. 28).

While everyone has an unconscious need ‘to make a self for himself’ by redescribing the chance circumstances of one’s own biography, only the strong poet has a conscious need to demonstrate his (*sic*) uniqueness, according to Rorty (p. 43). However, Rorty does not tell us on what basis or by whose judgement we may differentiate a strong poet from the weak. Such judgements are themselves highly contingent and changeable. Bourdieu (1993), linking the prestige of poetry to a tradition that has started with the Romantics, points to ‘a charismatic legitimation which is given to only a few individuals’, resulting in ‘a continuous struggle for the monopoly of poetic legitimacy’, which has led to the dizzying succession of art movements (p. 51).

A plea to ‘poeticize’ the helping professions underpins the case that Charon (2006), a medical doctor, makes for the educative potential of literature. She asserts that the ‘moral and aesthetic resonances of novels, poems, and plays offer different kinds of evidence from that offered by scientific experiments, and yet it is an evidence that counts very much in understanding humans’ predicaments’. She contends that literary training ‘would expand both clinical and moral imaginations, letting clinicians behold and value the singularity of individual patients and letting them reflect on their own experiences in the care of the sick’ (p. 194). However, the possibility that some literary works might express their authors’ psychopathology calls into question their moral resonances. Rank (1925/1971) linked the literary motif of the double (doppelganger) to the personality of the writers who explored it – listing Hoffmann, Poe, Maupassant, Dostoyevsky, and a few more. For example, Hoffmann was ‘nervous, eccentric, and strongly dependent on moods...suffered
from hallucinations, delusions of grandeur, and compulsive ideas – all of which he was fond of portraying in his writings,’ says Rank (p. 35); and there ‘can be no doubt about Dostoyevsky’s severe mental illness’ (p. 45). Referring to accounts that Dostoyevsky was ‘filled with an exalted self-esteem and opinion of himself’, Rank observes that ‘Vanity and egotism are also typical of many of his fictional characters’ (p. 47). Rather than viewing literary fiction unquestionably as a source of wisdom, it could be viewed as a cultural activity that creates experiences (i.e., not ‘appearances’, contra Plato) for both its producers and consumers.

As readers, we are sometimes confronted with our own self, obscurely and unaware, in texts that disturb us as well as those that appeal to us. Rarely, specific works inspire us, and may even give us a glimpse of transcendence in their numinous quality. A reader who is inexplicably moved by a story might not realize that self-confrontation is happening, and instead admire the author’s insight and skill. Yet, although the ‘active’ imagination producing the fiction is the author’s, the reader’s imagination, producing a meaning, is hardly passive.

Note

1. Interestingly, Tolstoy describes Ivan Ilych’s dying reflections, not as a narrative, but as holding conversations with himself; for example, ‘What is it you want?’ was the first clear idea able to be put into words that he grasped.
   ‘What? Not to suffer, to live,’ he answered.
   And again he was utterly plunged into attention so intense that even the pain did not distract him.
   ‘To live? Live how?’ the voice of his soul was asking. (Tolstoy 1886/2004, p. 123)

References

Jung, C. G. Unless otherwise stated, the following are from *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung* (CW) London: Routledge & Kegan Paul:
—— (1922) ‘On the relation of analytical psychology to poetry’ (CW 15).
—— (1928) ‘On psychic energy’ (CW 8).
—— (1958) ‘The transcendent function’ (CW 8).


Since Hayao Kawai (1976), the first Jungian analyst in Japan, asserted that Japanese society still contains many residuals of matriarchy, most Japanese Jungians have discussed the Japanese psyche in this way. Indeed, Shintoism, Japan’s original religion, has a goddess named *Ama-terasu no Oho kami* (Heaven-Shining-Great-August-Deity) as its main deity. However, does this mean that Japanese society is matriarchal? For the past three decades, many feminists’ works in Japan have offered considerable proof that Japanese modern society is very patriarchal (Ueno, 1994). Although I have identified myself as a Jungian-oriented psychotherapist, I have started to be suspicious of Kawai’s idea, as my clinical practice and research into eating disorders have led me to be interested in relationships between women’s psyches and their social contexts. Consequently, I come to this topic as both a Jungian and a feminist. In previous works (Nakamura, 2005, 2006, 2010), I have dealt with difficulties of individuation of women, linking those difficulties to their positioning in a patriarchal society characterized by Eastern Asian traditions. I have focused on the social status and spiritual backgrounds of Japanese women. The purpose of this chapter is to explore how archetypal images of both masculinity and femininity have been expressed in a patriarchal society, and how they function in women’s psyches in contemporary Japan.

In Jungian psychology, individuation is one of the most important concepts. As Jung defines it,

In general, it is the process by which individual beings are formed and differentiated; in particular, it is development of the psychological
individual as a being distinct from the general, collective psychology. Individuation, therefore, is a process of differentiation, having for its goal the development of the individual personality. (Jung, 1921, par. 756)

Regarding the developmental model, Jung (1928) says, ‘Multiplicity and inner division are opposed by an integrative unity whose power is as great as that of the instincts. Together they form a pair of opposites necessary for self-regulation’ (par. 96). The process of individuation is generally understood as striving towards a balance of opposites within the psyche such as the feminine and masculine. The feminine/the masculine, femininity/masculinity, feminine principle/masculine principle – these are all called archetypes in the terminology of Jungian psychology; that is,

These ‘primordial images,’ or ‘archetypes,’ as I have called them, belong to the basic stock of the unconscious psyche and cannot be explained as personal acquisitions. Together they make up that psychic stratum which I have called the collective unconscious. (Jung, 1929, par. 229)

Because individuation is a process of dynamic dialogue between the ego and the collective unconscious, archetypal images play a crucial role and it is important for exploration of women’s individuations to understand how both the feminine and the masculine function in their psyche. As Jung put it, ‘the essential thing, psychologically, is that in dreams, fantasies, and other exceptional states of mind the most far-fetched mythological motifs can appear autochthonously at any time’ (1929, par. 229).

First, I shall describe sandplay creations by a young Japanese woman. Sandplay therapy, a Jungian method widespread in Japan, is considered a medium through which people can express their deep symbolic, archetypal images. Second, I shall tell the Japanese myth of *Ama-terasu no Oho kami* (Heaven-Shining-Great-August-Deity) and *Sosa no wo no Mikoto* (His Impetuous-Male-Augustness) and some of its interpretations. The interpretation of myths is a traditional Jungian way to explore archetypal images. As Jung (1921) said, ‘the primordial image, elsewhere also termed archetypal, is always collective, i.e., it is at least common to entire peoples or epochs. In all probability the most important mythological motifs are common to all times and races’ (par. 747). Then I shall relate the myth to my client’s sandplay creations to consider the implications
for the Jungian approach to masculinity and femininity in women generally, and particularly for understanding her sandplay works in view of difficulties of individuation for women in contemporary Japan.

Finally, in my view, Jung always thought about individuation in opposition to the social context; for example: ‘The individual way can, by definition, never be a norm’ (Jung, 1921, par. 761). I shall discuss how a Jungian perspective is useful for people’s individuation in contemporary Japan, rethinking the classical Jungian thought from feminist viewpoints.

**Sandplay**

Sandplay is a method of nonverbal psychotherapy, founded by Dora Kalff (1966/1981), who connected Jungian theory to Lowenfeld’s World Technique, and developed it into a method applicable to adults as well as children. Kalff was also interested in Eastern thought and traditions, and introduced such ideas (e.g., the mandala) into her theory of sandplay therapy.

Kawai (1969), who had met Kalff and experienced sandplay therapy in 1962 in Zürich, intuitively confirmed that the method suits the Japanese. He gave sandplay therapy a new name, *Hakoniwa* therapy, when he introduced the method into Japan. *Hakoniwa* literally means ‘a small garden in a box’, and this coinage was greatly effective in helping Japanese minds grasp this concept, because we Japanese have traditions such as *Bonsai* or *Bonkei* (landscape on a tray). Through such traditions, Japanese people are familiar with likening small plants or a landscape in a small space to big trees or grand natural landscapes. In the 1960s, once the method was introduced into Japan, it became more widely used than in any other country (Kawai, 1969). At the time of this writing (August 2010), the Japan Association of Sandplay Therapy has more than 1900 members according to its website (www.sandplay.jp). So, it is natural for me, as a Japanese Jungian psychotherapist, to be familiar with this methodology. Now, of course, sandplay therapy is accepted in many countries. The International Society for Sandplay Therapy was established in 1985 (Yamanaka, 2000).

According to Kalff (1966/1981) and her followers, people can express deep archetypal images in their sandplay creations, sometimes even their images of the Self. Kalff stressed that a free and sheltered space and mother-child unity are absolutely necessary for the manifestation of the Self, the most important moment in the development of the personality (p. 32).
Sandplay works of a young Japanese woman

One of my clients was an excellent engineer, and was living separately from her husband due to her job. But she was suffering from depressive states and compulsive behaviour, and had to take time off from work due to these disturbances. She came to me for psychiatric care, and accepted psychotherapy without any hesitation. She was smart, rational, and usually dressed in black. We worked together for one year and three months. As a result, she recovered, but she quit her job and started to live with her husband as a housewife. Our therapy might be deemed a success, but I have been wondering for a long time whether her decision was the best one for her. What happened in her psyche? Fortunately, she left three sandplay works. I can explore their symbolic meaning.

She voluntarily told me in our thirteenth session that she wanted to try sandplay therapy. We were planning to do so in our next session, but she suddenly cancelled. It is usual for some people to feel a kind of resistance or fear of expressing their deepest images. Finally, however, she created a sandplay work with enthusiasm (Figure 8.1) and seemed to be really satisfied with it. At the same time, she seemed exhausted. An aircraft has crashed on a hill, a train has derailed and is falling into the sea, and the town has been destroyed by an earthquake. She explained that these awful events occurred separately. This is obviously a catastrophic world. It is thus clear that her psyche was completely broken.

Figure 8.1 Catastrophe
Looking at her work in detail, I can find biscuits, a nursing bottle, a hand mirror and a comb in the destroyed town. These things remind me that her maternal aspiration and femininity have been violated in her psyche. I can say the theme of the work is catastrophe.

I did not comment on her sandplay work, but she was already aware that the world she had was completely broken. After that session, she decided to take a one-week holiday to try to live with her husband. However, she became very tired during that time, so she left him again. She slept a long time, and had a dream in which she jumped from a high place and stabbed herself many times but could not die.

Two months after her first sandplay work, she produced this second one (Figure 8.2). She gathered all the sand in the box and made a Kofun-shaped square. A Kofun was a Japanese tomb for the ruling class from the third to fifth centuries. In her sandplay work, there is a beacon at the top, and three Haniwas (clay figures) on either side. A Kannon (Avalokitesvara, Bodhisattva of compassion) is buried deep in the tomb, and as a final touch she put an alien on top of the tomb.

I was surprised at how dramatically this second work differed from the first one. While the first one was dynamic, violent and destructive, the second one was stable. The tomb is a kind of square mandala. According to Kalff (1966/1981), circles and squares play particular roles
in symbolic expression. While the circle is a ‘symbol of perfection and of the perfect being’, the ‘square appears when wholeness is developing’ (p. 24). As I said before, she could not die in her dream, but the tomb symbolizes how something died, and its square shape may represent a wholeness developing in her psyche.

Let’s examine this sandplay in detail. Kannon is the most interesting item in the work. What does it symbolize? Kannon is the Bodhisattva of great compassion, mercy and love. Kannon was originally a male, but in East Asia, this Bodhisattva is commonly regarded as female. So it was worshiped by Japanese Catholics in the feudal days as Mary, the Mother (Japanese-English Buddhist Dictionary, 1991). In this context, we can think that Kannon represents femininity, maternity or salvation for my patient, and that this is still sleeping in her deep psyche.

Regarding the Haniwas, clay figures, an ancient Japanese historical record, Nihongi, explained that they were used to avoid self-immolation (Nihongi, 1972). However, recent archaeological research has suggested that they served in rituals for the dead (Takahashi, 1996, p. 49). Here, it seems that the dormant femininity or maternity of my client may be carefully respected and protected. The beacon on the top is a tower, and symbolizes phallic power (Herder, 1993), and as a lighthouse, symbolizing the light and wisdom of animus, it also shows my client’s constant goal across the waves of her life. In sum, the figure shows that although her psyche is ruled by a strange-looking alien, and her femininity or maternity is dormant, her transformation is going on. I see the theme of this work as withdrawal.

The next session was cancelled. Then she returned to me and disclosed that she previously had had an abortion when she was with her former boyfriend. At the time, she might not have felt pain about it, but eventually she realized how she had been harmed by the experience. When she produced her second work, I again did not make any comment. But with the disclosure of this painful episode, both she and I completely understood the meaning of her second work. Soon afterward, she decided to leave her job and to live with her husband. She started her new life without a wristwatch and wore soft, colorful clothes dominated by red, yellow and white. Her symptoms had almost disappeared. After we decided to stop our sessions, I suggested she try sandplay therapy once more. She agreed, and here is her last work (Figure 8.3).

Here, the surface of the ground is mostly covered with lids for medicine. The lower-right part is enclosed by walls, apparently expressing her new home. There is a small, yellow stuffed animal holding a brush
looking in a mirror. She put a well in the centre of the box, and, at the side of the well, two stones covered with moss. She explained that she liked medicine because it gave her a feeling of self-control. She had recently purchased a mirror, and the brush represents a broom. The enclosure in the lower right is her new home, but it is still empty. She did not make any comment about the well. She did not use all the space in the box, and she did not touch the sand in the box either. The lids for medicine covering the ground show her intense repression and represent how her recovery still depends upon medicine, something manmade. Therefore, this work seemed pathetic, and noteworthy for its sense of powerlessness.

The small animal with soft skin is the first creature in her work. It is looking at the mirror and holding the broom, apparently representing feminine behaviour. The mirror, of course, symbolizes reflection and shows that she has just started to find a new self. But the figure is still in a primitive phase, not human, much less maturely feminine, and not ready, surely, for her new home, which is still empty. The only sign of hope in her third work is the small well in the centre of the box. Of course, wells provide water, and water is the origin of life. Psychologically, it represents a path to the unconscious, and hence is a source of psychic energy or emotion. But this well is so small, and the only plant life near
it is still the delicate moss on stones. Consequently, compared with her
erlier works, we cannot help but say that this shows powerlessness. She
could not yet live as a fulfilled human being, which means that she
seemed to be embarrassed by her new persona as a woman. I see the
theme of this sandplay as finding a new self in a mirror.

The myth

It is remarkable how these themes – catastrophe, withdrawal, and
finding a new self in the mirror – are all connected to the myth of
Ama-terasu no Oho kami (Heaven-Shining-Great-August-Deity). This
goddess is seen as an ancestor of the Japanese emperors, and is thus
the national and the highest deity of Japanese myth. There are dif-
erent versions in The Kojiki (Records of Ancient Matters) and Nihongi
(Chronicles of Japan from the Earliest Times to 697 A.D.). In Nihongi,
Ama-terasu no Oho kami is born as the daughter of Izanagi-no-Mikoto
(His Augustness the Male-Who-Invites) and Izanami-no-Mikoto (Her
Augustness the Female-Who-Invites). They are creative gods, and they
consulted together, saying, ‘We have now produced the Great-eight-
island country [Japan] with the mountains, rivers, herbs, and trees.
Why should we not produce someone who shall be lord of the uni-
verse?’ (Nihongi, 1972, p. 18). They then produced the Sun-Goddess,
who is called Oho-hiru-me no muchi (Great-noon-female-of-possessor),
and in another version is called Ama-terasu no Oho kami. The resplend-
ent lustre of this child shines throughout all six quarters: North, South,
East, West, Above, Below. Therefore, the two Deities rejoice and send
her to heaven. Then two other gods, the Moon-god and Sosa no wo no
Mikoto (His Impetuous-Male-Augustness), are produced as her brothers.
However, Sosa no wo no Mikoto has a fierce temper and is given to cruel
acts. Therefore, his parents say, ‘Thou art exceedingly wicked, and in
not meeting that thou should not reign over the world’. So they expel
him (p. 20).

In The Kojiki (1981), on the other hand, Izanagi-no-Mikoto produces
Ama-terasu no Oho kami and her two brother gods by himself after the
death of his wife. He assigns Sosa no wo no Mikoto to rule the Sea Plain.
However, Sosa no wo no Mikoto misses his mother so much and does
not submit to his father. The father gets angry and expels Sosa no wo no
Mikoto from the world. Before leaving, he wants to make his farewell to
his sister, Ama-terasu no Oho kami in Heaven (p. 52–3). Learning of his
visit, Ama-terasu no Oho kami thinks that he may rob her kingdom, and
she dresses herself up like a man, with weapons to fight him. But Sosa
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no wo no Mikoto explains that he never had such an evil intent and he suggests to her that they should undergo an Ukehi as a proof of his sincerity. An Ukehi is a kind of oath in which two deities produce children from their possessions (in this case a sword and jewels), and it is also a kind of competition, dependent upon the sex of the children they produce. The result is very complicated, because there are six different versions regarding the Ukehi in The Kojiki and Nihongi. In The Kojiki, Sosa no wo no Mikoto wins because he begets female children but, in Nihongi, because his children are male. In any case, Sosa no wo no Mikoto proves his sincerity, and is allowed to stay in Heaven.

But Sosa no wo no Mikoto starts to behave violently. He damages rice fields and soils the sacred dining room of the goddess. These violations are really catastrophic. However, Ama-terasu no Oho kami neither blames him nor punishes him. At last, he hurts a young female goddess with a shuttle in the sacred weaving hall and she dies. In another version, Ama-terasu no Oho kami herself is hurt by the shuttle. She gets upset, and then hides herself in a rock cave. By her withdrawal, heaven and earth completely lose sunshine and become dark. All gods are troubled by this loss of sunshine, and they talked about a way to get the sun goddess out of the cave. They decide to put a mirror in front of the cave and hold a party. Then, a young woman dances so passionately, even erotically, that all gods laugh. Ama-terasu no Oho kami wonders why they are laughing despite their benightedness. So, she opens the rock door a crack and peeps out. Finding another sun goddess in the mirror, she is suspicious of what is happening outside, and opens the rock door more. A strong male god then quickly pulls her outside, and people get sunlight again. In short, she is tricked into returning to the world. After that, the gods severely punish Sosa no wo no Mikoto and banish him from Heaven.

Interpretations of the myth by Japanese Jungians

Many Japanese Jungian analysts have dealt with Ama-terasu no Oho kami (Kawai, 1964, 2009; Ankei and Yabuki, 1989; Oda, 1990; Yokoyama, 1995). First, I will focus on Kawai’s interpretation, because he was the first and greatest Japanese Jungian analyst, and his thoughts have vastly influenced his followers. For Kawai (2009), it is amazing that ‘the female sun shines highest in Japan, which many people think of as “a country of men”’ (p. 112–3), for in other counties the sun is almost always thought of as male and the moon as female. Analysing female figures in Japanese mythology generally, including Ama-terasu no Oho kami, he
tried to compare the Japanese with the Western psyche, mainly depending upon *The Kojiki*. Actually, Kawai preferred *The Kojiki* to *Nihongi*, for he thought *Nihongi* was influenced by Chinese culture and had been written with a political intent, while he saw *The Kojiki* as ‘the nearest to the original Japanese’ (p. 116).

I cannot introduce all Kawai’s (2009) interpretations here. So, I will limit myself to summarizing his core analysis of *Ama-terasu no Oho kami*. According to his interpretation, *Ama-terasu no Oho kami* is, in the first instance, a father’s daughter like the great virgin goddess Pallas Athene (p. 157), because her father produced her by himself in *The Kojiki* version. However, unlike Athene, *Ama-terasu no Oho kami*, ‘the Sun Goddess, like the male Zeus, came to stand topmost in the Japanese pantheon’ (p. 158). She could assume this role, according to Kawai, because when she first meets *Sosa no wo no Mikoto*, she displays a courage that shows that ‘masculinity is part of her inborn nature, since she was born from her father’ (p. 177). However, the ‘Sun Goddess, who played too much [of a] male role, was compelled to realize her [lack] of femininity by losing the fight’ (p. 178). After her defeat, she dramatically changed, and ‘became passive, to endure her brother’s terrible violence’ (p. 180), which, of course, is a catastrophe. According to Kawai, ‘she became much more feminine than before, but it was not enough. To become fully a woman, she must get, so to say, a perfect touch, a fatal blow’ (p. 181). At last, she is hurt by a shuttle and dies symbolically, as a result of the intrusion of the male. She is frightened by the experience and withdraws. In other words, this is the symbolic death of a virgin goddess. Kawai thought that by her passive withdrawal, *Ama-terasu no Oho kami* could establish her ‘passive superiority’ (p. 188) in Heaven. Then, after finding her new self in the mirror, is symbolically reborn as the greatest goddess in Japan.

Another Japanese Jungian, Horoshi Yokoyama, has discussed the myth also relying mainly on *The Kojiki*. He more or less accepts Kawai’s analysis, and summarizes the character of *Ama-terasu no Oho kami* by saying, ‘She transformed from a “father’s daughter” into a mature woman’, and then could become a great ruler of heaven and ancestor of the Japanese emperor (Yokoyama, 1995, p. 127–8). Kawai’s and Yokoyama’s interpretations suggest that women can mature, growing beyond being father’s daughters, only when they submit to a male intruder, experiencing a symbolic death and rebirth. This idea, of course, reflects Jung’s notion about animus, masculinity in a woman, and this view has been widely accepted in the Jungian community for long time, including in Japan. I will discuss the issue later.
However, one Japanese analyst has not agreed with such notions. Shin-ichi Ankei says:

This myth [of Ama-terasu no Oho kami] tells us how the Sun Goddess became the chief divinity of a numerous pantheon. From the viewpoint of mythological study, it is fairly exceptional that the Chief Divinity, the Deity of the Sun, is a Goddess. This peculiar fact offers one of the most relevant bases to authors who assert that Japanese society is on the whole matriarchal. First of all, however, we should not forget that it was the World Father Izanagi who assigned Amaterasu to rule the plain of High Heaven. Then we must ask if she is really so dominant and powerful in Japanese mythology as to deserve to be called the Chief Deity. (Ankei, 1985, p. 46)

What the myth of Ama-terasu no Oho kami implies

Let us again consider the archetypal images of Ama-terasu no Oho kami from viewpoint of Japanese mythology. Mutsuko Mizoguchi (2009), a female Japanese historian says, ‘People have believed for a long time that the Japanese national god, the ancestor of emperor is Ama-terasu. All excellent scholars in every academic field have discoursed ancient Japanese philosophy and religion as centred on Ama-terasu’ (p. 4). She then explains why people have held that belief for so long. The reason stems from an assertion summarized by Nobutsuna Saigo, a famous Kojiki scholar:

It is important to explore what the myth means potentially. It is clear that crisis and chaos, that is, the catastrophe caused by the violent deeds by Sosa no wo no Mikoto, are overcome by a great plan involving all the gods. And thus is cosmic and social order recovered. In other words, Ama-terasu no Oho kami is reborn through a trial. But it is not a mere recovery. She at last becomes real, the great Ama-terasu no Oho kami, literally the highest god of heaven, reborn as the sun god shining in heaven. (Saigo, 2005, p. 171–2)

But Mizoguchi and others, through their exact investigations of both The Kojiki and Nihongi, question the idea that refers to her as the highest of deities (Ogihara, 2007; Mizoguchi, 2009).

Mizoguchi maintains that native Japanese myths were edited and altered many times for political reasons, and she asserts that The Kojiki was redacted in ways that reflect Japanese social and political circumstances
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in the seventh century (Mizoguchi, 2009, p. 196). Therefore, The Kojiki includes many inconsistencies. Before the seventh century, Ama-terasu no Oho kami was addressed by other names, for example, Oho-hiru-me no muchi, and was neither the highest of deities nor the ancestor of Japanese emperors; she was not the national god but a simple, local sun goddess in Ise. According to Mizoguchi, the character of Ama-terasu no Oho kami has been altered repeatedly through several centuries. It was not until the Meiji era, in nineteenth century, that she came to be referred as the highest of deities, intentionally linked to the authority of the Japanese emperor so as to build up a strong centralized nation (p. 2). Regarding the catastrophe, withdrawal and reappearance of Ama-terasu no Oho kami, Mizoguchi says:

She did nothing except withdraw to the cave, upset with the violence of Sosa no wo no Mikoto. She came out of the cave not of her will but tricked by a lot of other gods. She took no commanding role in response to the catastrophe. The conviction, punishment and banishment from Heaven to Sosa no wo no Mikoto is carried out by other gods. The goddess is not at all involved in that. (Mizoguchi, 2009, p. 120)

Mizoguchi concludes that it is impossible to refer to Ama-terasu no Oho kami as the greatest of gods or the symbol of order in the cosmos. Ankei has a similar view:

These facts in myth show that the character of the Sun Goddess is quite diverse and contains many elementary factors which are not brought together enough to form an integrated ‘personality.’ Such ambiguous aspects discriminate her from the chief gods of other nations and peoples. Therefore she can hardly be considered to be a chief deity in usual sense. (Ankei, 1985, p. 48)

These arguments seem persuasive to me. We can see in the myth only that the ancient maternal social system was violated by a patriarchal one. Psychologically, women do not frighten men, and they accept men’s collective need for an ideal feminine figure. Criticizing Jung’s discourse regarding anima, Demaris Wehr (1987) said, ‘A woman’s worth, in other words, is measured by the degree to which she does not frighten men’ (p. 108). What we can find in the myth of Ama-terasu no Oho kami may be such an ideal feminine image. She was put on a pedestal as the highest deity in Japan because she did nothing and she might
have been able to accept varied projections by the collective conscious that the times needed.

The masculine and the feminine in Jungian psychology

In line with the above analyses, Robert Stein has said,

For a woman identified with the roles of mother and love goddess, this can be catastrophic. ... Once a woman is stripped of the power of these archetypal roles, she has only herself to offer in a relationship, and if she has left herself undeveloped as she has played out her roles over the years, she feels empty and worthless. (Stein, 1990, p. 41)

Clearly, too much identification with conservative gender roles distances women from their own potential. However, in Jungian studies, the importance of femininity has been stressed consistently and in broadly liberating terms. For example, Stein says,

The Feminine in both men and women is suffering. The liberation of the Feminine, rather than of women, is really what is needed. While the economic, educational, and social advantages that men have had over women are obvious and need to be corrected, I don’t believe this is the main issue. (Stein, 1990, p. 44)

In turn, however, it seems to me that the masculinity of women has not been so widely respected in Jungian psychology. Susan Rowland (2002) says, ‘Jung wrote little about the animus and most of it was negative’ (p. 50). In the past, women with phallic power were criticized in Jungian psychology as animus possessed. Connie Zweig (1990) said, ‘In Jungian circles, women like my friend and myself are referred to as having a strong animus-complex, which means we are run by our unconscious inner male component rather than by our ego, which is feminine’ (p. 11). Polly Young-Eisendrath (1990) emphatically criticized that position, saying, ‘Jung and some Jungians have used the concept of animus in a biased and psychologically damaging manner when they apply it to indicate a lack of objectivity in women and girls’ (p. 163). Most Jungians maintained that a woman should carefully treat her animus, and Jungians had long been suspicious of the feminist movement. But now this is changing. According to Zweig (1990), ‘women have learned the lessons of feminism’ (p. 11).
In this context, Kawai’s interpretation might have to be reconsidered from a feminist viewpoint. At first, Kawai’s concept of the ‘passive superiority’ of women was welcomed by Japanese women, because they had been suffering from low self-esteem for centuries in this male-dominated country. However, if ‘passive superiority’ encourages women to be non-assertive, to avoid confrontation, and to deny their real states, it fails to help them to foster and differentiate their masculinity in social and psychological development.

Kawai also argued for the balance of the femininity and masculinity in Japanese psyche:

The Sun Goddess is raised onto a higher level by retiring and even declining. This is a paradox in the process. Under the light of this mild sun, one cannot, sometimes, differentiate clearly high and low, good and bad, Heaven and Earth, or gods and human beings. This is a very important characteristic of Japanese mythology, or, one can say, of Japanese psyche. (Kawai, 2009, p. 195)

Yokoyama takes a similar view:

We can see a beautiful examination of integration of upper and downer parts of psyche in transformation of Ama-terasu no Oho kami, in which there is consciousness with a good balance of the femininity and the masculinity adapting circumstance and one’s role. In sum, the image of Ama-terasu no Oho kami means that the goddess’s feminine image survived in the formative process of Japanese patriarchal society and that the femininity harmonized the patriarchal system in Japan unlike the West. (Yokoyama, 1995: 130–1)

These discourses naturally rest on the idea that Ama-terasu no Oho kami is the highest deity in Japan. But, as I have said, that idea has now fallen under suspicion. So I agree with Ankei when he questions,

It is another positive proof of Kawai’s recent proposal of ‘subtle combination of the masculine and feminine principles.’ But from my point of view, these facts seem to indicate that Amaterasu is far more collective than individual as a deity and remains only in a potential state. (Ankei, 1985, p. 48)

If, as Ankei said, Japanese society and psyche are not maternal but very collective, they may disturb people’s individuation. Because it is
impossible to exclude completely the feminine from any society, we can see in the myth of *Ama-terasu no Oho kami* a way to control the feminine in a patriarchal society, implying that patriarchal consciousness takes real power from women in the name of a beautiful ‘passive superiority’, or that serious conflicts are covered by a ‘subtle combination of the masculine and feminine principles’. If, as Stein said, the ‘feminine in both men and women is suffering’, then it follows that the feminine in men must be discussed more than in women, for men are obviously dominant in any patriarchal society.

Difficulties of women’s individuation and the collective consciousness

Finally, let us return to the sandplay works of my client. I initially saw their themes (catastrophe, withdrawal, finding a new self in a mirror) in classical Jungian terms. However, when I was talking about the third sandplay work with my students, they did not agree with my interpretation. They focused on how it was so poor and weak, and noted that the yellow animal looked neither great nor happy, although the client recovered. I started to rethink the meaning of the works apart from a classical Jungian perspective. Do these works really express how a father’s daughter develops her femininity and encounters a new self, as in the myth of *Ama-terasu no Oho kami*? If we can see the works without any prejudice, like my students, we may say that, rather, they show the frustrated wreck which most intelligent women become in the patriarchal society of Japan.

More than 30 years ago, criticizing Esther Harding, June Singer (1976) argued that it is the responsibility of women alone to discover how to function in the impersonal way that is demanded by business and professional life without losing touch with the personal warmth and relatedness that Harding had identified with feminine nature (p. 50). However, I think that this is still a crucial problem for Japanese women. Even now, in Japan, women alone are often pressed to make a choice between a career and having a family. If they want both, they must expect a heavy load. I have discussed elsewhere how it is very difficult for Japanese women to expect their career advancement, as they tend to adhere to conservative gender roles (Nakamura, 2010, p. 161). There is a serious dilemma regarding gender roles and careers among Japanese women.

It is clear that my client was harmed by her traumatic event, an abortion. It was not only her fault, but she suffered from a deep sense of
guilt. As a result, she had to give up her dreams and career, and had to accept the woman role projected onto her. That is herself in the mirror. The themes of my client’s sandplay works (catastrophe, withdrawal, finding a new self in a mirror) indicate general difficulties of individuation among women in contemporary Japan, where patriarchal consciousness is so dominant. Young-Eisendrath, who argued about the animus development of women, says,

We can stop developing at any point in the life cycle, and we can retreat to an earlier adaptation at any time, as we often do under stress. The earlier stages characterize patterns of relating to the animus that may seem immature for adulthood, but may still be adaptive in a particular life context. Since ideals for feminine gender identity include dependency and lack of objectivity, women can remain adaptive to life contexts as adults even when they are enacting child-like roles. (Young-Eisendrath, 1984, p. 34)

Here, I can say that a Japanese woman may have to sacrifice her animus development and her individual process to be accepted as ‘an adult woman’ in Japan.

Towards dialogue

As we have seen, the sandplay technique is clearly useful in showing a deep conflict of an individual. Kalff (1966/1981) said, ‘An unconscious problem is played out in the sandbox, just like a drama; the conflict is transposed from the inner world to the outer world and made visible’ (p. 32). Also, an interpretation of myth gives us an understanding of the collective unconscious. Wehr (1987), however, pointed out, ‘Many feminists have criticized this use of myths and legends as a base for psychology and symbolism, claiming that the myths and legends we inherited represent patriarchal consciousness’ (p. 115).

If the interpretation of myth is used carefully, we can learn a lot. The Japanese psyche is so collectivist (not maternal) that individuation is difficult not only for women but also for men. Learning from Jungian methods, I believe that a Jungian perspective combined with feminist viewpoints may help people to realize their real states, socially and psychologically. It can also help to foster a dialogue between inner and outer worlds, individual and society, and the masculine and the feminine.
References


—— (1921) *Psychological Types* (CW 6).

—— (1928) ‘On psychic energy’ (CW 8).

—— (1929) ‘The significance of constitution and hereditary in psychology’ (CW 8).


The notion of the Dialogical Self considers the self as ‘a dynamic multiplicity of relatively autonomous I-positions in the landscape of the mind’ (Hermans, 2001, p. 174). These I-positions offer a way of talking which neatly sidesteps the problem of reification inherent in older concepts such as archetypes, complexes, subpersonalities, ego states and parts. I-positions come and go with the situation, and are not regarded as solid, continuous entities. They also resolve the problem of making a space for such concepts as soul, spirit or god/goddess, which are clearly not ‘sub’ anything, nor are they ego states or parts of the person. Some clients, and some therapists, make use of such ideas, and in most theories, they are hard to handle. But they can be I-positions.

Hence, out of all the possible names for the multiple locations within the person, I-positions is the most flexible, and the least liable to lead to problems in practice. This means that in therapy we can escape from the tyranny of just one unconscious mind, which can be so complex and difficult to consult that we can seldom be sure of what it says or what it wants. It may seem unnecessary to contest the concept of the unconscious, but many different voices nowadays are urging us to do just this (Wilber, 1997; Chiari and Nuzzo, 2010; van Deurzen, 2010). Perhaps the concept of the unconscious, like so many of the older ideas in psychotherapy, is not needed now that we have more adequate and interesting theories.

Instead of saying, ‘Consciously you say it is OK for me to go on holiday for six weeks, but at an unconscious level you may resent or fear it’, it is more natural (in the sense of being closer to everyday speech) and more accurate to say, ‘From your immediate I-position you may say that it is OK for me to go on holiday for six weeks, but you may have another I-position (perhaps an adolescent) who resents it, or another I-position
(perhaps a child) who feels neglected, or another I-position (perhaps an infant) who feels abandoned. Let’s explore that a bit. It may be worth saying here that therapists who use everyday speech in this way often find it easier to relate to the client in the room. One of the advantages of doing it this second way is that we can actually talk directly from one I-position to another, and get a reply back again. The one who resents the long holiday may be a teenager who can be interrogated; the one who feels neglected may be a child who can be talked with; and the one who feels abandoned may be an infant, who ‘by some miracle’ can also talk back. By encouraging the client to take up these I-positions, we can find out more about what is going on within the client. And this puts us as therapists in a position to do something to change the situation. We can reason with the teenager; we can empathize with the child; we can attend to the needs of the infant and get to the bottom of the screaming and apparent craziness.

Out of the theory of the dialogical self has come the notion of I-positions, as we have just pointed out. Yet it seems curious to me that so little of the research involving I-positions has featured the practice of letting the I-positions talk to each other. Of course, there have been some examples, such as can be found in Verhofstadt-Deneve’s (2003) psychodramatic application of the Dialogical Self Theory, in Neimeyer and Buchanan-Arvay (2004) work, in Westwood’s idea of therapeutic enactment (Westwood et al., 2003), and in Hermans and Dimaggio (2004) and Hermans and Hermans-Konopka (2010). What I want to do in this chapter is to show how useful it can be to use I-positions in this way. In other words, I want to add to what has been done in the existing literature, and relate it to other work in the field, including that having to do with the soul. In this chapter, I argue that one of the main advantages of the Dialogical Self Theory in psychotherapy is that it offers, in the concept of I-positions, a more effective way of approaching the multiplicity within the person than any previous method. As is well known from a great deal of previous work (Rowan, 1990), many different schools of psychotherapy have embraced such multiplicity and found ways of working with it. The most common of these is to use chairwork – that is to say, by personifying a character which has emerged during the course of therapy, and talking directly to it, and then talking back as the character itself. In the concept of I-positions we have a way of approaching chairwork which is less loaded with unnecessary assumptions than any previous approach. It is compatible with all the existing approaches, such as Gestalt therapy, transactional analysis, persona therapy, psychosynthesis, psychodrama, schema therapy,
experiential process therapy, transformational chairwork, voice dialogue, narrative therapy and so forth, and offers them, for the first time, a really adequate vocabulary. The dangers of reification – a temptation in many of these other schools – are virtually eliminated. The possibility of working in a productive way with the transpersonal is also opened up, as we shall see in due course.

The notion of an I-position is the latest and I think the most defensible version of a long-standing idea – the idea of multiplicity within the person. We are all familiar with the idea, so well used in literature and the arts generally, of different parts of the person with possibly conflicting needs and interests. In psychology we have had Freud (1923) who wrote of the ego, id and superego; Jung (1928) who talked about the complexes or the archetypes; Federn (1952), Berne (1961) and John Watkins (1978) who spoke of ego states; Lewin (1936) who wrote about subregions of the personality; Perls (1951) who referred to the topdog and underdog, or retroreflection; Klein (1948), Fairbairn (1952) and Guntrip (1971) who talked about internal objects; Balint (1968) who delineated the child in the patient; Mary Watkins (1986) who described imaginal objects, such as the imaginary friend; McAdams (1985) who deployed the concept of imagoes as a key to life histories; Hilgard (1986) who discovered the ‘hidden observer’ in hypnotic states; Tart (1986) who spoke of identity states; Denzin (1987) who talked about the emotionally divided self; Winnicott (1965), Lake (1966), Janov (1970) and Laing (1976) who referred to the false or unreal self; Gurdjeff (1950) who introduced the concept of little ‘I’s; Goffman (1974) who referred to multiple selfing; Stone and Winkelman (1985) who used the concept of energy patterns; Mahrer (1978) who theorized deeper potentials coming to the surface; Wake (2007) who talks about parts of the person; Watkins and Barabasz (2008) and Hunter (2007) who refer to alters; Mair (1977) who opened up the possibility of a community of self; Ornstein (1986) who spoke of small minds; Gazzaniga (1985) and Minsky (1988) who discovered agents and agencies within the brain; Gergen (1972), Martindale (1980), O’Connor (1971) and Shapiro (1976) who referred to subselves; Markus and Nurius (1987) who spoke of possible selves; Kihlstrom and Cantor (1984) who introduced the concept of self-schemas; Bogart (2007) and Baldwin (1997) who spoke of personas; Mearns and Thorne (2000) who spoke of the configurations of self; T. B. Rogers (1981) who wrote about prototypes; Beahrs (1982) who referred to alter-personalities; and Assagioli (1975), Redfearn (1985), Rowan (1990) and Sliker (1992) who talked about subpersonalities. All are talking about the same thing, multiplicity within the person. One of the distressing features of all the
psychotherapeutic literature is the way in which each school ignores parallel work, and just the few favoured writers and researchers are featured all the time. There is a kind of professional narcissism involved here.

There are two main reasons why the nomenclature of I-positions is superior to any of those just mentioned: One is that it is less liable to reification. When we succumb to the temptation of reification, we make the inner selves too strong, too solid, and too long-lasting – we tend to think of them as permanent or at least semi-permanent, living for weeks, months or years within the person. Reification is, of course, rampant in the psychological sciences, with various authorities bandying about personages like the Oral Type, the Masochistic Position, the Macho Man, the Inner Child, and so forth. With I-positions there is none of this. It is quite clear and explicit that they can come and go with great frequency at times, and are ‘of the moment’ rather than ‘of the essence’. This is a great advantage, because reification is rife throughout the psychotherapeutic literature, as we have pointed out, and any method or approach which avoids this is to be welcomed.

The other great advantage of I-positions is that there is no suggestion of subordination, of I-positions being in some way lesser than the whole person. This makes it possible to think of the soul, of the spirit – even of God – becoming an I-position. All we mean by this is that we can, in therapy, put the soul (for example) on the empty chair, visualize it, talk to it, and then take up that position on the chair and talk back as the soul. If we do not like the word ‘soul’, there are plenty of synonyms, such as the higher self, the antaratman, the inner teacher, the daimon and so forth. Some of these make it clear that the soul may be seen as something outside which can inspire us, or something inside which we can enter into and be. If we accept the idea of the transpersonal – and there is now a vast research literature on this, usefully summarized in Shorrock (2008) – this is particularly valuable in transpersonal therapy. This is important because of the way in which the transpersonal is ignored in much of the psychological literature and in psychotherapy and counselling and coaching. But if we want to do justice to the whole person (and most psychotherapeutic approaches give at least lip service to such an ideal) it is not valid to omit all mention of the soul and the spirit. These may well be concepts or I-positions that are important to our clients and hence considered real from within their experienced lifeworld. We certainly do not want to omit or ignore anything that is meaningful to the client.
How to use I-positions in therapy

I call the process of using I-positions ‘personification’ – in other words, we are effectively turning the entity, whatever it may be, into a person for the purposes of dialogue. There are basically three forms of personification in the world of therapy, counselling and coaching.

Empty chair work

This is the basic idea, pioneered by Jacob Moreno originally in the 1920s (Moreno et al., 2000) and popularized by Fritz Perls in the 1960s (1969), of asking the client to imagine that the object of his or her affections or enmity or questioning is sitting on an empty chair. The client then first of all describes and talks to the character involved, and then moves over into the other chair and enters into and speaks for that character. In recent years this has been formalized by the Integral Institute as the 3-2-1 method: first we describe the character in the third person (he or she is like this or that), then in the second person (addressing the person as ‘you’), and finally in the first person (turning the person into an ‘I’). Fritz Perls was the great master of this method, and showed that we could put into the empty chair such things as ‘the number plate in your dream’, ‘your smirk’, ‘the dream you did not have’ and so forth. This is the classic way of bringing people who are hard to reach into the room, such as your mother, your dead father or your aborted foetus. The more recent work has been well documented by Goldman (2002), although there is no mention of the soul in the latter.

Two chair work

In this version, we identify two (often incompatible) parts of the client, and put each one on a separate chair. The client is then encouraged to speak for each of the parts in turn, and may then be encouraged to engage in a dialogue between the two parts: perhaps one part may want to convince the other parts that they are more necessary or more valid than the other parts. Robert Elliott and others in the group led by Les Greenberg has done much research on this technique in recent years (Greenberg et al., 1998). This is important because it is only in recent years that there has been the present emphasis on research and evidence, and of course, the Dialogical Self tendency has been responsible for some of this big surge. More examples are to be found in the work of Victor Bogart (2007).

Multiple chair work

This is often used by the Voice Dialogue school, who may use up to ten or more chairs to personify different parts of the person (Stone and
Winkelman, 1985). Again, they may speak individually or engage in dialogues with other ‘persons’ on the other chairs. They have some good examples of working with the soul and with the spirit. The idea has been taken up by Kellogg (2004) in recent years, and more research is now on the way. It has been used very creatively in the last few years by Genpo Roshi in his Big Mind workshops, a transpersonal approach. He introduces characters such The Controller, The Sceptic, the Vulnerable Child, The Damaged Self, The Seeking Mind – and then The Non-Seeking Mind, Big Mind, Big Heart, and so forth, and invites people to enter such states for short periods, and speak from that position. In this way, ordinary people can be introduced to some extraordinary ways of seeing the world. This is work at what Wilber (2000) calls the Subtle Level, and it also reaches at times into the further level of the Causal.

This is therefore a very flexible idea which can take a number of forms. In recent years I have been urging that it is now possible, using the idea of I-positions, to have dialogues with one’s Soul or even one’s Spirit (Rowan, 2010). This idea too was pioneered by Moreno, who sometimes asked a protagonist to stand on a chair and be God. But it was refined and developed further by the psychosynthesis practitioners, particularly Molly Young Brown (1993).

It is obvious that the notion of an I-position makes all these moves more transparent and less worrying conceptually. It is important not to regard this as merely a technique (or set of techniques) which are useful in therapy, but to realize that it is a very free and flexible way of construing or understanding what people are really like. John Beahrs put it very well when he said:

*When is it useful or not useful to look upon an individual as a single unit, as a ‘Cohesive Self’? When is it useful or not useful to look upon anyone as being constituted of many parts, each with an identity of its own? When is it useful to see ourselves as part of a greater whole? I use the term ‘useful’ rather than ‘true’ since all are true – simultaneously and at all times.* (Beahrs, 1982, p. 4–5)

This last statement is helpful, I think, to all those who want to work with the Dialogical Self. They will continually be faced by critics who question the whole idea that the person can be multiple. To realize that this can be true yet not be the whole truth is an important step forward. Because I have criticized some Dialogical Self researchers for not making more use of these techniques in their work, it behoves me to give an example myself. This has to do with the difficulty of working with extreme emotions. Here is the example.
The murderess

This was a 60-year-old woman who had been married for 40 years. At the age of 22, she had given birth to a baby with birth defects. A medical decision was made to let the baby die after a few days. The baby was named and given a religious burial. The woman had never visited the grave, and felt guilty as a murderess. This crime weighed on her conscience so that she came into therapy.

All this took some time to emerge, by which time we had built up a trusting therapeutic relationship. It now seemed that we were ready to tackle this major issue. I put out a cushion on the floor in front of her, and suggested to the client that her baby was sitting on the cushion, and by some miracle could talk back if she addressed it. It took some time before she had the temerity to ask it to forgive her.

I asked her then to sit on the other cushion, be the baby and answer back. After a lot of tears and hesitation, the baby answered that forgiveness was not given. The mother was guilty and should suffer. ‘How could you do that to me?’ The baby was adamant. The client cried a great deal.

It took some time before we dared to approach the matter again. In the meantime, the client had investigated further and talked it over with me, and it did seem clear that she had actually had no part in the decision apart from assenting to the doctors’ suggestions.

We returned to the cushion and the baby, and tried again to negotiate. But the baby was still not convinced, and accused my client of collusion and evasion of responsibility. She was still guilty. More tears ensued.

After a few more weeks, we came back to the baby again, and this time there appeared to have been a shift. The baby was still uneasy about being too ready to make allowances and did not understand the concept of compassion. But there was a grudging assent to the idea that it was not all the mother’s fault.

After another gap, we tried again, and this time the baby was much easier about the matter, showing much more understanding and placing the blame in a much more diffused way on the whole surrounding cast of characters. My client felt forgiven and absolved from blame. I was very moved by this process.

Soon after that, she visited the little grave and cleared away the debris that had collected on it and decorated it with flowers. She reported crying a great deal, but said that those were healing tears.
With later clients, too, I found that it was possible to put an aborted fetus on a cushion and find out its attitude, often coming to a positive resolution with the woman involved.

Here we have a good example of the case put forward by the Dialogical Self school:

As we argued earlier, the self is characterized by oppositions, ambivalences, and ambiguities, in which a broad variety of positions play their part, not only those that are foregrounded as presentations to the outside world but also those that are backgrounded as ‘shadow positions’ (Hermans 2001), ‘exiles’ (Schwartz 1995) or ‘disowned selves’ (Stone and Winkelman 1985) in the darker spaces of the self. (Hermans and Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 178)

I give this example to illustrate the point that dialogical work can lead us into some very deep areas, and may suggest ways of working which are theoretically quite unusual. It can also be used in group work, as has been well described by Sewell and colleagues (1998).

The transpersonal

The transpersonal is a vast realm for psychotherapy, counselling and coaching, and it has been emerging as a really important aspect of the therapeutic engagement over the past thirty years or more. I focus on it because it is all too common in our psychological work to leave out the element of spirituality, which has been well written about recently by David Matteson (2008), for example. If we want to do justice to the whole person, it is not valid to leave out such important components as the soul or the spirit. The term ‘transpersonal’ is superior to the term ‘spirituality’ for the reasons succinctly stated by Roberto Assagioli. He described the transpersonal as,

a term introduced above all by Maslow and by those of his school to refer to what is commonly called spiritual. Scientifically speaking, it is a better word; it is more precise and, in a certain sense, neutral in that it points to that which is beyond or above ordinary personality. Furthermore it avoids confusion with many things which are now called spiritual but which are actually pseudo-spiritual or parapsychological. (Assagioli, 1991, p. 16)
The clearest and most useful map of the transpersonal, in my opinion, has been given to us by Ken Wilber (2000) who says that we are all on a path of psychospiritual development, whether we know it or not and whether we like it or not. This process has three main phases. First, there is the pre-personal – the whole realm of childhood development when we see ourselves as part of a family rather than as a separate and distinct personality. Second, there is the personal – the vast realm of role-playing in society, where we grow up believing that we have to defend and enhance our self-image. We learn about rationality, science and determinism. This process ends up with a mature ego, as psychology generally describes it, capable of self-defence and self-enhancement in very effective ways. Third, there is the transpersonal – the later realm where we first of all shake off the shackles of the self-image and discover authenticity, then later perhaps admit that we are spiritual beings capable of enjoying symbols and images and archetypes and of exploring altered states of consciousness and opening ourselves up to inspiration and joy, and then later perhaps again shake off all that and open up to the total freedom of the One, the All or the None, where we no longer need concrete representations of the divine. This is all very well described in the relevant literature (Cortright, 1997; Washburn, 2000; Wilber, 2000; Ferrer, 2002).

There is no suggestion in Wilber’s writings that we should all go to the transpersonal, and indeed, it seems that to go very far along this path is rare and difficult. The path to the mature ego is easy, because society is right behind us, encouraging us to be a better and better role-player. In fact, it very often takes a crisis, perhaps quite painful, to get us to leave the familiarity of the personal – what has sometimes been called the ‘consensus trance’. When we do, it is very often along the lines of – ‘I have spent thirty years building up my social self, and learnt very well how to play my roles for the benefit of other people, but what about me? Who am I really, behind all the roles?’ At that point, we may get into counselling or psychotherapy, or even take a course to become a therapist, as many people have done in recent years. In fact, therapy is of great help to put us on the road to the transpersonal, because it enables us to deal with our shadow material. The shadow is a concept introduced by Jung (1951) originally, but it is vitally necessary for us to understand it if we are to move on into the transpersonal realm without self-deception. The shadow comprises all those aspects of us that we either reject, do not understand, or do not even know about, although its effects are very often obvious to others. To go on into the transpersonal without dealing with the shadow is asking for trouble,
and Wilber is very clear about this (Wilber, 2006, p. 126). This leads us to the idea of resistance in psychotherapy, because it is resistance that can make it hard for us to explore and deal with our shadow material. This is a very common and very useful idea, as has been pointed out by Michael Guilfoyle (2006). How do we deal with it in the Dialogical Self model? The first thing is to identify the resistance. This can be done very gradually and tactfully if necessary: ‘Do you ever feel that there is a voice within you which is saying just the opposite to your conscious intentions?’ or ‘Do you ever get the sense that some part of you wants nothing to do with your plan or your program?’ In doing this work, of course, we must always respect the client’s belief system and way of seeing things.

Having identified the resistance – for example as a saboteur, or a perfectionist, or a procrastinator – the next step is to put it on a chair, or on a cushion, or in some other convenient location. For example, if it just takes the form of a wall, we could just visualize the wall in the middle of the floor.

The next step is to visualize the resistance. Encourage the client to bring some picture, image, vision to mind that puts the resistance into some concrete form. This may need some shaping to make it easier to handle: For example, if the client says it is a fog, encourage him or her to visualize it as a particularly deep and dark fog, almost solid in its thickness. Once the client is visualizing the resistance, ask him or her to speak to it. There is no need to put words into the client’s mouth – just wait until the client produces something. What the client says to the resistance does not matter very much. It is the dialogue itself that is the important factor. Don’t let the client talk about the resistance – he or she must talk directly to it, as if it were some kind of person. Keep on encouraging the client to talk until it seems clear that some reply is needed. Then ask the client to change places, positioned in such a way that it is easy to talk back to the space where the client was sitting.

Now the client is the resistance. Help the client to take a moment or two to really get into the role. Often the voice changes at this point (Stiles et al., 2004). Answer the requests or accusations or whatever the client has been saying. This is the crucial point, and the interaction can be quite intense. Encourage the resistance to talk more. At an appropriate moment, it is often a good idea for the therapist to talk to the resistance directly, finding out what role it is taking in relation to the client – what it thinks it is doing. Much can emerge from this kind of dialogue.
It is worth pointing out that if we have the concept of the Dialogical Self we do not need to preserve or use the concepts of transference or countertransference. Twenty years ago David Smith (1991) was demonstrating that there was actually no theoretical justification for the concept of transference, using a very careful examination of the classic documents in psychoanalysis, and we can now see that if we have I-positions we do not need transference. Instead of saying ‘Perhaps your strong reaction to me is really directed at your father’, we might say instead, ‘Perhaps you could express these strong feelings to this empty chair, and see who appears there’. If this worked, a dialogue could then ensue, which would reveal the material needing to be dealt with here. Similar considerations apply to countertransference – the therapist may need to work on this in her or his own therapy.

Discussion

As suggested previously in this chapter, the implications here run very deep. The concept of the unconscious historically emerged from the discovery of persons within the person (Ellenberger, 1970; Chertok and de Saussure, 1979). It grew and developed from the middle of the eighteenth century until today, as these authorities have shown in great detail. But if it were invented to account for the evident multiplicity within the person, it is not needed today as we have the improved theory of the Dialogical Self, which states that this multiplicity is not something odd or strange which needs special explanation to handle, but rather something natural and basic to what human beings are. All this highly complicated and unusual apparatus (Freud’s system of the Unconscious and so forth) can go into the fire. The many arguments and reported researches in books like Hermans and Dimaggio (2004) bring alive the theory in extremely convincing ways, and we do not need to shrink from applying the lessons in a radical way.

Working with the Dialogical Self in this way is, I believe, the wave of the future. It arises very naturally out of the work with clients and coachees. It was exciting, for example, to pick up a recent book by Robert Neimeyer (2009) on constructivist psychotherapy, and find in the very first chapter a case vignette where a woman was encouraged to put her dead father in a chair and dialogue with him, with good results. It was enthralling to discover the work of Scott Kellogg (2004) who actually calls his approach ‘Transformational Chairwork’ and uses the idea as to the manner born. It has been very encouraging to see how
Les Greenberg and his colleagues (1998) have been conducting serious research on empty-chair work and two-chair work, as for example in the chapter by Barry Wolfe and Patti Sigl on experiential psychotherapy of anxiety disorders, or by Robert Elliott, Kenneth Davis and Emil Slatick on process-experiential therapy for posttraumatic stress difficulties, in the same volume.

But it is important to go back to the basic breakthrough being canvassed here. It is that when we work with human beings, what we are actually doing in all cases is to facilitate the processes of positioning, re-positioning and counter-positioning which enable us as therapists to address the self in highly dynamic and non-reifying ways. By working in this way, we enable new configurations of the self to open up. It is interesting to note that in the person-centred school, which many of us have regarded as very simple and basic, the concept of ‘configurations of self’ is now part of the basic theory being taught (Mearns and Thorne, 2000). The Dialogical Self is not a sport, an exception, a peripheral thing, but part of a broad movement towards a new vision of the person which is more and more popular in the therapeutic world of today.

Much of the important work has been put together in my own (Rowan, 2010) book, which goes very thoroughly into the historical use of these ideas by virtually all the great names in the field of psychotherapy. It also goes into the question of how we can believe at one and the same time in the unity of the self and the multiplicity of the self: Both of these are vitally necessary. It does seem to me that this is the way to go if we are to do justice to what human beings are, and how to conduct therapy with them.

References


There is perhaps no other concept with a longer history of confounding human minds than the concept of the ‘self’. Several texts on ancient history note that serious contemplation and emphasis on the theme had long been in place in two of the ancient civilizations of the world, India and Greece. The widely known inscription of ‘Know thyself’, engraved in the forecourts of the Temple of Apollo at Delphi, was, in particular, noted by the Greek travelogue writer Pausanias, who lived during the second century A.D. (Alcock et al., 2001). In India, the self was the central theme in the philosophical treatises of Upanishads, dating back to 1500–600 B.C. (Rao, 2002). During several periods in the history of human thought, the theme of the self often waned into insignificance after long periods of intellectual vigour and insight, only to re-emerge after a while in all its scholarly glory and might. The concept’s sporadic rise and decline was often impelled by the various social, political and historical forces of the period. In our present time, the concept stands at unprecedented heights of scholarly intrigue. Confounding as it is, no other concept in the history of philosophy and psychology has been associated with more divergent perspectives. While this richness has led to its emergence as one of the most central concepts in psychology, it has resulted also in fragmentation and divergence, leading one to question the value of the construct.

This chapter explores the concept of the self by comparing and contrasting one of the most recent conceptualizations in psychology, Dialogical Self Theory (DST; e.g., Hermans et al., 1992), with two
time-honoured Eastern traditions, Advaita Vedanta and Theravada Buddhism. DST is one of the most promising efforts of the present time, especially due to the richness with which it captures the complexities of a globalized world in addressing the puzzling question of what constitutes the self. The theory’s growing popularity and application in fields ranging from counselling and psychotherapy to literary studies are noteworthy. Nevertheless, the theory is still in the process of development, and is not without inadequacies. It is hoped that the present comparison would help us to recognize its strengths, shortcomings and potential, and thereby contribute to its development. The two Eastern perspectives, with their profound understanding of self, are promising in their capacity to yield insights in that regard.

A brief account of the self in Buddhist, Advaitic and Dialogical perspectives

Nature of the self in Buddhism

Before delving into the intricacies of the Buddhist conceptualization of self, it is important to note that the understandings expressed here are based on Theravada Buddhism, which is considered to be the earliest version of and the nearest approximation to what Buddha had taught (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1989). To Buddha, the self was an ever-changing entity without permanence. In his profound study and observation of the self, he could not find anything that contributed to a sense of permanence, be it in our physical self from birth to death or our mental self, as in the feelings we have for others and ourselves, and the thoughts and actions in which we engage. Without any sense of everlastingness in itself, all these experiences that one goes through are limited to their context, time, and place, and are therefore impermanent by nature (Schumann, 1973). If one were to ask whether Buddha sought something permanent, the answer would be ‘no’. His search was to find a solution to human suffering. He had little interest in finding permanence or impermanence in human existence. Nevertheless, the observation of impermanence was significant, for it brought to him the realization that permanence would not resolve suffering. Therefore, any attempt to achieve the final goal of removing suffering from human existence should start with an understanding of the impermanence of the self.

Buddha considered the self as a collection of elements, though not without any unifying or organizing principle. He introduced the Law of Dependent Origination to explain how various entities, such as
the body and mind and all that comes with them, occur together or ‘happen’ in a person and in the world at large. As part of the Law of Dependent Origination, he also proposed the cosmic principle of orderliness which governs the physical, mental, and moral dimensions of existence. According to this principle, events happen not out of chaos, but due to a causal order, and human life is part of a long causal chain. Every action is ruled by cause and effect, and any causal chain sets off from ignorance (of the impermanent nature of all existence), and continues with its cyclic paths, until ignorance is removed once and forever (Strong, 2001). Accordingly, it is the illusory assumption of permanence that causes one to hold on to one’s feelings, thoughts or possessions. In essence, change is the only permanent feature of existence.

Nature of the self in Advaita Vedanta

Advaita (non-dualism) Vedanta is a school of thought preached by Adi Sankaracarya, an eighth-century philosopher, who was in pursuit of the true essence of the self. The doctrine is a sub-school of Vedanta (one of the six orthodox systems of Indian philosophy) and expounds the unity of existence, thereby affirming the Atman or self. Sankara’s strong intentions to uplift and revive the Vedic culture, at a time when the country was swept away by Buddhist influences, took him all over India, holding discussions with philosophers, religious figures and intellectuals (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1989). In conspicuous contrast to Buddha’s conceptualization of the self, Sankara’s Advaita Vedanta affirms the existence of a permanent self or an absolute reality, which he calls Brahman. All other postulates are structured around this central concept. This transcendent reality is the ground of all existence and transcends all time, space, and causality.

At an individual level, this essential self is termed Atman, and no difference is made between Atman and Brahman in their nature. When Atman is clothed in the Upadhis or limitations, such as body, mind, and other attributes (agency, emotions, etc.) that accompany these, it is termed Jiva. The Jiva is the enjoyer, sufferer and actor. Upadhis are impermanent in nature. The ultimate goal of human existence is to discover the true self that is Atman. Atman is compared to universal space, Upadhis to a jar, and Jiva to the enclosed space. The ultimate goal is to break the bottle and unite with the infinite space of Atman. It is the illusion, Maya, which holds us from the realization of the true self (i.e., Atman). The world of change, duality
or plurality is thus an illusion (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1989). Several literatures are credited to Sankara and most of them are written with the single intention to help one’s realization of the identity of one’s soul with the Brahman.

Nature of the self in Dialogical Self Theory

Dialogical Self Theory is inspired by William James conception of the self as the knower (‘I’) and known (‘me’) and by Bakhtin’s dialogism (see chapter 1, this volume). Its early dissemination suggests that the theory was conceived in response to the limitations of understanding of self as a bounded and decontextualized entity, which had long prevailed (Hermans et al., 1992; Hermans and Kempen, 1993). According to Hermans, the self is dynamically multiple in its agency or authorship, and its multiplicities are capable of entering dialogical relationships with each other. These multiplicities can expand and contract in the experiential space. The multiple selves, termed I-positions, are constructions (rather than innately given). Dialogical relationships are possible among different I-positions, and dynamics are set in motion as particular positions enter into dialogical relationships. As constructions, I-positions are subject to constant change (Hermans and Hermans-Konopka, 2010). On the whole, the self is viewed as an ever-changing entity of multiplicities, the quintessence of it being the synchrony of these multiplicities in time and space. Paradoxically, this synchrony is never an ultimate experience, as constantly changing contexts continue to destabilize the once-reached steadiness. The hypothetical possibility of an ultimate synchrony of the multiplicities of self in time and space is yet to be addressed in the theory. The theory places great value on understanding the dialogical relationship between multiple I-positions.

This brief discussion has offered a glimpse into the varied conceptualizations of the self in different traditions, and in so doing provides impetus for further exploration of similarities and differences in how the three perspectives answer some of the most puzzling questions underlying the phenomenon of the self. Five guiding themes help to structure the following exploration:

(1) The perspectives’ guiding purpose and objectives;
(2) Its socio-historical context;
(3) Unity and continuity of the self;
(4) The way and ultimate destiny of the self; and
(5) Ethical dimensions of the self.
The perspectives’ guiding purpose and objectives

Briefly noting the purpose underlying the different perspectives, and whether the intended purpose is adequately realized in its assertions and assumptions, would help the reader to understand the perspectives better and in fairer light. It may be noted that the central concerns and assumptions underlying these perspectives, by virtue of their respective purposes, were markedly different in each of these understandings of self.

As mentioned, Buddha’s intention was to find an ultimate solution to human suffering of all kinds. Sankara’s treatises on the self and his exposition of the doctrine of Advaita Vedanta were driven by the mission to testify and validate the essence of ‘true’ (Advaitic) self. He intended thereby to revive the then-declining Vedic knowledge and culture, which had kindled in him a philosophically as well as experientially guiding, transcendental experience of the absolute. It may also be noted that for Sankara, the comprehension of self was not driven by a personal quest, but was nevertheless his subject of interest due to it being a highly valued central thesis in the traditional Indian philosophical systems of the time.

The objectives and rationale behind DST, which is rather intellectually driven, are characteristically different from the intents and purposes of the spiritually driven perspectives expounded by those Eastern sage-scholars. In essence, DST may be considered as an attempt to comprehend the human mind as caught up in the complexities of an inevitably challenging (globalized) context, filled with divergent and conflicting voices.

The contentions and corollary postulates proposed in these perspectives seem to correspond to their intended purposes, and the perspectives may be considered as more or less successful in fulfilling their objectives. However, these perspectives differ in their respective foci and ranges of application; hence, a comprehensive understanding of the self remains unresolved. For instance, one may not expect Buddhism to propound on the agency or unity of the self, or Advaita Vedanta to elucidate the psychopathology of the self in a worldly context, as those issues fell outside the parameters of their respective interests and intentions. Arguably, a profound understanding of the intricacies of the self might not be so central a concern in Buddhism as it is in DST and Sankara’s Advaita Vedanta.

The perspectives’ socio-historical context

Theories of the self are not ahistorical or decontextualized. Exploring the historical and social contexts of the different perspectives helps us
to understand their origins and provides ideal grounds for starting a fruitful understanding of the perspectives. Although different in their specific contexts, the two Eastern perspectives share the general broader setting of an ancient India reeling under the forces of two conflicting traditions and culture: on the one side, the culture characterized by asceticism, traceable back to the Indus valley civilization; on the other, the culture of invading traditions characterized by materialism and a sense of power (Kalupahana, 1976). The history of Indian philosophy is often described as the story of the struggle for supremacy between these two conflicting traditions. While the ascetic tradition – with its emphasis on higher spiritual meaning with life, Yogic (union through physical and mental exercises), and mystical experiences – was devoid of any organizational or power structure, the invading traditions had the key attribute of self-assertive tendencies (Kalupahana, 1976).

Socio-historical context of Buddhism

Buddha lived circa 563 B.C. to 483 B.C. (Cousins, 1996) in a turbulent period in northern India, when petty kingdoms were engaged in the pursuit of expanding their power and influence. It was also a time of intense religious speculation and spiritual quest and yearning. The period witnessed intense religious activity, as there was significant discontent with the Brahmanical system which emphasized sacrifices and rituals (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1989). In the Brahmanical system, an exclusive few kept themselves in a privileged position and governed over most matters, especially spirituality and education. Moreover, they claimed to be in possession of revealed truths that were not knowable by any ordinary human means. Parallel to this, other movements were gaining prominence, such as sceptics from different schools of thought, atomists, materialists, agnostics, Jainas or Ajivikas and more. Despite the bewildering diversity of religious communities, most shared the same vocabulary: \textit{Nirvana} (transcendent freedom), \textit{Atman} (self or soul), \textit{Yoga} (union), \textit{Karma} (causality), \textit{Buddha} (enlightened one), \textit{Samsara} (eternal recurrence or becoming), \textit{Dhamma} (rule or law), and so on (Britannica, 2010).

In his own days, Buddha was considered a heretic of the worst kind by the orthodox religious teachers (Kalupahana, 1976). His teachings were a response to the social context of the time, where various perspectives distinguished only by minor differences competed with each other for superior theoretical and ritualistic strength. The lack of a singular perspective dominating the overall scenario contributed to utter confusion in people's minds, especially with regard to ethical and moral
dimensions of their life. Buddhism’s success during that period may be attributed to the characteristically simple explanations that Buddha provided regarding human suffering and the way out of it, along with an emphasis on the significance of upholding ethical principles to guide the person in a morally sound day-to-day life.

**Socio-historical context of Advaita Vedanta**

The principles of Advaita Vedanta were systematized and consolidated by the great thinker Adi Sankara (788–821 A.D.), who was also one of the greatest saints of his time. He came from a Brahmin family that lived near the historic Periyar River stretch in Kerala of southern India (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1989). During this period, Kerala, famous for spices, especially pepper, had trade relations that stretched as far as the Romans in Europe. The details regarding the political situation of the period are inferences by means of educated conjectures. In general, Kerala was going through a period of trade-led prosperity, when local chieftain-led towns were developing into proto-kingdoms. There was a strong presence of Jewish, Christian and Muslim merchant communities in the region (Whittaker, 2009). The extent of popularity and influence of Buddhism and Jainism in the region is not known, but, in general, Buddhism’s strong presence was felt throughout India. However, the tradition was also in decline, in spite of the tremendous popularity it had gained over the years. Although Hinduism was gaining prominence, it had been divided into innumerable sects that were in conflict with each other. Along with the many theistic and atheistic sects, there were also sects which outrightly rejected Veda (Potter, 1981).

Sankara’s scholarly exposure to other religions and philosophical traditions of the time, his personal understanding of Vedanta as supreme to all other then-prevalent schools of thought, along with his ardent concern for the discredited state of the rich Brahmanical tradition, impelled him to defend and revive the Vedanta tradition. From a socio-historical perspective, Sankara’s advocacy of Advaita Vedanta met the timely need to reunite people with their traditional roots, from which they had been distanced due to the influence of different popular schools of thought, which had destabilized their spiritual and cultural reality.

**Socio-historical context of Dialogical Self Theory**

Somewhat akin to Sankara’s Advaita Vedanta, Hermans’s DST reflects a need of our time, and has emerged in response to the dearth of a theory that corresponds with contemporary socio-historical reality. One of the
defining features of the contemporary period is the confounding and overwhelming ‘interconnectedness’ at all levels of human experience.

The central feature of globalization is the removal of barriers between and within various entities such as demographic, economic, political and military structures (Hermans and Hermans-Konopka, 2010). The removal of barriers easily extends to other structures, such as culture, religion, education, identity, literature and more. With its central attribute of interconnectedness, globalization results in outcomes such as increased multiplicity of choices, broader and wider educational possibilities, increased communication networks, technological advances that decrease temporal and spatial distances and so on. Their impact exposes individuals to diverging, multiple and opposing assumptions and possibilities at almost all conceivable aspects of day-to-day life. At a social level, this phenomenon challenges the uniqueness of the various traditions and threatens their existence. At an individual level, it confounds people’s psyches, leaving them uncertain, confused and insecure in the face of multiple choices and manifold positions. According to Hermans and Hermans-Konopka,

Globalization is supposed to have a deep impact on the organization of the self: its repertoire is populated by an unprecedented density of positions; the repertoire becomes more heterogeneous and laden with differences, oppositions and contradictions; it is confronted with a variety of changes in the environment and receives more ’visits’ by unexpected positions; and there are larger ‘positional leaps’ (jumping from one position to another). (Hermans and Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 76)

Indeed, DST is a timely response to capture the essence of a present-day self, mired by a multitude of voices in the reality of a globalized context.

Unity and continuity of the self

One of the central concerns in Western conceptualizations of the self is its distinctive feature of continuity and unity (Laird, 1917). Theories are expected to provide a coherent explanation of how unity of the self’s various elements is gained, and what constitutes self-continuity (i.e., a sense of sameness through time). The unity and continuity of the self is often threatened by present-day globalization and other environmental concerns, which contribute to a rapid change in the physical, social and

**Unity and continuity of the self in Buddhism**

The basic postulates of the Buddhist perspective on the self make it clear that Buddha denied the existence of a substantial self with distinctive characteristics of unity and permanence. The common experience of unity and permanence of the self is considered an illusion. In his empirical analysis, Buddha considered that the person (with mind and body) consists of five elements, which are in a continuous state of flux, none of which contributes towards a substantial self: (1) material form, (2) feeling or sensation, (3) perception, (4) mental dispositions due to impressions left by past experiences and behaviours and (5) reason or intelligence.

An analogy to that flux is the experience of watching a film, when we experience (the illusion) of unity and continuity though in reality there is only a series of frames following one after another. However, unlike the case of adjacent frames in a film, Buddha found a causal connection between the units of experiences (as stated in the Law of Dependent Origination; Allen, 1959). Thus, the common experience of unity in the self arises from the continuity of preceding causes and subsequent effects. Unity is assumed out of the experience of continuity.

Given the understandings in the early Buddhist literature, often considered as the closest to Buddha’s views, it could be inferred that he was silent (except for a few rare occasions) on the question of whether there exists anything which is absolute or unchanging, that may provide the self with an essential sense of unity and continuity in India (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1989). For instance, in the passage below he affirms the existence of a transcendental self:

> There is, O Bhikkhus, an unborn, unoriginated, uncreated, unformed. Were there not, O Bhikkhus, this unborn, unoriginated, uncreated, unformed, there would be no escape from the world of the born, originated, created, formed. Since, O Bhikkhus, there is an unborn, unoriginated, uncreated, unformed, therefore is there an escape from the born, originated, created, formed. (*The Udana*, 1902, p. 112)

However, in general, Buddha kept his silence on the subject. This silence is often attributed to various reasons such as his aversion to metaphysical speculations, which he considered to be of no help in the explanation of phenomena.
Unity and continuity of the self in Advaita Vedanta

The Advaita Vedanta presumes that the self at the level of Jiva, with its cognitive, affective, and volitional aspects, cannot adequately account for its unity and continuity. The Jiva with its limitations (Upadhis) – which include the physical body, the mind, senses, agency and memories – is understood as going through various transitions. The transitory nature of Upadhis prevents a sense of unity and continuity (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1989). The source of unity and continuity of the self is from a transcognitive state, at the level of Brahman/Atman, which is an absolute and unchanging state of wholeness.

In describing Brahman, Advaita literature describes four states of consciousness with distinctive features. They are (1) the wakeful state, characterized by outward cognition, senses perceptions and motor activities; (2) the dream state, which is inwardly cognitive, and provides access to exclusive areas of personal world; (3) the deep sleep state, which is a holistic, neither solely inwardly nor solely outwardly focused and brings a certain degree of quietude; and (4) the final state, which is transcognitive and indescribable and the basis of providing self-sameness or experience of an unchanging self, which is Brahman (Paranjpe, 1998). Our intuitive sense of unity and continuity, and, paradoxically, doubts about it, are attributed to the illusory superimposition of the properties of Jiva (transience) on Atman (intransience), and vice versa.

Unity and continuity of the self in Dialogical Self Theory

In DST, I-positions provide unity and continuity of self. The concept of the ‘I’ builds upon William James’s (1890) conceptualization of self-as-knower. It has three features: continuity, distinction and agency (Hermans and Dimaggio, 2004). Recently, Hermans and Hermans-Konopka (2010) acknowledge the fact that analyzing the self in terms of ‘multiplicity and difference’ cannot provide ‘a definitive and satisfying answer to the question of whether the self is coherent enough to function as a unity’ (p. 137), and they explore other possibilities. Going beyond James, they propose a novel feature of the postmodern self, its ‘receptiveness’. In their own words,

We will argue that, in the present era, there are strong reasons to attribute to the I not only an appropriating function but also a receptive one. We will show that the self has potentials that cannot be sufficiently understood by the notions ‘appropriation’ and ‘ownership’ because they assume the existence of a possessive self. We will
demonstrate that the receptive function makes experiences possible that are inaccessible to the appropriative function of the self. (Hermans and Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 140)

The receptive ‘I’ is described in three levels based on the dimension of immersed–detached. At the final level, the ‘I’ is completely depositioned. The depositioned ‘I’ is in a state of pure consciousness or a transcognitive state, characterized by an absence of mental content. In all these three levels, space becomes transformed and the spatial boundaries recede. Other features are openness and receptivity, high permeability of its boundaries, and its capacity to become part of a larger whole.

While Hermans and Hermans-Konopka (2010) do not propose that the depositioned state provides a sense of unity and continuity, they do emphasize the importance of this state for bringing us closer to ourselves. Indeed, it may be of great significance to explore whether this state corresponds to Shankara’s experience of Brahman, or to that about which Buddha had kept his silence. If the receptive ‘I’ can provide an experience of infinity, then, reasonably, it should also be able to provide a true sense of unity and self-sameness. Indeed, the nature of the receptive ‘I’, its departure from its inherent ‘appropriative’ function, and the assumptions underlying the coexistence of a receptive function (which is apparently beyond time and space) and appropriative function (which is anchored in time and space), are issues that require further clarity and understanding.

As Paranjpe (1998) has noted, Western psychology has always identified itself with the study of the ‘wakeful state’ and does not consider evidence from other states of consciousness as important or worth exploring. Perhaps this exclusion has been one of the biggest errors in psychology, as human experiences are not limited to wakeful states of experience (Paranjpe, 1998). Freud, Jung and, more recently, transpersonal psychologists, have acknowledged and explored these questions, but, nonetheless, Psychology as a whole continues to overlook such questions. Serious consideration of other areas of consciousness and their inclusion in theoretical conceptualizations have always been the merit of Eastern traditions. In this context, a question that requires considerable contemplation is what is DST’s position regarding other states of consciousness. Indeed, it may be of great value to consider transcognitive states of the self as the objective of DST and the establishment of dialogical relationships as the means to attain it. Exploration in those directions is beyond the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, the prospect of DST exploring other states
of consciousness reflects the possibility of enriching the theory and making it more comprehensive.

The ultimate destiny of the self and the path to it

Most perspectives on the self do not merely seek to explicate its nature and functioning. They are not value-free understandings of the notion, and often expound an ideal or ultimate goal of the self and prescribe a path or means towards that goal. In the following, we consider how the Eastern and Dialogical conceptualizations of the self address this issue.

In Advaita Vedanta, the ultimate goal of the self is the attainment of liberation (Moksha) from the cycle of existence. This goal requires one to remove the veil of ignorance (Avidya, Maya) and recognize (Paravidya, Gnosis) the primordial relationship or identity of the self with the true self (i.e., Brahman). This realization brings one to Paramananda or ultimate bliss – a notion that is often unsuccessfully likened to transcendence in transpersonal psychology. Indeed, psychological perspectives and concepts related to self, due to their inclination towards reason, often fail in their attempts to capture the essence of the experiential realities expounded in Eastern traditions. The ultimate goal of self-realization in Advaita Vedanta, despite being an experiential reality, cannot be proven by reason or logic (Deutsch, 1969). Regarding the means for attaining self-realization, knowledge into the nature of the self is emphasized. In particular, Advaita prescribes a threefold stage of relentless and critical inquiry into the nature of the self as a method for self-realization. First, Sravana (Learning) means carefully listening to the non-dualistic teaching of Vedanta. Second, Manana (Reflection) means deep reflection or contemplation on what is learned from the teaching. Here one is expected to carefully examine all important and possible divergent views and refute them in a rational manner. In this process of self-examination, the person does not leave a single doubt or objection unexamined. In this stage, reason (Tarka), as emphasized by Sankara, helps the seeker to attain single mindedness in achieving the goal of self-realization, as well as clearing the mind from possibly distracting thoughts of oppositions. The process is highly dialectical, that is, deeply involved in justification and refutation. Third, Nididhyasana (Contemplation) means learning to become completely engrossed in the contemplation of Brahman in such a way that no other thoughts enter the mind (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1989). This final stage leads one to the direct realization of Brahman.
In Buddhism, everything that represents the ultimate goal of the self could be summed up in one word: *Nirvana* (Enlightenment), which is the attainment of liberation from the causal chain of existence. In this respect, the ultimate goal of the self in Buddhism (*Nirvana*) and Advaita Vedanta (*Moksha*) seems to be the same. However, while these perspectives are similar in their goal of liberation from the cycles of existence, the idea of *Nirvana* emphasizes an experience or state of being, whereas the idea of *Moksha* underscores the process of one’s realization of the true nature of the self. Little is known about the nature of *Nirvana*, as Buddha’s emphasis was rather on the way to liberation. The literal meaning of the word ‘*nirvana*’ means blowing out or cooling. It could mean the blowing out of the passions, desires and ignorance about the causal chain (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1989). The way or path to the removal of suffering as prescribed by Buddha consists of two principles: the middle way and the eightfold path. The principle of the middle way represents a renunciation of all extremes in mental or physical exercises, actions, thought, emotions and so on. It may be noted that this principle was borne out of Buddha’s personal experience of engaging in extreme mental and physical exercises, which he later realized as detrimental in the pursuit of liberation. The principle of the eightfold path consists of eight precepts of the right way of life with which one has to comply in order for the cessation of suffering and the attainment of realization.

It has to be noted that there is a radical difference between Buddha’s teachings and Advaitic principles. For instance, unlike Buddhism, Advaita Vedanta allows for divinity and grace to assume a significant position in the pursuit of self-realization. Likewise, however, Buddhist precepts place the emphasis, not on convention or authority, but on the seeker and the truth. The following quote from a Buddhist text rightly captures this:

> Be ye lamps unto yourselves; be ye a refuge to yourselves; betake yourself to no external refuge; hold fast to the truth as a lamp; hold fast as a refuge to the truth; look not for refuge to anyone besides yourselves’. (Quoted in Radhakrishnan, 1923/1989, vol. 1, p. 428)

While the Advaitic and Buddhist traditions provide deep understandings on the transcendental goals of the self (and the way to reach it), DST takes a rather pragmatic stance on the subject matter. The nearest that the theory comes to understanding the ultimate goal of the self is its oft-stated objective of establishing dialogical relationships between
elements in the internal and external worlds. Presumably, this removes the barriers between one's internal and external worlds, and thereby facilitates the expansion of the self and fosters the interconnection of the self and society. In their most recent work, Hermans and Hermans-Konopka (2010) call for a broader conception of dialogical relationships, and consider the establishment of dialogical relationships as a 'learning process' which contributes to a 'high levels of awareness and integration' (p. 6). Indeed, high levels of awareness and integration of the self are of great value at an individual as well as social level. At an individual level, it contributes to one's well-being and personal growth. At a social level, it facilitates harmony and peace. The incorporation of 'awareness' and 'integration' into the theory implies the possibility of expanding it to include the ultimate destiny of the self and the path to it.

Arguably, the ultimate goal and path as expounded in Buddhism stands out from that of the other two traditions by virtue of its clarity and simplicity. It appeals to the common person, without compromising its grounding in reason and logic. Regarding Advaita Vedanta, it is indeed the School's proposition of quite a demanding intellectual path to reach self-realization that has raised much criticism (Paranjpe, 1998). The fact that it can be beneficial only to highly advanced minds with a motivation for self-actualization makes it less appealing to the common person. We find that DST may further contribute to our understanding of self if it can refine and elucidate its understandings on the ideal of self and the way to it. Questions that may help expand and refine the theory include the theory's potential benefits for particular sectors (e.g., people with psychological challenges, individuals desiring personal growth, people in management or leadership roles, etc.), its relevance to the common person's life in general, the purpose and practicality of 'good dialogue', and the possibility and characteristics of an ideal dialogical relationship.

Ethical dimensions of self

The self, as a notion fundamental to human experience in its entirety, cannot be separated from the ethical dimension that constitutes its very essence, that is, agency. Accordingly, the stances taken by the different perspectives in this respect become a subject of great significance.

Ethics (Dharma) was a central concern in Buddhist thought, the pragmatic purpose of which, as Buddha contended, was to provide ordinary people with a set of guiding principles that would help them to lead a virtuous existence. In a period when anarchy ruled, this was a
much called for ideal. It is important to note here that the ethical precepts propounded by Buddha were not grounded in the shifting stance of metaphysics, but rather based on an empirical understanding and observation of the apparent facts of human experience (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1989). In general, the guiding ethical principle has been that whatever action helps to weaken the causal chain of suffering is a ‘good’ action, and whatever action strengthens the causal chain is a ‘bad’ one. This brings us to the word Karma, oft repeated in Buddhist texts, which has been used to signify ‘actions’. However, the word ‘Karma’ is not limited to the literal meaning of action. It embodies more profound meanings, which imply the intellectual and volitional component of an action. On the whole, it signifies three components of action: the volitional preparation, the act itself and its effect (i.e., what follows the act). Together, these underpin the moral dimension in one’s volition and action, the consequences of one’s moral choices and the value in cultivating the sense of ethical responsibility in one’s life. Indeed, the basic postulates of the self in Buddhist thought are driven by a sense of moral purpose.

In Advaita Vedanta, any mention of ethics relates to the ultimate goal of reaching the absolute self (Brahman). Self-realization is considered as the absolute goodness. The ethically good is any action that leads to the realization of infinity. The opposite is the ethically bad. A person on the path of self-realization should, first and foremost, assume a non-dualistic position of ‘all is one’, which then becomes a guiding principle to all of his or her intentions and actions. In general, it may be said that ethics in Advaita Vedanta implies doing good Karma, and this helps one in the realization of the true self. It is important to note here that Sankara, in expounding the principles of self-realization, did not formulate any ethical principles, but closely followed and espoused whatever ethical standards were proclaimed in the traditional Vedic systems.

With few exceptions, most traditional perspectives have acknowledged the ethical dimension of the self. However, this has not been the case with modern psychological perspectives of self, which has always refrained from a prescriptive understanding of moral conduct. Although moral development and moral reasoning have been topics of extensive theoretical and empirical analysis for some time, a normative understanding of what constitutes the differentiation of right and wrong has always been considered as outside the confines of the discipline. In light of this, it is surely of significance to note that DST does not overlook the moral dimension of the self and proposes ‘dialogue’ as ‘representing a
moral and developmental purpose’ (Hermans and Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 174). The theory expounds in great detail the notion of a ‘good’ dialogue, once again affirming the moral aim of dialogue. Indeed, dialogue, apart from being a structural and functional unit of self, is also the ethical basis of self.

Concluding comments

As limited and inadequate as it may be, this chapter presents insights from a comparison of two Eastern traditions with one of the most recent Western perspectives. Numerous attempts of a similar nature, that is, a comparative analysis of Eastern and modern Western conceptualizations of the self, have been undertaken. Most of these conclude with a rather discouraging note about the futility of reconciling the objective, theoretical and empirical ethos of Western thinking with the subjective, experiential and phenomenological Eastern standpoint. The distinctiveness of the present work lies in its underlying theme of enhancing the conception of the self in Dialogical Self Theory. The comparative review with the time-honoured Eastern traditions is a means to achieving this purpose. By comparing and contrasting the perspectives, we gain insight into the value of DST and what makes it influential, as well as some vexing constraints that currently limit it.

Undoubtedly, all three perspectives have been or could be influential in shaping people’s understanding of the self. The influence of Advaita Vedanta on Indian thought has been so profound, that in one form or another, Hindu philosophy has become Advaita Vedanta (Britannica, 2010). Buddha’s teaching, perhaps due to its value in addressing human suffering, appeals globally, and its popularity is ever increasing. DST, with its central concepts of dialogicality and multiplicity, has found its place in the realms of psychotherapy and social psychology. By addressing issues of the self in a globalized world, it has successfully portrayed itself as a socio-historically rooted theory.

An exploration into the relative strengths and criticisms of the three perspectives may help us gain a better insight into the directions that Dialogical Self Theory may take towards its prospect of continued theory. The strength of Buddha’s teaching lies in the fact that it is built on an empirical understanding of self. The various postulates in the theory support each other. Buddha’s overemphasis on human suffering is a common criticism, but it provides a very clear objective and basis for the perspective. The theory has its value in the principles that it puts forward to remove suffering. One of the principles, the eightfold
path, provides its ethical stance and reinforces its characteristic coherence. Sankara’s Advaita Vedanta is, in essence, a response to a particular society’s search for higher spiritual meaning of the self. However, the value in this tradition is its presentation of clear objectives and a systematic method to attain realization. DST can be considered to be in its early stages of development. Its recent attempt to address other states of consciousness and ethical dimensions of the self is certainly commendable. However, it raises a question on how these dimensions may be further developed without contradicting the central assumptions of the theory.

In closing, we are reminded of the Zen parable of the ‘Ox and the Ox Herder’. In the parable, the ox symbolizes the self and the ox herder symbolizes the seeker of self. The parable metaphorically presents the journey of a seeker, who searches for the self, finds it, struggles with it, tames it, realizes it, transcends it and finally comes back to relate to worldly existence. In its journey towards demystifying the concept of ‘self’, Dialogical Self Theory has indeed captured the essence of self, but definitely has a long way to go before it can reach perfection, without ever distancing itself from humankind’s common concerns with existence.

References

Jung and Miki: Similarities and Differences

Shoji Muramoto

Kiyoshi Miki (1897–1945), a Japanese philosopher, is little known at least among Western psychologists, but his thoughts seem to help us to clarify features and problems in modern Western psychology, especially the psychology of C. G. Jung (1875–1961). Since 1967, Miki’s works have been available in *Miki Kiyoshi Zenshu* (Complete Works of Kiyoshi Miki; henceforth MKZ) in 20 volumes, and some soft-cover editions of his essays are long sellers in Japan. However, none of his writings has been translated into any foreign language. Although some studies of modern Japan have mentioned Miki, the secondary literature in English thematically dealing with his works is limited to two (Nagatomo, 1995; Townsend, 2009).

This chapter’s task is twofold: to present Miki’s ideas for Western readers and to explore their implications for Jungian psychology. A systematic comparison is not my intention here, and even though I try it when possible, it remains modest and provisional. I rather will be content with identifying similarities and differences between them. Although Miki is perhaps the most historically conscious of all Japanese philosophers, the reference to his biography and the historical and political situation in which he worked as an intellectual will be restricted to the minimum. In contrast, I will devote more space for the intellectual-historical context of both men.

In Miki’s writings, the name of Freud appears only a few times as one of the figures representing irrationalism in current thought (MKZ 11, pp. 185, 213), and Jung is never mentioned as far as I know. He was perhaps interested, not so much in psychology as a discipline, but in psychological aspects of various philosophical thoughts.

Miki was a thinker who, refraining himself from claiming originality, found it especially important to locate himself in the whole historical
context of the ongoing intellectual history in the West as well as in
Japan. So understanding something in light of his philosophy means
virtually viewing it through the eyes of those thinkers whom he had
studied and incorporated before interpreting it with his own theoretical
framework. What might be called his original thoughts only came from
his awareness of problems raised in his current situation. Miki’s stance
is therefore conducive for correctly locating the Swiss psychologist, too,
in a comprehensive context of Western intellectual history.

The primary concern with individuality

Miki’s primary concern with individuality is already apparent in his
earliest unpublished writing, ‘Unspoken philosophy’ (1919; MKZ 18). As
the unusual title suggests, it is not so much a philosophical but a psy-
chological essay, for it confesses and explores the subjective basis of his
philosophy. Noteworthy is that the young Miki’s psychological insight
resembles Jung’s and even Dialogical Self discourse:

Individuality implies, paradoxically speaking, having a mind being
both a single person and several persons opposing, contradicting
and conflicting with each other.... The individual is correctly evalu-
a t e d  o n l y  i n  a n  i n t u i t i o n  t o w a r d  i t s  w h o l e n e s s .  Th u s  u n d e r s t a n d-
in individuality does not find its foundation in a spoken but in an
unspoken point. (MKZ 18, p. 61)

Also in common with Jung, as a characteristic style of discourse, is
Miki’s preference of using opposites and types, including introvert and
extrovert, in his writing.

Goethe

Both Jung and Miki admired the German writer Goethe since their ado-
lescence. Reading Faust, Jung saw ‘a prophet’ in the German poet (Jung,
1961/1989, p. 60). For Miki, he was the master in art. Both quote, in
their autobiographical writings, the line ‘two souls live in my bosom’
from Faust (Jung, 1961/1989, p. 234; MKZ 18, p. 51).

However, there is an important difference: While Jung’s references to
Goethe are almost exclusively from Faust Part 2, Miki extensively cites
Goethe’s writings on natural science as well, treating him as a thinker.
It is not an exaggeration to say that his ideas on individuality, type and
character are based on Goethe.
Kant for Jung

Both Miki and Jung started with German Idealism, especially Kant. This German philosopher, as is well known, imposed the strict limitation on human knowledge, arguing that it is not a copy of the outer world but the result of subjective constitution from sensory data based on the *a priori* categories of time, space and causality – a central thesis of *The Critique of Pure Reason* (published in 1781). Kant rigorously distinguished the sensible, or phenomena, from the intelligible, or noumena. The thing-in-itself (*Ding an sich*) belongs to the latter, as something inaccessible; what we can experience is only the former while the latter is reserved for faith.

Jung often claims to be a Kantian in terms of epistemology (e.g., Jung, 1973, p. 294), but his particular approach to Kant must not be overlooked. He was primarily introduced to Kant through Schopenhauer as an interpreter of Kant, because these philosophers seemed to offer him the much-needed philosophical foundation of occultism or spiritualism with which he had been strongly concerned since his childhood. *The Zofingia Lectures* (Jung, 1983), a collection of papers from Jung’s student days, clearly shows that Jung as a student, fighting both materialism and the established Protestantism, was mainly inspired by Kant’s writings during the pre-critical phase, especially those works dealing with spiritualism. For example, *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* (published in 1766) includes Kant’s acknowledgement of the authenticity of Swedenborg’s clairvoyance.

In the first of these lectures, ‘The Border Zones of Exact Science’, Jung as a student names ‘three allies’ in the cause of supporting spiritualism: David Strauss, Schopenhauer and Kant. He quotes Kant’s statement on spirits, ‘we can cite no *a priori* cause to reject their experiences’ (Jung, 1983, p. 24). While Kant himself later became sceptical regarding spiritualistic phenomena, Schopenhauer (1844/1987), using the Kantian distinction, asserted that they were ‘rooted directly in thing-in-itself and in the world of appearance giving rise to phenomena’, and identified the thing-in-itself with the will (p. 697). He tried to solve the problem of the relationship between noumena and phenomena, which Kant had left unsettled, by assuming the dream organ independent of time and space. Jung regards it as the actual subject beyond one’s conscious control and called it the soul. Readers will note that Jung’s later thought of the self is already budding. As Charet (1993, p. 143) rightly points out, Jung found in Schopenhauer the psychological foundation of spiritualism, but the psychology he was going to construct would keep a spiritualistic element.
Adopting the Kantian distinction of noumena and phenomena, Jung later theoretically distinguished archetypes themselves (an sich) from archetypal images (1954, par. 417), perhaps to save the scientific integrity of his psychology. Yet, while his contemporary neo-Kantians lost their spiritual vitality by finding the raison d’être of philosophy only in the methodological construction of cultural sciences distinct from natural sciences, Jung (1937) emphasized the importance of observing what Rudolf Otto had called the substance of religion, the numinous, experienced as mysterium terremendum and mysterium fascinosum. Beyond Kant, in a sense, and through Schopenhauer, Jung became the champion of spiritual psychology, although remaining cautious on the subject of spiritualism at least in the public scene.

Jung’s sympathy with the Kantian dilemma on the relationship between noumena and phenomena may be the reason why he characterizes his psychology as both phenomenological and natural-scientific (Jung, 1942/1948, par. 2), an unusual hybrid statement for those familiar with the history of the phenomenological movement. It may also explain why Jung’s followers have generally been indifferent to the phenomenological tradition with a few exceptions (for example, Brooke, 1991).

**Kant for Miki**

In contrast with Jung, Miki hardly mentions spiritualism, and was mainly inspired by Kant’s writings in the critical period. The young Miki saw in Kant both the culmination of the Enlightenment and its turning point to the Romantic development of German Idealism as represented by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. In his view, this was done through the experience of teleological connections in reason (MKZ 2, p. 7).

Although admiring Kant as his master of philosophy, Miki felt that his own primary concern with the individual in history was met by neither *The Critique of Pure Reason* (published in 1781) nor *The Critique of Practical Reason* (published in 1788). As a student, Miki, already relying on Kant’s first critique, states that the individual or the particular cannot be logically deduced from the universal, and is deprived of its uniqueness when rationalized by general laws (MKZ 2, p. 123). His contention suggests the limitation in the conceptual construction of individuality on the plane of natural sciences, for which Kant attempted to provide a philosophical foundation. The strength of *The Critique of Practical Reason* seems to Miki to consist in the acknowledgement of universally valid values; but its weakness is that the individual is deprived
of its own uniqueness, and is provided only with a contingent status in the fulfilment of the categorical imperative. In Kant’s deontological ethics, one should act in ways that are in accordance with what is universally valid without any exception. In this highly abstract concept, the concrete existence of the individual in society is hardly visible, and it does not matter who does what when and where.

In contrast, The Critique of Judgment (published in 1790) was, for Miki, more promising in the philosophical foundation of the individual in history, because reflexive judgement, a concept elaborated there, refers to the ability of considering the logical contingent as if it were in teleological connection with the whole system of experiences. While being aware of the regulative, not of the constitutive, character of teleology in the appreciation of nature and artistic works as main areas treated in Kant’s third critique, Miki asks whether there is not a sphere where teleology can be objective, or freedom can become a fact; and believes that it is a human historical action which elevates nature to culture (MKZ 2, p. 53), a point to be elaborated in his later humanistic thoughts. Jungian psychology may be enriched and deepened by exploring how psychotherapy, both as a process and as an historical action, can be understood in light of the Kantian teleological concept of judgement.

Further, Miki is highly sympathetic with Kant’s Religion within the Bounds of Reason (published in 1793) due to the acknowledgement of human needs and the humanization of religious ideas. The Kantian bracketing of the transcendent and focusing on the subjective condition in religion seems to be preparing for its subsequent psychological interpretation as represented by William James and Jung. It may be worthwhile to ask how the Kantian concept of the radical evil elaborated there is in connection with the Jungian opposition to the traditional theological conception of the evil as *privation boni* (Jung, 1942/1948, par. 247).

### Hegel

Jung seems to be consistently negative in his evaluation of Hegel’s philosophy. For example, he says, ‘The victory of Hegel over Kant dealt the gravest blow to reason and to the further development of the German and, ultimately, of the European mind’ (Jung, 1954, par. 358). Jung even compares Hegel’s discourse with ‘the megalomanic language of schizophrenics’ and sees in it ‘a symptom of weakness...and lack of substance’ (p. 360). Unlike Miki, he clearly seems to stand on Kant’s side, opposing Hegel. But we must be careful not to be misled by Jung’s statements. The
truth is more complicated, for how much he owes to the Hegelian dialectic, consciously or unconsciously, in his preference of using opposites, his quest for their coincidence or unity in the self and the apparently sudden emergence of its symbol, and his finalist perspective as distinct from the Freudian causal point of view is an intriguing question.

Miki can be said to partly agree and partly disagree with Jung when he says that any philosophy with everlasting vitality has the element of scepticism, but that Hegel’s philosophy is the only exception (MKZ 1, p. 215). Generally speaking, however, Hegel was for Miki another point of departure as well as one of his main partners throughout his philosophical development. He finds in Hegel core ideas such as Logos and Pathos for elaborating his primary concern with individuation, which is shared by Jung.

**Individuation**

It must be stressed that the concept of individuation may be very hard to understand, particularly for modern individualists. Individualism is a modern ideology that demands us to make the ‘individual’ a principle according to which all other things in human life are decided. It is often almost synonymous with egoism. To grasp the true meaning of individuation, we must ask what is individualized.

When Jung (1961/1989) opens his autobiography, stating, ‘My life is a story of the self-realization of the unconscious’ (p. 3), he distinctively places himself in a tradition of individuation beginning with Aristotle. Thus, unlike the case in his assumption of archetypes, in advocating individuation he was not so much Platonic but Aristotelian.

Miki quotes from Aristotle’s *Physics*: ‘What is first known for us is something chaotic from which elements and principles become known later through analysis. So we must proceed from the universal to the individual. For the whole is known better by sensory perception and the universal is a whole’ (MKZ 9, p. 56). He then points out that here the universal (*katholon*) does not refer to the logical universal but the sensual universal, perhaps suggesting its connection with the concrete universal in Hegel, as distinct from the abstract universal in Kant. Any Jungian would probably recognize in the words quoted above *prima materia* as one of basic terms in alchemical work. In fact, matter (Greek: *hyle*; Latin: *materia*) is the principle of individuation, and must be structured as something organic, or originally instrumental (*organikos*), in order to receive form (Greek: *eidos*; Latin: *forma*). So man is the composite of soul as form and body as matter. Unlike ‘Idea’ in Plato, ‘form’ in
Aristotle is not separate from matter, but is continuous with it. For the higher matter goes, the more it becomes form.

Medieval Christian theology adopted this Aristotelian thought so as to formulate its teaching theoretically. It added a positive significance to the principle of individuation through its doctrine of Incarnation. Its hostility to physical aspects of human existence is due to its Platonic tendency.

Leibniz was the first modern thinker of individuality. Miki, even as a student, quotes from *Monadology*: ‘The individual includes the infinite. One who can understand the infinite can understand the principle of individuation, too’ (1921, in MKZ 2, p. 150). Miki notes, however, that Leibniz was still dominated by logical thinking. Kant, as mentioned earlier, was aware of the irrationality of individuality, in other words, the impossibility of logically deducing it from the universal, but failed to develop this idea. It was Schopenhauer who revived the Aristotelian concept of individuation in modern philosophy, though in the Platonic direction. Schopenhauer (1844/1987), studying Buddhism and other religions including Gnosticism, attributed *principium individuationis* to the blind will of life, and found in self-denial of the latter the salvation from sufferings (p. 392).

In contrast, Jung did not make individuation something to be overcome, but the highest goal of human development, which psychotherapy is expected to facilitate. In ‘Septem Semones ad Mortuos’ (The Seven Sermons to the Dead), written in the period entitled in his autobiography as ‘confrontation with the unconscious’ (Jung, 1961/1989), he says: ‘Hence the natural striving of the creature goeth towards distinctiveness, fighting against primeval, perilous sameness. This is called the PRINCIPIUM INDIVIDUATIONIS. This principle is the essence of the creature’ (p. 380). When read literally, he might seem like an advocate of modern individualism, but his subsequent writings clearly show that – while stressing the distinctness of each person as much as possible – he still belongs to the long tradition of individuation, for his concept of individuation refers to a process in which the collective, as the universal, becomes integrated through the ego’s serious confrontation and negotiating with it.

**Collective: Universal or social?**

In Jung’s concept of individuation, what is individualized is the unconscious, specifically the collective unconscious. Miki, as an historically and sociologically conscious philosopher, however, would not fail to
see the ambiguity in Jung's expression of the collective unconscious. Jung (1943) defines it as 'a deeper layer of the unconscious' than the Freudian and Adlerian unconscious; it is 'where the primordial images [later called archetypes] common to humanity lie sleeping' (par. 102), 'an impersonal or transpersonal unconscious' which is 'detached from anything personal and is common to all men' (par. 103). This suggests that the collective unconscious is something universal, beyond the differences of societies.

Yet, the word 'collective' usually refers to a group, although more loosely organized than a community or an association. Collective representations is an important sociological concept in Durkheim's (1912/2001, p. 175) thought. It means common beliefs uniting members of traditional or simpler societies by the power of symbols. It seems to have obviously provided Jung with the basis for his coinage of the collective unconscious, making the latter open to social sciences. In fact, there are also passages where Jung uses the adjective 'collective' in this potentially sociological direction. For example, Jung (1928a) says, 'there is also a collective psyche limited to race, tribe, and family over and above the “universal” collective psyche' (par. 235). Although not directly mentioning Durkheim, he draws upon works by followers of this French sociologist, such as Mauss, Hubert and Levy-Brühl, at least mentioning in passing the similarity of concepts (e.g., Jung, 1937, par. 89). However, while for Durkheim and his followers society is an organic reality of its own, for Jung it is at best a mass without its own structure, and is principally reduced to individuals’ psyches.

These two aspects of the collective unconscious, the social and the universal, are intriguingly reflected in the Japanese translation of the term by Hayao Kawai, the first Japanese Jungian analyst. On the one hand, he deprived this term ‘collective’ of an implicitly social-scientific potential by translating it into a Japanese expression *fuhenteki-muishiki* (Kawai, 1967), which could be translated back into English as the ‘universal unconscious’. On the other hand, he was mainly interested, not so much in the universal mind, but in the cultural, if not national, identity of Japan (Kawai, 1996). So, for him, the universal unconscious might be the Japanese unconscious, not the unconscious of mankind.

Jung’s concept of individuation seems to be best appreciated by reference to Hegel’s philosophy. Suffice it to say here that in Miki’s view, Hegel abandoned the Kantian abstract universal and set the principle of the concrete universal as represented by the state; and to note his doubt whether the concrete universal can be the basis of individuality rather than making it a puppet of the state (MKZ 2, p. 133). This is also
a politically actual problem, viewed against the historical context of Miki’s writings.

Nowadays, society and universality tend to be understood as opposing, or at least disjointed. The former is the subject matter of the social sciences; the latter, of philosophy or religion. An approach is criticized as reductionist or essentialist depending upon whether it is the social or the universal which it emphasizes or disregards. But in early nineteenth-century thought, as represented by Hegel, the universal included the social. The latter was regarded as the concrete expression of the former. This is what Hegel called the concrete universal, an idea shared by many thinkers at the time, but which individualists today find difficult to understand. Even atheists or materialists such Feuerbach and Marx, who replaced the idea of God with the species of mankind or society in historical development, can be rightly understood only in their intention to retain the element of the universal. When speaking of the collective unconscious, Jung, who lived mainly in the early twentieth century, retained the Zeitgeist of the early nineteenth century, even though he disliked Hegel. Both Jung and Miki held, as taught by Hegel, that the universal might estrange the individual from him-/herself.

Later in ‘Philosophical Anthropology’, an unfinished and unpublished work (MKZ 18, pp. 143–4), Miki tried to deprive the concrete universal of substantiality, and also to overcome the individualist misconception of individuality. For he shows that it is only in society that humans can meet each other as ‘I’ and ‘thou’, as beings that cannot be completely made immanent.

Heidegger and Pascal

When Miki left Japan in 1922 to study abroad, he had already grasped basic problems inherent in both representatives of German Idealism, Kant and Hegel, as mentioned previously. Oscillating between them, Miki had explored a deeper and more comprehensive perspective from which to see the concrete human existence in history. Miki first studied in Heidelberg with Heinrich Rickert, the central figure of Neo-Kantianism at the time, and after learning nothing new from him, Miki met Heidegger in Marburg four years before the publication of Being and Time (Heidegger, 1927/1967).

Due to his early death, Miki seems to have mainly understood Heidegger in two ways: on the one hand, as an existential philosopher following Pascal and Kierkegaard, not as a thinker of Being; on the other, as the best Aristotle scholar at the time. He was strongly
Shoji Muramoto is influenced by Heidegger in both respects, although the latter has been generally less recognized in Japan. Miki's writings on Aristotle (MKZ 9) reveal how much Heidegger was indebted to the Greek philosopher in terms of style of thinking and discourse. The days in Marburg were also very important for Miki because Karl Löwith, Heidegger's assistant and a Jewish scholar of the same age as Miki, introduced him into the vast world of German intellectual history.

Miki's first book, published immediately after his return to Japan – *The Study of Man in Pascal* (1926, MKZ 1) – is generally considered to have resulted from applying what he had learned from Heidegger to Pascal's thought, in both method and content. Miki claims that human beings ought to be studied, neither by (scientific) explanation nor by phenomenological description, but by interpretation. Hermeneutics, for him, consists in the mutual references of basic experiences and concepts. He distinguishes Pascal's and his own anthropology from psychology by rejecting the objectification of human being and regarding the human soul as the specifically human mode of being.

It is easy to show in the following how each of Pascal's terms corresponds to Heidegger's concept (enclosed in parentheses): human conditions (being-in-the-word); divertissements (inauthenticity); terror (anxiety); misery (standing above nothingness); honesty (authenticity); wager (anticipatory decision of one's existence); and so on. However, Pascal as understood by Miki differs from Heidegger slightly and yet significantly. His main concern is not so much Being in itself but human being; in other words, not ontology but anthropology, although the two are inseparable.

**The human as a medium**

Miki fully agrees with Pascal's view that the human is a being in the intermediate between all and nothing, or angels and beasts, and that *le juste-milieu*, the right intermediate, is not given but something to be found out (MKZ 1, p. 18). Since then, this conception of human as a medium was consistently maintained as the most basic idea in Miki's anthropology. He saw it running throughout the history of Western philosophy since Plato and Aristotle.

In viewing the human as a medium, Miki shows his affinity, not so much with Heidegger, but with Jung. Although Jung's theoretical outlook is psychological, its underlying anthropology – in a sense more familiar in the German-speaking world, that is, a conception of human being – could be seen at least in his own experiences. Namely, a human
Jung and Miki: Similarities and Differences

is living in two contrasting realities: on the one hand, in a realm inhabited by spirits and demons, and, on the other, in a society where, mostly unconscious of these spirits, people are spending their ordinary lives. Jung sought, throughout his life, a way ‘that can mediate between conscious and unconscious reality’ (1943, par. 120). Thus, applying Miki’s conception of the human as a medium may rescue Jung’s psychology from intellectual isolation, locating it in the Western intellectual history. However, it must be added that for Jung human existence was only meaningful in its relation to spirits and demons. It may be said that, in his view, human existential concerns could be aroused only in the encounter with what is felt as being supernatural.

Studies of Marxism: Basic experience, anthropology and ideology

After returning to Japan in 1925, Miki sensitively responded to the current historical situation by publishing writings on Marxism one after another (MKZ 3). Miki is sometimes classed as a Marxist, but this is not the case, for he merely defended Marxism based on his belief that ‘any thought moving people and driving history must have some truth’ (MKZ 18, p. 100). His approach to Marxism was an attempt to extend what he had learned from various thinkers in Western philosophy and apply it in the actual historical situation. For example, his words explaining the motive of his involvement in Marxism, ‘Only the consciousness of this age is the actual consciousness for us’ (MKZ 3, p. 37), displays a typically Hegelian stance.

In ‘A Marxist form of anthropology’ (published in 1927), Miki offers several important concepts helpful in understanding the development of any thought: basic experience, logos, anthropology and ideology (MKZ 3, pp. 5–19). The expression of basic experience may have been adopted from Section 45 of Being and Time, where it refers to an experience anticipating the meaning of Being before its explicit interpretation (Heidegger, 1926/1967, p. 232). Partly inspired by Marxism and the sociology of knowledge, Miki adds to it an historical dimension, saying that each historical era has its own basic experience, a set of experiences not ruled by, but leading to, demanding and producing logos. Logos in turn involves speaking in society, the public sphere. Anthropology, as the primary logos, expresses basic experience, which is the self-understanding of humans in the given era. It corresponds to the ontological decision on the understanding of what it means to be, in the proper sense. When, in the course of history, a particular anthropology becomes contradictory
with human life, it must be replaced by another. Ideology is the secondary logos, and a change in it is mediated by anthropology.

It should be noted that, unlike Marxists, Miki thought that the infrastructure of any thought was not the socioeconomic structure, but the basic experience of the age. He had no intention to reduce any ideology to some underlying structure. On the contrary, the emergence of an ideology from basic experience was, for him, an originally creative work by Logos in history. Once created, it comes to claim its autonomy as a collective force, facilitating or inhibiting communications in the public sphere.

**Dual features of Jungian empiricism**

For Miki, Jungian psychology would be one of the ideologies constructed from a particular anthropology as an expression of the basic experience characteristic of its age. Miki would have paid attention to Jung’s characteristic discourse, which claims that his (Jung’s) standpoint was empirical – a typically Jungian statement, found throughout Jung’s writings as a psychologist. Miki’s attitude toward it would have been twofold.

On the one hand, Miki would have found that Jung’s claims were shared by Renaissance and modern thinkers. Medieval thinkers, too, emphasized the importance of experiences, but believed them to be in harmony with divine revelations. In Miki’s view, while medieval life was only meaningful in relation to Adam as the universal prototype of a human being or as a member of a community sharing the common fate, the Renaissance humanists understood one’s life from itself alone. Life was self-sufficient, needing nothing else. The principle governing this view of life was therefore immanence, not transcendence (MKZ 5, p. 197). The concept of experience stood for immanence in British empiricism, German Romanticism, philosophy of life and vitalism. Jung, too, seems obviously to belong to this tradition of self-contained life. It is as if he were saying that experience was everything.

On the other hand, Miki would have pointed out the unique or even strange aspect of the Jungian approach which, unlike other forms of empiricism, claims to experience transcendental beings. Although this does not mean that Jung simply believed in supernatural entities, he was convinced of their reality, as evidenced in his theoretical writings as well as autobiography. It is natural that he could not accept criticisms of his psychology as a kind of psychological reductionism. He was aware that the transcendent could not be reduced to subjectivity, but
is experienced as numinous. The object of experience, in Jung’s view, asserts its otherness as reality, no matter how it is rationally explained away as a projection of the unconscious. It must not be overlooked that the seemingly immanent concept of libido (psychic energy), distinct from its Freudian causal-mechanistic interpretation, often emerges in Jung’s writings as some divine or mythical figure.

**Duality in basic experience in Jung: Primary and secondary**

We might say that basic experience, as the origin of Jungian psychology, is the experience of the transcendent in the age of disenchantment and secularization, when it tends to disappear and only appears as the immanent without being recognized as such. This Jungian basic experience, however, did not immediately lead to the formation of Jungian psychology as an ideology.

We must be cautious about the Jungian empiricist discourse. In the last paragraph of the chapter entitled ‘Confrontation with the Unconscious’ in *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, Jung (1961/1989) writes that ‘everything essential was decided’ in the experiences during the period after his break with Freud; later details were ‘only supplements and clarifications’ of the experienced material that he called the *prima materia* (p. 199). In alchemical work (*opus*), *prima materia* is not the end but the point of departure. The subsequent chapter in his autobiography is indeed entitled ‘The Work’. What would *prima materia* become without *opus*? Experience is not everything but needs ‘supplements and clarifications’. More generally speaking, in Miki’s terminology, Pathos and Logos are mutually dependent.

We could even say that the Jungian concept of experience already includes in itself ‘supplements and clarifications’. It could be differentiated into the primary experience and the secondary experience. The former refers to a raw experience in which the subject is simply overwhelmed by some unusual event, inner or outer; and the latter implies an experience in which its meaning is disclosed to the subject. So the secondary experience could be also called hermeneutic experience, and, especially in Jung’s case, psychological experience, for he interprets any mysterious experience as stemming from the psyche. The secondary experience has powerful and deep impact, healing or disastrous, as does the primary experience, because it does not happen as something additional but, in modern ideology, as helping one’s adaptation to our historical age, in which the transcendent is no
longer recognized as such. What overwhelms the subject in the primary experience reveals itself, or rather is interpreted, in the secondary experience as the psyche. So the experienced and the experiencing are regarded as the same. Still, the otherness of the overwhelming in the primary experience is retained even if it is psychologically assimilated in the secondary experience. The archetype of the self is experientially infused with the charm of this mysterious figure as something or someone alien.

**Spiritual or demonological anthropology in Jung**

Miki might see a particular anthropology in the Jungian basic experience. According to it, someone visited by the demonic, which would have been taken for granted in pre-modern ages, is perplexed with something indefinite, as it is not identified as such anymore, and is even denied of its existence in the world shared with others. The term ‘demonic’ in this context does not refer to a devil in the Christian sense. Rather, it is derived from the Greek *daimon*, an intermediate being between gods and humans. It can work upon mortals both positively and negatively. The Jungian psyche must not be identified simply with the human subject in the modern sense, for it includes not only personal elements represented by the ego, but also demonic elements represented by complexes and archetypes. It is noteworthy that Jung believed these to be autonomous, in other words, by their nature not completely reducible to human subjectivity. He often says that the spirit blows as it will. Are they not the offspring of demons in modern disguise? If so, demonological expressions, often found in Jung’s phrases such as ‘animus-possessed’, would be more than metaphors. Even Lord Jesus, whose obscure and varying identity occupied Jung throughout his life, seems to have been experienced as a *daimon*. How could mortals discern whether a figure fascinating them is divine or demonic?

Miki, an admirer of Goethe, does not speak of demons as entities, but speaks of the demonic (*das Dämonische*) as explained in *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, seeing it in extraordinary desires and drives. Far from reducing humans to animals, Miki defines the demonic as ‘the sensible with the character of infinitude and absoluteness’ which is based upon the human subjective predicament, suggesting that ‘humans are homeless in the world, in other words, have no standpoint there’ (KMZ 18, pp. 271–2). Readers would easily find correspondences in Jung. He, too, suggested the substantial identity of instinct and spirit (Jung, 1919/1954), described the estrangement of the introverted suffering
from the modern world, and observed the absence of the Archimedean point in psychology (1954, par. 437).

A possible link between Jungian psychology and Marxism

Aristotle’s statement that being could be spoken of in various senses was the point of departure for Heidegger in his fundamental ontological inquiry. Miki, as Heidegger’s student and Hegel-Marx scholar, therefore writes that each age has its own basic experience and accordingly involves a certain ontological decision (KMZ 3, p. 377). This insight immediately touches our concern with the formation and further development of Jungian psychology.

No two systems of thought seem more incompatible with each other than Jung’s psychology and Marxism, for the former is exclusively concerned with the exploration of the inner world while the latter with change of the outer world. But Miki’s article ‘Marxism and Materialism’ may shed light on a possible link, for he tries to deconstruct two apparently opposing concepts of consciousness and matter. On the one hand, Miki quotes Marx, ‘das Bewusstsein (consciousness, or rather literally, being conscious) can never be anything but das bewusste Sein (the being that is conscious)’ (1927, MKZ 3, p. 48). Then he ontologically transforms the idealistic concept of consciousness: ‘Consciousness is nothing but a concrete mode of being of the whole person’ (MKZ 3, p. 48). On the other hand, Miki suggests that ‘material’ in Marxism, far from being pure matter as the opposite of spirit, might be a self-understanding of humans as sensual and practically negotiating with others, or a hermeneutic concept referring to work as human interactions in the world. As will be mentioned, it was to be replaced by Pathos.

Thus, consciousness and material turn out to be similar, if not the same. From this new perspective, Jungian psychology and Marxism, both based upon and demanding interpersonal practice, would look less remote from each other than we have imagined.

Dialectic

As mentioned earlier, the logic of dialectic seems to be strikingly common in the reference to opposites by both Jung and Miki. However, Miki felt that the nature of dialectic, or even logic in general, was not correctly understood, at least in his time. It is still believed today that there are two kinds of logic, formal and dialectical, the former represented by Aristotle and the latter by Hegel.
In ‘Formal Logic and Dialectic’ (1929, MKZ 3), Miki notes that Aristotle and other Greek philosophers never considered their logic as formal, because for them logic was intimately connected with their substantial metaphysics, in which only that which does not change, but remains identical with itself, excluding any contradiction (such as Idea in Plato's sense), was thought to ‘be’ in the proper sense. Logic was therefore inseparable from ontology. The Greek logic became ‘formal’ only when it lost its proper meaning of being, and was planted into quite different grounds by late Greek commentators and Christian thinkers. In Miki’s view, the concept of being in Christianity is not substance but life, and its basic premise is the reconciliation of opposites. That could be where Miki and Jung are very different. For example, the fifteenth-century theologian and philosopher Nicholas of Cues, who spoke of coincidentia oppositorum, was counted by Miki as a representative Christian thinker, but would be regarded by Jung as an exceptional figure in the Christian world, because he finds its collective attitude one-sided.

Like the Greek logic, dialectic – far from being a method empty in itself and formally, even mechanically, applied to things demanding explanation – is intimately related to a certain meaning of being. Being, here, does not mean subsistence but existence; or, not eternity but change. Miki agrees with Hegel’s view that this logic is traceable back to Heraclitus, but observes that the latter was less a systematic logician than an intuitive thinker indifferent to scientific studies. Miki sees dialectic thinking as more evident in the Christian world, regards Hegel as a philosopher who established the Christian logic, and, relying on Dilthey, views the early Hegel as the philosopher of life. However, because as an Aristotelian idealist, Hegel regarded only what subsists behind changes as real, his dialectic remained contemplative, Romantic and insufficient, and consequently was overcome by Marxist materialist dialectic. In Miki’s view, Hegel and Marx were diametrically different in their ontological decision regarding what it means to be.

In another article from 1929, ‘Freedom and necessity in dialectic’ (MKZ 4), Miki refines his understanding of dialectic. For him, it is ‘the logic of order’ as seen in Pascal’s scheme of three orders: body (corps), mind (èsprit) and heart (coeur); or, unlike the logic of understanding in Kant, it is the logic of heart which brings reason back to itself. In dialectic, the uniqueness of each order is acknowledged, but, while ascent from a lower to a higher order is discontinuous and demands a leap, descent from a higher to a lower order is continuous. Dialectic is therefore the unity of freedom and necessity. Miki considers Hegel’s logic to be ‘a psychology in a deeper sense,’ and regards The Phenomenology
of Spirit as ‘descriptions of wanderings of consciousness’ from the lowest to highest order of spirit itself (MKZ 4, p. 105). From a different perspective, it depicts how spirit comes back to itself through stages of self-alienation and self-awareness, a process that Jungians would immediately find as typically gnostic.

From Miki’s perspective of dialectic, it would not be incorrect to say that Jung’s psychology is also ruled by the logic of dialectic. Jung (1928b) defines modern man as ‘one whose existence demands the maxim of consciousness and the minimum of unconsciousness’ (par. 149). Yet, he points out the possibility that the most intensive consciousness of modern man may become its opposite, what Heraclitus called enantiodromia (par. 164). Like Hegel, Jung believes that everything is in contradiction and in the process of transformation. In Jung’s thought, the ego and the self, respectively, correspond to consciousness and spirit in Hegel’s. Derivatives of the unconscious such as symptoms, dreams, fantasies, myths and artistic works could be logically classified as the concrete universal. He remained within the Hegelian sphere of influence, as is seen from his use of the term ‘the objective psyche’ in his writings.

The energetic viewpoint and esse in anima

Lacking in Hegel, but indispensable in Jung, is the so-called ‘energetic’ viewpoint (Jung, 1928c). Jung claims that his concept of libido, unlike Freud’s qualitative one (which is confined to sexuality), is essentially quantitative. At odds with the mechanistic viewpoint of early-modern natural sciences, for him energy was subjective, specifically unconscious, and teleological. Perhaps partly due to the Zeitgeist, he wanted to make his analytical psychology look more scientific than Freud’s psychoanalysis, and therefore, it is an ideology in Miki’s sense. Today we hear less often Jungians making remarks simply based on ‘psychic energy’.

More importantly, in Jung’s case, the meaning of being as determining the nature of logic is neither essence (eternal) nor existence (contingent), but an image as their intermediate form. This could be what characterizes Jung’s dialectic, and where he meets Miki.

According to Jung’s (1961/1989) autobiography, during the period of confrontation with the unconscious he learned through the imaginary figure of Philemon that there are things in the psyche which are as real as are those in the outer world (p. 183; see also Jones and Hermans, chapter 1, this volume). In Psychological Types, Jung (1921), relying on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, speaks of esse in anima so as to render
superfluous the ontological argument that had been divided into *esse in intellectus* and *esse in res* (par. 45). He often puts the adverb ‘merely’ before the adjective ‘logical’; but, if we agree with Miki’s view on the intimate connection of logic with ontology and psychology, Jung comes much closer to Miki, whose last and unfinished work was *The Logic of Imagination* (MKZ 8).

**Type**

During the final phase of his work, from his release from a first detention (on political grounds) in 1932 until a second arrest and death in prison in 1945, Miki used less Marxist terms and focused more on anthropoplogy or humanism and the logic of imagination. However, his basic question, shared by Jung, remained the same: How is individuation possible in our age, in which what it means to be a human is no longer self-evident? He tried to find the answer in the concept of type.

While for Jung and his followers, ‘type’ tends to function as a classificatory system of psychological typology for clinical purposes, Miki’s understanding is more faithful to German humanism as represented by Goethe and Wilhelm von Humboldt; namely, as the unity of the universal and the particular. Whereas for Jung (1921), a type is ‘a habitual attitude’ to be compensated by the other, ‘an integral part of psychic economy’ (par. 6), for Miki it is to be created for opening a new stage of history, as achieved in great literary works that initiate new styles and genres. It is created, not by the intellect, but by imagination as a function mediating between understanding (dealing with the universal) and sensation (related to the particular), or better, between reason (intuiting the eternal) and understanding as discursive thinking. A type is also called character, so individuation is understood to be characterization as character formation (MKZ 5, p. 126).

The word Pathos, in conjunction with Logos, often appears in Miki’s writings during the final phase. One of its precursors in his earlier writings is ‘basic experience’ before being transformed into anthropology and ideology by Logos. He also calls it objectless consciousness, the consciousness of Nothingness, or the unconscious. While admitting the difference between depth psychology and Miki’s philosophy, we might get a new vision by paraphrasing the goal of psychoanalysis, ‘bringing the unconscious to consciousness’ into ‘bringing Pathos to Logos’.

Another precursor of Pathos is the material in Marxism as understood by Miki. In his view, just as the material is the principle of individuation, Pathos is the principle of characterization (MKZ 11, p. 189). In Miki’s
view, the human being is a dialectical unity of Pathos, as inward trans-
scendence, and Logos, as outward transcendence. Just as Jung’s (1958)
concept of the transcendent function does not mean going beyond the
psyche, but ‘the transition from one attitude to another... without loss
of the unconscious’ (par. 145), Miki does not mean that a man can stand
outside society. Rather, he wants to deepen the meaning of society by
speaking of ‘social body’. Body is both what we feel inside as inner man
(homo interior) and what comprises us from outside as outer man. Pathos
carried by body therefore has a social dimension, and criticizing the
Kantian rational ethics, Miki proposes humanistic ethics based on symp-
pathieia or sharing Pathos (MKZ 11, p. 192).

There are many other points where Miki could meet Jung. Patiently
elaborating the same theme and continuing to offer stimulating ideas,
Miki died prematurely. It may be worthwhile to ask what would have
been his response if he would have come to know Jung’s psychology.
The present essay is only a preparatory small step in this direction.

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The meaningful word is a microcosm of human consciousness.
(Vygotsky, 1934, p. 285)

In this chapter, I will attempt to reinterpret the constructive method of Jung’s psychology in comparison with Vygotsky’s theory of thought and speech. The point of the discussion is the transcendent function as one of the core concepts of Jung’s psychology. Then I shall discuss the semiotic activity of inner speech from the dialogical viewpoint. Finally, the deep theme of the dynamic relation between consciousness and unconsciousness will be explored.

The Russian psychologist L. S. Vygotsky (1896–1934) has been very influential in modern psychology, especially with regard to the social constructionist movement and the collaborative approach to educational and clinical practices (e.g., Wertsch, 1985, 1991). In the 1990s, a ‘Vygotsky Renaissance’ occurred in the Western world. Michael Cole (n.d.) cites philosopher Stephen Toulmin, who, in his review of Vygotsky’s book *Mind in Society*, has called him the ‘Mozart of Psychology’ and argued that he had provided the basic theories of modern psychology (p. 7). Vygotsky participated with Luria in the early phase of the Russian psychoanalysis movement in the 1920s (Etkind, 1994; Ovcharenko, 1999; Morioka, 2009). This is one of the significant influences in the relationship between Vygotsky’s theory and clinical psychoanalysis, especially with regard to his theory of inner speech (Tenzner, 1990).

Although Jung and Vygotsky never actually met, I will construct a heuristic dialogue between the two. Further, I will try to set out a new interpretation for Jung’s theories from the viewpoint of Vygotsky’s concept of social formation of mind.
Connections

Vygotsky (1934/1986) mentioned Jung in a footnote, though only apropos discussing Bleuler’s concept of autistic thinking – noting, ‘In this respect certain remarks made by Bleuler in his discussion with C. G. Jung seem to be of great importance’ (p. 377, n. 11), but not conveying Jung’s position. There is no evidence that Jung knew about Vygotsky. There was certainly no direct contact between the two men, but we could imagine a relationship between them.

An indirect connection is the Russian psychoanalyst Sabina Spielrein (1885–1942), who had been a remarkable patient of young doctor Jung in Burgholzli Hospital, and subsequently worked as a psychoanalyst in 1920s Russia (Spielrein, 1911/1995). A detailed account of her work is included in Carotenuto and Trombetta (1982), whose book produced a sensational impact upon its publication, and we can find a more thorough discussion in a Special Issue of the *Journal of Analytical Psychology* (Covington, 2001), dedicated to Spielrein. For Jung, the therapeutic relationship with Spielrein was a source of severe conflict but resulted in extremely beneficial results. Burghölzli Hospital records of Sabina Spielrein (published in Covington, 2001, pp. 15–42) indicate that Jung’s therapeutic method during that period gradually shifted from free association to sequence analysis of dreams (also see Hoffer, 2001).

Elkind’s (1997) controversial paper suggests that she might have provided a considerable amount of the inspiration behind many fundamental ideas in psychology, not only for Piaget (who was an analysand of Spielrein), but also for Vygotsky. This has caused considerable controversy. If this story has some validation, Jung and Vygotsky had indirectly shared in spirit.

Constructive method

Construction is one of Jung’s main methods, and is clearly contrastable with the method of reduction. It is a method for constructing the whole living image of a client’s subjective situation from fragments of dream content. As Jung (1958) states, ‘Constructive treatment of the unconscious, that is, the question of meaning and purpose, paves the way for the patient’s insight into that process which I call the transcendent function’ (par. 147). In his original constructive method, Jung stressed the importance of prospective understanding as opposed to a causal-reductive approach. He states that if an analyst does not understand the contents of fantasies, these should not be interpreted merely in a concrete-reductive sense but rather in a constructive one. Jung (1915)
clearly outlined this stance in his lecture ‘On psychological understanding’, in which he compared the causal-reductive method with the constructive method. With regard to temporal characteristics, the former indicates retrospective understanding and the latter prospective understanding.

Jung criticized the causal-reductive method that reduces the unknown to the known, and the complicated to the simple. For Jung (1915), ‘To understand the psyche causally is to understand only half of it’ (par. 398). This kind of understanding was designated retrospective understanding, and was attributed to the Freudian method. We are naturally inclined to explain causally, and to take something as explained when it is reduced analytically to its cause and general principle. Scientific explanation calls for a causal explanation. In this meaning, Freud’s method is strictly scientific, as Jung mentioned. But psychological understanding is a subjective process and calls for another stance of understanding and method. Jung proposed another kind of understanding, namely constructive and prospective understanding. Psyche is always in the process of becoming. This aspect of the psyche can be grasped synthetically or constructively. ‘The causal standpoint merely inquires how this psyche has become what it is.... The constructive standpoint asks how, out of this present psyche, a bridge can be built into its own future’ (Jung, 1915, par. 399).

Concrete human psychology: Politzer and Vygotsky

Jung used the terms ‘construction’ and ‘constructive approach’ in contrast to the causal-reductive approach. As he makes clear (e.g., Jung, 1915), his original idea was developed in the context revising Freud’s approach to psychoanalysis. The viewpoint of construction was also common among other psychologists in the same decade. The Hungarian psychologist Politzer (1903–42) presented critical psychology and psychoanalysis in French, trying to formulate human psychology from the viewpoint of drama. He radically influenced Vygotsky with regard to the idea of concrete human psychology, as expanded in the following.

According to Politzer (1928/2001), psychology should be concerned with the concrete human being as a unique manifestation of cultural and historical reality. We cannot construct the personal truth of a concrete human being through impersonal elements alone. Psychoanalysis originated in the exploration of personal meaning. The dream theories of Freud and Jung are concerned with the notion of the concrete human.
In ‘Concrete Human Psychology’, Vygotsky (1929/1989) presented a viewpoint based on theatre theory and the methodology of drama, influenced by Politzer, and considered the concept of construction. Vygotsky referred to Politzer in his note as follows, ‘psychology = drama... A drama truly is full of internal struggle which is impossible in organic systems: The dynamic of the personality is drama’ (p. 67). Vygotsky had a program for concrete human psychology as drama. Politzer analysed dreams as drama. This kind of analysis may be the main task of concrete human psychology. Drama is the action of a concrete person and draws on the life of that particular person. The meaning of action is not clarified by introspection but is made up of récit (narrative). Psychology is able to approach the individual life and experience of récit through the analysis of drama. In contrast to ordinary life, drama forms a sphere of individual meaning that can be called humanistic signification. Psychoanalysis deals with the sphere of personal meaning, and retains its récit. However, many concepts in psychoanalysis are not concrete living ones as Politzer claimed.

This view of drama is worth considering towards understanding individual meaning subjectively. Human beings are the subject of meaning acts, and are constructed and shaped through their narrative (Bruner, 1990). The human subject is generated in the act of telling, which connects event to event. It is a kind of retrospective act, but generates the person’s future.

Vygotsky stressed the act of construction, especially through the semiotic mediation process. The concept of semiotic mediation establishes connections across some of the most important areas of human social existence, and foregrounds the fundamental relationship between mental functions. Vygotsky tried to theorize the process by which human beings construct their own self. His developmental theory is a fundamental framework for grasping the human psyche as socio-genetic. The world in which we live in is humanized, full of material and symbolic objects (signs, knowledge systems) that are culturally constructed, historical in origin and social in content. Because all human actions, including acts of thought, involve the mediation of such objects (‘tools and signs’), they are social in essence. For Vygotsky, the social basis of mind involves all levels or organization of human affairs, societal and institutional as well as face-to-face (Hasan, 2005). Furthermore, individuals use the tools for mediation in their internal psychic world, which consists of internalized speech and social relationships. The main tool for thinking is an internally used sign; that is, inner speech. A sign can be used both externally and internally. A
sign connects human relationships. At the same time, it can connect self to one’s own self.

The following section takes a closer look at Jung and Vygotsky’s respective approaches to construction.

Formation of internal life

The transcendent function

I refer mainly to Jung’s (1958) essay, ‘The transcendent function’, originally written in 1916, which since its publication for the first time in 1957 has been influential, not only in the Jungian school but also in some other contemporary schools of psychotherapy. For example, the Eriksonian hypnotic therapist Gilligan (1997) referred to the transcendent function: ‘As we come back to relatedness, our experience of self as dialogue develops. If we remain faithful to the conversation, the transcendent function occurs: the opposites integrate into a united form’ (p. 64). The essay ‘The transcendent function’ was important for Jung in his recovery process from the crisis brought about by his separation from Freud. Jung focused on the theme of the collaboration of conscious and unconscious data in this paper and presented the constructive method for analysis (also see chapter 1, this volume).

According to Jung (1958), the tendencies of the conscious and unconscious are two factors that together make up the transcendent function. Jung posited the transcendent function as a dynamic union of unconscious and conscious content, and illustrated it by analogy to a conversation: ‘It is exactly as if a dialogue were taking place between two human beings’ (par. 186). Through such dialogue, when contradictory voices confront each other collaboratively, a ‘third’ emerges. The genesis of the third is in itself therapeutic. This point of view can be called constructive. For Jung, the cure and recovery of inner life is highly crucial for coping with psychic crisis. The constructive method is important not only for theoretical speculative investigations, but also for the concrete method of practice for coping with psychic crisis.

Jung suggested the practice of noting down on paper all one’s fantasies and similar associative experiences. Several forms of this can be used in the construction method. The first type is the basic and popular form of the active imagination of inner visual images. The second is to listen to inner words to identify audio-verbal types. Jung described such inner words as ‘perhaps mere fragments of apparently meaningless sentences to begin to carefully note down’ (Jung, 1958, par. 170). He recommended listening to the ‘other’ voice that is a sort of inner critic
or judge. Another tactic of the constructive method involves the use of plastic materials for the hand. Bodily movements are also useful for some people. Many materials are useful for the constructive method. Jung suggested that the method of drawing and writing would activate the person’s spontaneous fantasies. This method of active imagination brings enrichment and clarification of affect for the person, whereby the affect and its associated contents are brought nearer to consciousness.

**Internalization and semiotic mediation**

Jung developed a theory of the existence of an internal psychic plane. Such forms of inner life are seriously important in Jungian psychology, as compared with other psychologies. How can a human being form the intra-psychic space? Vygotsky presented one of the basic theories of the formation of the psyche.

Vygotsky’s (1978, 1934/1987) psychology is focused on the social formation of the personal psyche and consciousness. He explored the origins of consciousness, and examined the higher level of consciousness that is the basis of the historical and social development of behaviour, with particular attention to cognitive development in early childhood. His view of the formation of the psychic inner world is premised on there being a primary plane of social relations, the internalization of which forms intra-psychic functions. The relationships and dynamics constituting higher mental functions are originally experienced in concrete social relationships. In the process of internalization, the transition from the external to the internal is mediated by signs or language tools. The human psyche is constructed by this semiotic mediation, filtered through the process of internalization. The relationships between intra-psychic functions thus develop from actual interpersonal relations in the course of the transition into inwardness and internal reality.

How can we discuss this internalization process? It is not a simple spatial transition from the external to the internal. It includes the qualitative transformation of the internal psychic system and its structure. In other words, internalization can be said to be ingrowing. This process is inevitably mediated by signs.

Vygotsky (e.g., 1934/1987) adopted a basic view of how the internal psychic plane is formed. The function of signs that mediate between the internal and the external is important in this process. At first, signs are tools by which one can communicate with others, but later they become a tool by which one can communicate with oneself, and that becomes internal dialogue. Vygotsky says, ‘Inner speech is an internal plane of verbal thinking’ (p. 279).
Sense and meaning

In his later years, Jung developed his theory by focusing on the collective unconscious field. The function of signs and symbols is crucial in this transition. According to Jung’s paper, the transcendent function is not simply semiotically mediated activity. Referring to the ‘constructive treatment of the unconscious’, he writes,

The method is based...on evaluating the symbol (i.e., dream-image or fantasy) not semiotically, as a sign for elementary instinctual processes, but symbolically in the true sense, the word ‘symbol’ being taken to mean the best possible expression for a complex fact not yet clearly apprehended by consciousness. (Jung, 1958, par. 148)

In Jungian psychotherapy, clients may connect consciousness and unconsciousness through the experience of symbols.

Whereas Jung evaluated the function of the symbol, not the sign, Vygotsky emphasized semiotic activity. Here we can refer to the semantics of Vygotsky’s (1934/1987) language theory. He differentiates sense from meaning in human speech. Sense has characteristics like dynamism, fluidity and complex formations with several zones that vary in their stability. The sense of a word changes in different contexts. Thus, sense itself is undetermined without context, and can never be grasped totally. Meaning is one of the most stable, unified, and precise zones of sense.

If one cannot form an adequate representation of one’s personal sense, one may end up with suffering, complaints, or diseases. We can grasp utterances within the dynamics of sense and meaning in Vygotsky’s theory. From this dynamic viewpoint on the function of speech, sense may be dominant in the utterances of the analytic situation. Psychic reality seems to be full of personal sense. Personal sense can be understood through the narrative of a life story and the interpretation of analytic transference. However, we have to study not only the personal level of sense but also the collective level of sense, which Jung had taken as his psychological theme.

The idea of a symbol, as used by Jung throughout his works, could be understood as the optimum development of a sign in Vygotsky’s sense. A symbol potentially holds multiple senses. A symbol in the true sense is not clearly grasped by momentary consciousness. Its sense cannot be determined in just one interpretation. In other words, it potentially holds prospective expression. The basic question in practice, for the therapist, is not how to get rid of the momentary unease and difficulty,
but how future problems may be successfully countered. The client’s unease and difficulties include the momentary possibility of the client’s incomplete life theme.

The prospective understanding and the constructive method are called for in this instance. Jung (1915) said, ‘In so far as we regard the actual content of the psyche as a symbolic expression of what is to be, we have to apply a constructive interest to it’ (par. 405). In the practice of psychotherapy, the future is in its essence always new and unique. The present expression is bound to be incomplete in relation to the future. Yet the therapist is expecting new meanings in which insight and a therapeutic outcome can emerge gradually.

**Thought and speech**

**Two modes of thinking**

There are several cues in Vygotsky’s theory for explaining the transition from the personal to the collective world. This is especially noticeable in his theory of thought and speech. Vygotsky identified two modes of thought: One mode is complex and concrete; the other mode is scientific and conceptual. Jung too had explored two kinds of thinking (in a debate with Bleuler during 1911–13, to which Vygotsky alluded, as mentioned previously), but identifying one mode as dreaming or fantasy thinking, and the other as directed or logical thinking.

In the introductory chapter of *Symbols of Transformation* (originally published in 1912), Jung (1956) explains the two modes. Directed or logical thinking is reality thinking, which can be adapted with directed attention, and the train of thought itself works in verbal form. In this way, material emerges of which we think as language and verbal concepts. This mode of thinking is directed outwards for the purpose of communication. Scientific techniques fostered by this thinking have developed along with an emphasis on causal sequences. In contrast, the mode to which he refers variously as dreaming, fantasy or associative thinking consists of what William James had described as trains of images. This kind of thinking occurs effortlessly and spontaneously, guided by unconscious motives. Therefore, in this mode of thinking, the person is apt to be distanced from reality. Fantasy thinking sets free subjective tendencies. However, it also has the wisdom and intelligence of authentic meaning. It could be said that fantasy thinking is the most ancient mode of thinking, and that such thinking is a resource of creativity. This second mode is the form of thinking in dreams. In dreams, the most heterogeneous things are brought together, regardless
of actual relationships between them, and a world of impossibilities replaces the realistic.

According to Vygotsky (1934/1987), scientific thinking is carried out on the basis of concept formation as actualized in the development of higher mental functions. The other mode of thinking that Vygotsky considered – to which he referred as ‘thinking in complexes’ – is concrete thought, an archaic mode that connects things on the basis of their proximity or similarity. This is similar to Jung’s concept of associative thinking (which, in turn, is related to Jung’s theory of the complexes). Vygotsky explored the dialectical relations between concrete and scientific thought. However, unlike Jung, he regarded concrete thought negatively as primitive.

According to Jung (1956), the two kinds of thinking have a complementary relationship. If fantasy thinking makes contact with conceptual thought, the fantasy becomes creative. Directed conceptual thinking can be compensated through fantasy: ‘Through fantasy thinking, directed thinking is brought into contact with the oldest layers of the human mind, long buried beneath the threshold of consciousness’ (par. 39).

The simultaneous and the sequential

To Vygotsky (1934/1987), as he put it, ‘thinking and speech is the key to understanding the nature of human consciousness’ (p. 285). He formulated his view of the essential relationship between thought and speech from a temporal viewpoint. Thought and speech have different modes of temporal and logical existence, and contain dynamic relations that make the psyche creative. In the extract presented in the following, Vygotsky explains that the temporal feature of thought is simultaneous, and that of speech is successive (sequential). Unlike speech, thought is not made up of individual words. Vygotsky compared thought with speech, and explained the difference with the following example:

I may want to express the thought that I saw a barefoot boy in a blue shirt running down the street today. I, however, do not separately see the boy, the shirt, the fact that the shirt was blue, the fact that the boy ran, and the fact that the boy was without shoes. I see the scene all together in a unified act of thought. In speech, however, thought is partitioned into separate words. Thought is always something whole, something with a significantly greater extent and volume than the individual word. Over the course of several minutes, an orator frequently develops the same thought. This
thought is contained in his mind as a whole. It does not arise step by step through separate units in the way that his speech develops. That which is contained simultaneously in thought unfolds sequentially in speech. Thought can be compared to a hovering cloud that gushes a shower of words. (Vygotsky, 1934/1987, p. 281; italics added)

It is quite interesting here to draw a comparison with the following text. In the novel *Kusamakura* by Soseki (1906/1965), the protagonist is talking about an episode in his life. After he has had a pleasant encounter with someone, he makes the effort to ‘note down’ his experience, but he cannot get enough expression for the impressive scene:

Perhaps time was a contributory factor to the happiness that reached right down to the innermost depths of my soul. There was, however, no element in my present condition that had to follow the course of time and develop successively from one stage to another. My happiness was not due to the fact that one event arrived as another left, and was in turn followed by a third whose eventual departure heralded the birth of number four. It was derived from the atmosphere that pervaded my surroundings: an atmosphere of unvarying intensity that had remained with me there in that one place from the beginning. (Soseki, 1906/1965, p. 93; italics added)

Soseki compared the two modes of artistic representation of language and of painting. Emotional experience does not necessarily have to go along with linear thinking over the course of time.

How can we represent that which has remained with us in one place from the beginning? This has been a central theme in aesthetics and literature. Artistic expression, such as a painting or plastic art seems to be better than language for expressing nonlinear emotional states. These states have features such as graduation, ambivalence and contradiction simultaneously. They may involve representations of spatial arrangements, as a painting does. Language has the basic trait of linearity and successive logic at its essence. Condensed elements are necessarily included simultaneously in our emotional experiences. Consequently, symbolic representation is indispensable for analysis (in Jungian psychotherapy). Symbols can hold the perceptions of multiple senses simultaneously. However, it is necessary to be mediated by some materials in the analytic situation. In the constructive method for the transcendent
function, the successive verbal representation has to be once transformed to return to the simultaneous level. Where does it live? It is in inner speech.

The cosmology of inner speech

Audiatur et altera pars (‘hear the other side’)

In the last part of ‘The Transcendent Function’, Jung (1958) commented on ‘how little able people are to let the other man’s argument count’, stressing that ‘this capacity is a fundamental and indispensable condition for any human community’ (par. 187). Likewise, it is necessary to let the unconscious have its say. Jung recommended the simple practice, ‘to note down the “other” voice in writing and to answer its statement from the standpoint of the ego. It is exactly as if a dialogue were taking place between two human beings with equal rights’ (par. 186; italics added), stating that the ‘capacity for inner dialogue is a touchstone for outer objectivity’ (par. 187; italics added). Jung further presented the example of conversing in signs with deaf-and-dumb persons as an analogy for an inner dialogue in which the unconscious has its say only in visual products. ‘Faced with such products’, says Jung, ‘the ego must seize the initiative and ask, “How am I affected by this sign?”’ (par. 188). The ego’s response to this question is important material for analysis.

We can explore further discussion on the work of internal dialogue by drawing upon Vygotsky’s theory. Vygotsky (1934/1987) clarified the characteristics of inner speech: ‘Inner speech is an entirely unique, independent, and distinctive speech function that is completely different from external speech’ (p. 279). The characteristics of inner speech are: (1) the predicate is dominant (the subject and verb are connected in inner speech); (2) the syntactic and phonetic aspects of speech are reduced to a minimum; and (3) inner speech represents the predominance of sense over meaning and infusion of sense into a word. Vygotsky saw these features as forms of agglutination, or the collective extension of sense. A unit of utterance is thus not a word or phrase, but a sense.

The last sentence in Vygotsky’s (1934/1987) last book, Thought and Speech, is: ‘The word is a microcosm of consciousness, related to consciousness like a living cell is related to an organism, like an atom is related to the cosmos. The meaningful word is a microcosm of human consciousness’ (p. 285). Inner speech is made up of a mass of condensed senses, simultaneously. It is a microcosm.
Inner speech in clinical practice

According to Vygotsky, inner speech, which later is transformed into thought, is generated through the internalization of a process related to social relationships. Gradually, it develops original grammar and meaning. Inner speech represents thinking in a basic way. It is a dynamic, unstable, fluid phenomenon and prepares one for the next stable plane of verbal thinking. Further, it has to develop in the collective field. Vygotsky (1934/1987) wrote, ‘Only a historical theory of inner speech has the capacity to lead us to a correct understanding of this complex and extraordinary problem’ (p. 284). In this way, personal consciousness can be connected to collective consciousness.

Inner speech forms one’s thoughts, self-talk and reflective consciousness. The words are addressed to one’s internal self. The analytic situation can be understood as the verbalization of this inner speech and internal dialogue. The analyst has to remain in the position of mediator between inner speech and social language. The function of inner speech can be activated in the analytic situation as fantasy thinking.

We may introduce here the therapeutic application of Dialogical Self Theory (Hermans and Hermans-Konopka, 2010). From the viewpoint of Dialogical Self Theory, the self is conceived as a form of dynamism, or a process, which arises in conversation between people. The clinical practice of the dialogical self consists of talking about one’s self to others and silently talking to one’s self. This double conversation, both self-to-self and self-to-other, creates a dialogical space that expands both inner and outer dialogue while concentrating on self-narrative. Selves are structured and shaped in this space. One can experience various selves here. These selves begin a dialogue with each other, and thus they are created by a process of dialogical movements in an imaginal space (Hermans, 1996).

It is a fundamentally important to create a dialogical space in both internal and external ways. For example, the method of free association gives one of the clues useful for creating a therapeutic space for the development of inner speech. Verbal free association amplifies usage of words that is different from their ordinary use. Utterances in free association form a network of personal original meanings. This is a field of personal sense. Ohshima (1990) wrote about his experience of being in Lacanian analysis. In the context of free association, he said that his own speech had been transformed in the analytic situation, as if his words worked like Kigo in haiku poetry. That is to say, ‘The relationship of a word to a meaning is not a one to one correspondence. Rather a word is only a light that shines on the cloud form of meanings’ (p. 81).
Kigo in haiku expresses the sense of a season, and takes a role in forming the basic tone of the poem. It is an indispensable element of haiku. A word is just a part of specific grouping of meaning. Such a play of words can be a cloud formation of meaning. There is a correlation of flexible meanings in which insight and a therapeutic outcome can emerge for the client.

Therefore, it can be said that inner speech is full of images. In the psychotherapeutic relationship, the client’s emotional experiences are given some formulation in the connection of one image to another, and in the autonomous movement of images. Inner speech has a similar function to painting or play because the preverbal form is suitable for such simultaneous constellation traits. It is therefore therapeutically reasonable that the expressive method of painting and playing made of images is popular material in Jungian analysis. The simultaneous and the sequential are given correspondence by such materials.

**Conclusion: Emergence of the third**

The psychological theories of Jung and Vygotsky complement each other as theories of consciousness. Vygotsky, concerned with words, speech and verbal thinking, developed his thoughts about personal consciousness, whereas Jung surely deepened our understanding of the world of the collective unconscious. Jung stressed that one-sidedness is an unavoidable and necessary characteristic of directed-thinking processes. However, consciousness is continually widened through confrontations with previously unconscious content. It puts its media of expression at the disposal of unconscious content.

The directions of the two thinkers were diametrically opposite, but their focal points were both related to a shift from the level of the individual to the collective. Both paid attention to the interplay of sense and symbol in this context. In Vygotsky’s case, the shift is from complex-concrete thought to scientific-conceptual thought. However, these two modes of thought can always create a dynamic interaction that would generate a new outcome. In Jung’s case, the confrontation with the unconscious must be total and integral. Jung generally held that the appearance of the archetypal image is not independent from personal consciousness. Jung (1958) suggests that the confrontation of the two positions generates a tension charged with energy and creates a living third thing (par. 189), and stresses that this is ‘the second and more important stage of the procedure, the bringing together of opposites for the production of a third: the transcendent function’ (par. 181).
The third will be constructed in collaboration of the conscious and the unconscious. At the outset, it is uncertain what type of the third will be constructed. The third cannot be completed in the therapeutic situation. This is certainly the dialogical space in which the third is to be co-constructed and is itself to be a basic form of psychotherapy. In this space, the self of one moment talks to the self of the next moment. Continuous conversation takes place from self-to-self. Jung and Vygotsky have both taken a stand for the possibility of realization in which new epistemology may replace the narrow view of causal determinism.

References

—— (1915) ‘On psychological understanding’ (CW 3).
—— (1956) Symbols of Transformation (CW 5).
—— (1958) ‘The transcendent function’ (CW 8).
The Cosmology of Inner Speech: Jung and Vygotsky


To complement the tale of the frogs who met on a mountain, told in the Introduction, here’s another tale about cooperation and foolishness on a summit. Like Kyoto and Osaka, Khelm is an actual place (a small town southeast of Warsaw, Poland), but in Eastern European Jewish folklore it has become a legendary town of fools. Once they decided to remove a large boulder from a nearby hilltop. The entire population gathered there. They started laboriously to drag down the heavy stone. When they were halfway down, a stranger passed by and burst out laughing: ‘Why are you dragging it? Give it a shove, and it will roll downhill on its own’. Seeing the sense in his advice, they laboriously dragged the boulder all the way up to the hilltop, gave it a shove, and it rolled all the way down on its own (Weinreich, 1988). Now that this book is ‘halfway down’ to the printer’s press, perhaps our publisher has functioned like the wise stranger when insisting on including an editor’s conclusion to nudge the book on its course. In any case, I shan’t drag it all the way back by summarizing the chapters. Instead, I’d like to pick a particular thread out of the emergent themes, and will briefly amplify one or two of its aspects.

Although we had given the contributors the general (and vague) theme of thresholds, something somewhat different, more focused, has emerged as a common thread. It could be summarized as follows.

What is the goal of the self? Cherian and Ahammed (chapter 10) state this question directly. Jung had answered it with a concept of individuation (as cited in chapters 1, 4, 7, 8 and 11). Dialogical Self Theory (DST) is less specific, but pragmatically assumes that personal coherence is good for mental well-being. A common aim is self-realization; but what is being realized? Furthermore, a peculiarity of the English language permits construing it as something being cognized (self-understanding).
or something made real (self-actualization). DST encourages self-understanding as the goal of therapy and of personal development generally, though this doesn't mean ‘cold’ cognition of oneself. It is a realization (actualization) of dialogical potentialities within the self – which both originates in, and validates, the self as extended into the social environment. In contrast, Jung posited individuation as occurring in opposition to individuals’ social adaptation: ‘Individuation is a natural necessity inasmuch as its prevention by a levelling down to collective standards is injurious to the vital activity of the individual’ (1921, par. 758). Muramoto (chapter 11) identifies the philosophical difference between present-day individualism and individuation as conceptualized by Jung and his intellectual predecessors. It may be added here that in non-Jungian psychology, individuation implies a child’s or young person’s achievement of self-understanding as an autonomous agent within a social group. In Jungian psychology, individuation refers to a lifelong developmental process whereby the psyche realizes (makes real) its natural striving towards equilibrium – a goal towards which self-understanding is a means. ‘The aim of individuation is nothing less than to divest the self of the false wrappings of the persona,’ stated Jung, immediately adding, ‘and of the suggestive power of primordial images’ (i.e., archetypes; 1921, par. 269). Please note the rationalistic undertones of his caveat (later I link it to what Max Weber had called the ‘disenchantment of the world’ in modernity). Generally, do the DST and Jungian standpoints contradict or complement each other? This remains a matter for debate.

How could people achieve self-realization? Means include not only techniques at therapists’ disposal (as sampled in chapters 2, 3, 8 and 9) and expressive activities such as creative writing (chapters 5 and 7), but also the array of worldviews that are available to the person – psychologies as well as other philosophical and traditional systems of thought (such as considered in chapters 10, 11 and 12) – and which are available in the globalized world as well as in one’s localized milieu. Furthermore, Puchalska-Wasyl (chapter 6) indirectly reminds us that the conditions which make self-realization possible include not only what is given in the environment but also personality traits, such as the person’s style of internal dialogicality. This, in turn, suggests individual differences in receptivity to given paths to self-realization.

The ensuing query is potentially more contentious than the truism that different ‘types’ of people are more at home with different practices or worldviews. Provocatively, Rowan (chapter 9) suggests that all previous concepts of elements within the self (including his own earlier
notion of subpersonalities) ought to be replaced with the nomenclature of I-positions. Yet, if Yama (chapter 2) or Nakamura (chapter 8) were to make that conversion in their clinical practice, would their clients have benefitted as they did from these therapists’ Jung-oriented approach? It seems to me (but I might be wrong) that telling someone like Nakamura’s client that her sandplay works express a different I-position from her habitual one would have missed the point of the technique, and thus overlook the significance of her creations for bringing her unconscious conflict to consciousness. Interestingly, Rowan himself does not apply the Personal Positions Repertory (PPR), the technique devised by Hermans, but advocates a technique (‘chairwork’) that has more in common with the rationale and historical roots of Jungian ‘active imagination’ than with the PPR. Others, yourself, may agree or disagree. If this book is to achieve its purpose, it should encourage the further articulation and debating of such issues.

It is a Jungian maxim that the psyche tells its own story in dreams, myths and fairy tales. The Jewish tale opening this Epilogue could be taken as an allegory for the self. There’s a representation of ego-consciousness (the collective consciousness of the town’s community) and its ‘other’, the stranger who confronts them with their own foolishness. Despite heeding his advice, they are compelled to apply it from their previous starting point. That’s how knowledge necessarily evolves. Both individually and collectively, we build upon what we already know or believe. Phenomena of human life are usually studied in terms of the conceptual categories, preoccupations and practical goals defining particular disciplinary fields. Those reflect intellectual histories.

Psychology has always been concerned with the empirical person – the living human being, even when that entity was reduced to abstract patterns of behaviour or a statistical construction of the ‘average’ person. From the late-nineteenth century designation of psychology to the natural sciences to its post-modern reclamation for the social sciences a century later, and in all its schools of thoughts, the discipline has expressed what Max Weber described as disenchantment:

The fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by the ‘disenchantment of the world.’ Precisely the ultimate and most sublime values have retreated from public life either into the transcendental realm of mystic life or into the brotherliness of direct and personal human relations. (Weber, 1919/1946, p. 155)
As psychotherapy-oriented, Jungian and dialogical-self perspectives are particularly attuned to how living people may meaningfully experience their existence, especially in distressing circumstances. In the clinical vignettes in chapters 2, 3, 8 and 9, we glimpse flesh-and-blood people (curiously, all women) and the application of techniques for the discovery of meaning. Yet, disenchantment is at play in the very ‘project’ of modern psychotherapy, even in its humanistic schools. It is implied in Assagioli’s assertion that ‘scientifically speaking’ transpersonal is ‘a better word’ than spiritual; ‘it is more precise and... avoids confusion with many things which are now called spiritual’ (cited by Rowan, this volume, p. 159).

Saler (2006) regards Weber’s ‘disenchantment’ theme as continuous with a critique of the ‘Enlightenment emphasis on reason and science at the expense of other ways of apprehending and being in the world’, a critique that had begun with late-eighteenth century Romanticism: ‘Enchantment was associated not only with transcendent meaning and purpose, but also with wonder and surprise; these were the qualities that modernity, with its emphasis on inviolable natural laws, threatened to extirpate’ (p. 695). Although Jungian psychology is attuned to pre-modern enchantment, Jung understood his own vocational calling as that of a physician of the soul. In a Foreword to a book by the Dominican priest fr. Victor White, Jung contended that for the ‘empiricist’ (such as himself) ‘whose orientation is that of the natural science’, the concept of myth simply means ‘a statement about processes in the unconscious’, and this equally applies to religious beliefs (1952, par. 451). While theologians ‘are busy wrangling’ about religious truths, says Jung, the doctor ‘cannot wait for age-long schisms to be settled, but... must discover just where the sick person feels a healing, living quality which can make him whole’ (par. 452). The scientific task, then, is objectively to map those archaic layers within the psyche, where pre-modern enchantment affects people’s individuation; but the scientist or doctor ought not to succumb to wonder and surprise.

Psychologists too are busy wrangling about truths. DST came into being in the wake of the most profound schism in social psychology, when the post-modernists were campaigning to reclaim psychology as a social science. In the 1980s and 1990s, there was a sense of new discoveries of truths about the social genesis of mind and the self – ideas that have been around since the 1920s and earlier in sociology (e.g., the work of G. H. Mead) and also expounded by Vygotsky, as seen in chapter 12. Our culture seems irrevocably ‘disenchanted’ – or, rather, enchanted with the notion of disenchantment (Saler, 2006). Typically
we believe ourselves to be estranged from pre-modern enchantment. We may ‘retreat’ into the brotherliness of personal human relations (to paraphrase Weber), finding meaning for our existence in *communitas* – in intimacy, togetherness and intensity of community spirit. Such strategy could be read into the post-modern relocation of selfhood to the ‘society of mind’, epitomized in DST, and is indeed explicit in the title of Hermans et al.’s (1992) seminal paper, ‘The dialogical self: Beyond individualism and rationalism’. Whereas in the Jungian view the psyche tells its story in dreams, and so forth, according to the ‘new’ psychologies it is the collective stories that write themselves into our psyche.

Roland (2001) contended that DST must take into account also the spiritual self, not only because people on a spiritual path acquire personal positions reflecting their orientations ‘toward God...or various gods and goddesses, as well as relationships with various spiritual teachers’, but also because ‘the realization of the spiritual self transcends the dialogical self’; in this context Roland cites ‘the Hindu Vedantic dictum that Atman (the individual soul) equals Brahman (the Godhead), and the Buddhist experience of emptiness, a powerful ground of being’ (p. 319). In chapter 10, Cherian and Ahammed have provided precisely this triangulation of Hindu, Buddhist and dialogical-self perspectives. They note Hermans and Hermans-Konopka’s interpretation of transcendent states of awareness in terms of the ‘depositioning of the I’. The deposed ‘I’ ‘becomes a form of awareness, with silence at its core...at a distance, even separate from, any content’ (such as the concerns, memories and anticipations characterizing specific I-positions) (Hermans and Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 170). Yet, for better or worse, this translates phenomena of mystical experience and self-transcendence into the jargon of an objective discourse perpetuating a disenchantment of the world – not unlike Jung’s self-positioning as an ‘empiricist’ who seeks objectively to describe the workings of the unconscious by analyzing pre-modern enchantment.

A dual dialectic thus runs throughout this book’s chapters. First, there is the interrelation of Jungian and DST standpoints. As we tried to convey in chapter 1, rather than positioning one as true and therefore the other as false, the two perspectives could be viewed as dialectically interrelated, like as the black-and-white contrast of the yin and yang symbol. In their original meanings, the words yang and yin were applied, respectively, to ‘the light and dark sides of a mountain or a river’, and then extrapolated to ‘the two alternating states of being’ (Wilhelm, 1950, p. lvi). Which side of the mountain is shady alternates; likewise, which standpoint is most appropriate may depend upon what
exactly we are seeking to explain or achieve. Furthermore, what visibly constitutes the one is latent in the other, and vice versa. A second dialectic cuts across both. It is the interplay between the force and motive of the scientific (and quasi-scientific) quest for explanation, on the one side, and the quest for understanding, for meaning, wonder and surprise, on the other. The two forces need not be mutually exclusive. I’ve read the contributions in this book, and the sources upon which I built my own contribution, with wonder and surprise.

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